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ABSTRACT 
Th i s th es i s i s d irec t e d at th e use o f the Ma ryland mi I iti a dur i ng 
th e Whi s key Rebe l I i o n o f 1794 in wes t e rn Penn sy l vani a . Th e ca l I tor 
mil i t i a , ma de by Pres ident Washingto n, was no t we ll r ece i ved in t he 
sta t e . The q uota was no t ti li ed , and attempt s t o ti II it t o uched o ff 
ri ots in wes t e rn Ma ryl and. Th ese r i o t s made ano th er ca l I necessa ry , 
thi s time ma de by Ma ry l and Gove rno r Thomas S i m Lee . On l y Ma ry l and troops 
wer e r eq ues t e d, a nd -/-he quo t a was t i I l ed compl et e l y and qu i c k l y . Th e 
diffe r e nce in the mi I iti a ' s r esponse i s an impo rtant pa r t o f thi s 
th es i s beca use it a ff o rd s a n exami na t i o n o f the conditi o n o f f ede r a l 
sta t e r e l ati ons in t he f i r s t fe w yea r s a fte r the r atifi ca ti o n o f th e 
Co ns t i tuti on. 
Ev ide nce d i scussed in thi s th es i s prov i des ma t e ri a l from whi c h 
seve r a l conc l us i ons may be drawn . Th e examinat i o n of the f e de r a l a nd 
s t a t e mi I iti a l aws s hows that the f ede r a l gove rnment was uncerta i n o f 
its pos i t i on in attemp t ing t o di c t at e l eg i s l at i o n t o th e sta t es . Th e 
s t at e gove rnment was unce rta in t oo , abo ut how muc h it s ho u l d be d i c t at ed 
t o . Th e r es ult o f these unce rta i nti es was a se t o f wea k mi I i t i a l aws 
th at l e f t th e r es pons ibi I i ty o f obed i e nce t o them up t o th e in di v i du a l 
mi I iti a men . Indee d, th e two gove rnments wer e not o nly un sure o f the ir 
pos it i o ns with each o th e r , but a l so uns ure o f the ir pos iti o n w i th th e 
c iti zens . Th ey wer e no t ce rta i n t hat i -he c iti zens wo u l d s uppo rt mi I iti a 
l aws , o r mi I iti a ca l I s . 
Th e diffe r nee i t he mi I i-t-i a ' s r e~ pons t o th two ca l Is a l so 
shows th a t t he mi I iti a was no t ce rta in o f its r es pons i b i I i ty t o answ r a 
r eq u i s i t i on . Troo ps from Ma ry l and wer e mu c h mo r e conce rn ed wi th 
prot ec t i ng the ir o wn s t a t e , and poss ibl y homes and t ami I i es , th an th ey 
wer e with pro t ect ing th e f ede ra l gover nment ' s whi
s key exc ise . As id e 
from the naturDI des ire fo r se l f preservati on, th
e diffe rence indi cates 
that th e mi I iti a a nd i t s lea de r s were wi I I ing to 
in co nve ni e nce th em-
se lves f o r th e sta t e , but not for th e Uni on. 
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In Sep t emb e r, 1794, a part of the Ma ry land militi a was ca ll e d up 
by Pres ident Was hin gt on t o he lp s uppress th e Whi s key Rebe l I ion i n 
wes t e rn Pe nn s y lvan i a . Th e s tate gove rnment, r epresente d by Gove rnor 
Thomas S im Lee , r es ponde d by iss uing o rde r s t o ra ise e nough mi I it ia t o 
f i I I th e Pres ide nt ' s requ es t. Th e s t a t e co u Id not s upply mo re th an ha If 
o f the 2350 me n r eq ues t e d. Th e f a i lur e t o fi 11 the r equi s iti on was 
ca used by a noti cea b le lack of pos it ive act ion by th e s t a t e gove rnment 
to he lp r a ise th e quot a , by a re luc t a nce of the mi I i t ia t o vo l untee r , 
and by th e f ac t that th e mi liti a was not fu ll y o rgan i ze d by th e t ime th e 
ca I I was ma de . 
Th e s t at e gove rnment ' s attempts t o r a i se th e q uot a by means o f 
a draft i n wes t e rn Ma ry la nd t o uched off ri ot s in th e a r ea a lmost imme-
di a t e ly. Th e ri ot s were a t f i r s t i so late d and deeme d not mu ch of a 
threa t t o th e gove rnme nt, but as th ey in c r eased a nd s prea d, th ey c rea t e d 
a c ri s i s . Th e s t a t e , in mid- Septemb e r , 1794 , r es ponde d t o thi s c ri s is 
wi th its own ca l I for mi I iti a t o be used on ly in th e wes t e rn pa rts o f 
Mary land. Un i i ke the f e de ra l requ is iti on, th e s t at e ca l I was comp le t e ly 
f i I I ed. 
Thi s th es is examin es th e two mi I i t i a ca I Is and exp I o res th e r ea sons 
why th e fir s t was less s uccess fu l th a n th e second. Th e impo rtant iss ue 
in these e ffo rts t o ra i se th e troops is that th e s t a t e mi I iti a was 
~i I I i ng t o and d id s uppo rt the s t at e gove rnme nt wh e n ca l l ed upon, but 
not so wi 11 ing t o s upport the fede ra l gove rnme nt. Thi s iss ue mu s t be 
q ua / if i e d t o i nc lude th e s uppo rt that th e s t at e gove rnment ga ve to th e 
f e de ra l ca l I. Mo re prec ise ly, th e s t at e gove rnme nt was prepa r ed t o as k 
more of th e mi I i ti a to s uppo rt s t at e laws th an to s uppo rt f e de ra I laws . 
Th e sta t e ' s use o f the mi I i t i a t o s uppo rt its own l aws r a i ses 
ano th er important po i nt : th e mil i ti a , r ega rd l ess of the Const ituti ona l 
prov i s i ons f o r divi s i on of r espons i bi I ity , wa s a s tate o r gan i za ti o n , at 
l eas t in Mary l and . Th e s tate contro l l ed t he mi I iti a as mu c h as any 
government was capa b l e of contra il i ng a n untra i ned mass of c i t i ze n 
so l di e r s . 
The i ss ue o f state ve r s us f e de r a l contro l i s centra l t o thi s 
thes i s beca use i t was a major prob l em in the process that c r eated 
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t h e mi I i t i a , and affec t e d th e gove rno r ' s e fforts t o r a i se th e nat i o na l 
quota . Th e p r obl em o f contro l s urfaced dur i ng debates on th e ratifi cat i on 
o f the Const itut i on , and continued through th e Congress i ona l deba t es on 
c nat i onal mi I it i a l aw in t he ea r l y 1790s . It ap pea r ed in Ma ry l and i n 
t h e e fforts of t he l eg i s lature to enact a s t a t e mi I i t i a l aw. Th a t th e 
i ss ue s ti 11 pers i s t ed in 1794 wa s s hown by th e Mary l and gove rnment ' s 
r eact i on to Pr es i dent Wa sh i ng t on ' s ca l I. Th e gove rnor did no t l end tu / I 
s uppo r t to th e e ffort t o ra i se troops f o r f e de r a l se rvi ce . Nowh e r e 
was thi s l ack o f s upport mo r e ev i dent than in hi s dec i s i on no t t o 
purs ue a dra ft of cava l ry . He dec ided th a t a dr aft mi ght ndan ge r th e 
furth e r ex i stence of th e sta t e ' s cava l ry, and rathe r th an l ose th e 
horse so l di e r s , he chose t o l eave 1-he Pres ide nti a l r eq ui s iti on unf i I l ed . 
Another important i ss ue bro ught o ut i n thi s study i s the extent 
to wh i ch th e state control l ed th e mi I iti a . The state gove rnment was 
unsure of the s upport that th e mi li t i a mi g ht g i v to a ca ll to r fede r a l 
duty , and so wa s ca ut i o us in pr ess ing tor se rvi ce . Th e ca ut i on was of 
no ava i I in parts o f weste rn Maryl and , how ve r , because some o f the 
mi I iti a ri o t ed an d ca used the sta-t-e t o ca l I tor its own quota of troops . 
When th e sta t e made a sepa r at e ca l I , t he same type of ca uti on was not a 
maj o r cons ide r ati on, primar il y beca use th e s tate was pe rce ive d t o be 
in dange r. 
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A fina l s i gnifi cant i ss ue i s the I gis l ati on that c r ea t e d i -he 
s tate mi I i t i a . Cong r ess i onal and s t at e l eg i s l at ive act i on i s directly 
connected t o bo th o f the i ss ues menti o ne d above : th e question o f s t a t e 
versus f e de r a I control o f th e mi I iti a , and th e ext ent o f s upport th e 
s t a t e co u l d expect from the militia. Congress initi at ed mi I iti a l eg i s-
l at i on th at gave th e s t at e a g r ea t dea l of a utho rity over a l I aspects 
o f th e mi I iti a . The f ede r a l gove rnmen t a l so did no t impose f i nes f o r 
non- comp I i a nce , whi c h indi ca t e d th at th e nat i ona l government was no t 
s ure i t had the power or poss ibl y th e ri ght t o f in e a s tate for f a ilure 
t o o bey a nati o na l l aw . Mary l and th en enacted a mi I iti a l aw th a t wa s 
no t demanding on th e men who wo uld form th e mi I iti a . The s tate act 
imp osed I i ght fines for non - comp I i ance , whi c h in part i ndi ca t ed tha t th e 
s t a t e wa s a l so not s ure that th e c i t i zen s would s upport a mo r e demand ing 
mi I i ti a sys t em. 
Th e p r ob l ems o f ena c ting and enfo r c ing th e mi I i ti a l aws , f e de r a l 
and s t a t e , f o rm an introduct i o n to th e d i scuss i o n of the two ca l I s f o r 
th e Ma ry l and mi I iti a . The national mi I iti a l aw o f 1792 was th e ca t a l y s t 
for th e Mary l and act of 1793 . Thi s nat i ona l act , t oge th er with th e 
e vents l ead ing t o its f o rmulati on and passage , f o rms th e background 
o f th e s t ate I aw . Th e r efo r e , th e nati ona I I aw w i I I b di sc ussed in th e 
introd uc t i on rath e r than in a separate chapte r . 
Th e na ti o nal expe ri e nce o f the l at e 1780s f o rms a bac kg r o un d f o r 
di scuss i on o f f e de r a l attempts to enac i - militi a l eg i s l at i on . D l ega t es 
to th e Const ituti o na l Conventi on we r e we l I aware o f t he p r obl ems o f 
rai s i ng a mi I iti a f o r ce unde r th e Art i c l es of Confede r ation . One o f 
4 
th e f ac t o r s l ea din g t o th e downf a l I o f these a rti c l es had been a 
re vo I t I ea d by Da ni e I Shays in I 786- I 787 . 
1 
I t ha d pose d a ve ry r ea I 
t hreat t o th e gov e rnm ent, and even manage d to di s rupt seve r a l d i s tr i c t 
2 courts . Th e Massachusetts s t at e mi I i t i a was used t o t urn bac k th e 
r eb I s , wh o wer e p r epa ri ng t o attack th e a r sena l a t Sp ring f i e l d , Massa-
c huse t ts . An extra f o r ce o f mi I it i a was ru she d t o th e a r se na l wh en i t 
appea r e d th at t h e 1340 men o f t he r eg u l a r a rmy , r a i sed by Cong r ess i n 
Oct obe r , 1786 , 3 co u l d no t arr i ve i n t i me . 
4 
The r ebe l s we r e e ff ec t i ve l y 
di spe r se d by t he mi I i t i a in Februa r y o f the nex t yea r , and the t ens i on 
i n Massachusetts was r e li e ved , a t l east t empo r a r i l y . 
Th e r e wer e no pr o v i s i ons in th e Ar t i c l es o f Confede r at i on t o r 
t he enfo r cement o f l aws , and so the s t a t es wer e l eft t o f end fo r th em-
se l ves . Th e stat es , as i n Massachusetts , use d th e i r mi I i t i as as 
l aw enfo r cement agenc i es , and as f o r ces t o s uppress r i o t s o r r ebe l I i on . 
Th e Ar t i c l es d i d s t ate t hat " e ve ry s t at e s ha l I a l ways keep up a we ! l- r e-
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g u l ated and d i sc i p l i ned mi li t i a ." That s t ateme nt was t he f u ll extent 
o f Con f e de r at i on contro l o f the s t at e mi I i t i as , howeve r , excep t th at 
Cong r ess was t o se l c t a l I o ff i ce r s o f t he r ank o f Co lo ne l and abo ve . 
No sys t em t o r ca l I i ng o ut th e mi I i t i a i n case o f eme r genc y was o ut ! i ned , 
no r was i t c l ea r wh o wo u l d command the seve r a l mi I i ti as s ho u l d th ey eve r 
be ca l l ed o ut t ogethe r . St a t e contro l o f t he mi I iti a was a l mos t 
s upreme . 
Eve n t ho ugh th e de l ega t es we r e awa r e o f the de f i c i enc i s o f t he 
Art i c l es w i th r ega rd t o c ommon defense , a so l ut i on a t th e Convent i on wa 
not eas il y ach i eve d . Ma ny de l egates f ea r e d th e i mp I i ed powe r s o f a 
stand ing a rmy . Thi s f ea r had o ri g i ns in t he Br i t i s h d i s ! i ke o f 
. 6 standing a rm i es . Th er e wer e a l so mo r e i mmed i a t e ob j ect i on s . Ve r y 
l itt l e th r eat o f attack from a fo r i gn powe r ex i sted i n 1787 . Th e 
nat i ona l treas ury conta in ed l itt l e money , and the ex pense incurred by 
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a new stand i ng a rmy wo u l d be cons i derab l e . Th e conf eder ated govern ment 
cou l d not a ff o rd t o pay th e bi I I s o f the l as t a rmy , muc h l ess any new 
o ne . 
Th e arg uments for a s tand i ng army wer e many , howeve r , even i f no t 
a lw ays exp r essed at the Conventi on , A l exa nd e r Hamilton , J ohn Jay and 
James Mad i son in c lu ded se ve r a l p r o- army essays i n Th e Fe de ra li s t . On e of 
these , writ t en by Hamilton , r emi nded th e r ea de r of th e troubl es ca use d 
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by Shays r ebe l I i on . He a rgued : 
Cases a r e I i ke l y to occur und e r our gove r nments , 
as we I I as unde r th ose o f othe r nat i ons , whi c h 
wi 11 sometimes r ende r a mi I itary for ce in t i me 
o f peace essent i a l to th e security o f th e 
soc i e ty ; and th at i t i s therefore imp r ope r , 
in th i s r es pect , t o contro l the l eg i s l at ive 
discret i on . I t [Shays Rebe l I i on] a l so t eaches 
us , in its app Ii ca ti on i -o th e Un i t ed States , how 
I i t t l e th e r i ghts o f a f eeb l e government a r e l ~ke l y 
to be r espect e d , even by i t s own cons t i tuents . 
Th e arguments f o r and aga ins t a sta nding a rmy wer e debat ed at g r eat 
l ength by th e de l egates t o th e Con vention . The r eso l uti on o f these 
debat es was a compromi se . Th ere was t o be a s t an d i ng a rmy , i t s s i ze 
I imited in peace time by Co ngress . Furthe r , " no app r op ri at i on o f 
money t o that use [ma i ntenance o f the army J s ha I I be f o r a lo nge r t e rm 
th en two year 
10 Th e nee d for an army was ac know l edged , and at th e 
same t ime contro l s wer e set , f o r f ea r o f t h i s necessa ry ev i I. 
Th e mi I i t i a f are d bette r t han th e a rmy i n th e Const itut i on , 
beca use th e majority o f th e de l egates app r oved o f som type o f mi I ii- i a . 
No l ess a man than Geo rge Wa sh i ngton cons id r ed it th e " Great Bu l wa r k 
11 
o f ou r L i bedi es in indepe nde nce ." De l ega t es co u l d not agree on th e 
pr ope r p l ace for contro l o f the militi a , even th o ugh th ey ag r ee d th at 
a mi I itia should ex i st . A pro-n at i ona l contro l de l ega t e , Charl es 
P inkney of South Ca r o l ina arg ued that a "uni formit y in Di sc i p li ne and 
Reg u l at i o n sho uld pervade th e wh o l e [mi I iti a] , o th e rwi se , whe n th e 
6 
mi I it i a o f the seve r a l s t ates a r e r eq uired t o act togeth e r , it wi 11 be 
diffi cult t o combine th e ir ope rat i on s from th e confus i on a diffe r ence 
of Di sc i p Ii ne an d Mi Ii tary Habit w i I I produce ." He adde d th at th e 
milit i a was "i n f ac t th e on l y adeq uat e force th e Union possesses , if 
any s hould be r equired t o coe r ce a r efractory o r neg I i gent Memb er, and 
ca rry o ut the Ordin ances an d Dec r ees o f Cong r ess into executi o n .
111 2 
De l egates o ppose d t o a s trong nat i ona l government f ea r ed just 
s uc h a coe r c i on if a nat i o na I mi Ii -t-i a we r e in s tituted. Luth e r Martin , 
the adamant sta t es rights de l ega t e from Mary l and, wrot e th a t " th e 
mi I i t i a , the on I y de f ense whi ch the Sta t es ca n have for th e security o f 
their r i ghts aga in s t a rbitra ry enc roachments of th e gener a l government ,
11 13 
wo uld be taken from th e s t at es by a un i form nati o na l mi I iti a . Obj ect i on 
to the nati ona l p l an was a part o f th e l arger confli ct betw een p r oponents 
of a centra l gove rnment and th ose of a confede rati on. 
Jus t as th e Const ituti o na l prov i s i ons for a s tanding army we r e a 
compromi se , so t oo , wer e the mi I i t i a c l auses . Th e Pres ident was t o 
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command th e militi a when it was i n f ede r a l se rvi ce . Or gan i zat i on 
and di sc i p line o f the militi a wer e to be the r espons ibili t i es of Congress , 
according to section e i ght o f Arti c l e I. Th e s t at es wer e to gove rn 
th e mi I i t i a at a l I o th e r t imes . Se l ect i o n and commi ss i oning o f o ffi ce r s 
and the tra ining o f th e troops wer e l eft to the s t ates in thi s Arti c l e . 
I t a l so i nc l uded th e s tipul ati o n that Congress was " t o provide fo r 
ca I Ii ng forth the mi Ii ti a to execute th e I aws of the Uni on, s upp r ess 
in s urrecti on a nd re pe l 
15 
invas ions ." 
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Not a f ew of th e men at th e Co nve nti on be ! ieved that th e mi I i tia 
might s ome day be use d t o s uppress an in s urrec t ion f omented by th e 
r eg ul a r a rmy. Ap pa rent ly a l t e ring hi s v iews t o f it the occas ion, 
Ham i I t on wrote : 
A we I I regu I at ed body of mi I it i a . . . w i I I not 
onl y lessen t he ca ll for milita ry es t abli s hments ; 
but i f c irc ums tan ces s houl d a t any time ob i ige 
the gove rnment to fo rm an a rmy o f a ny magn i tude , 
th at army can neve r be fo rm i d ib le t o th e I ib e rti es 
o f th e peop le , whil e t he re is a la r ge bo dy of 
c i t izens I ittl e i f any infe ri o r to them in 
di sc ip lin e and th e use o f a rms , wh o s t and rea dy 
t o de f end the ir own ri ghts an d those o f the ir 
f e ll ow c iti zens . 16 
An a dde d prot ecti on aga in s t th e des poti s m o f a s t anding a rmy was 
lat e r a dde d by th e Second Amendment t o th e Cons t ituti on. Thi s amendment 
ass ume d "A we l I-reg u la t e d mi I iti a be in g necessa ry fo r th e sec urity o f 
a free s t at e , th e r ight o f the peop le t o kee p and bea r a rms s ha ll 
not be infringe d." Th eo re ti ca ll y , the n, an a rme d in s urrecti on wo uld 
have t o conte nd with an a rme d, loya l c i ti zenry. As a las t r eso rt, if 
ne ithe r t he a rmy no r th e mi I iti a could be co unted upon, th e c iti zens 
cou l d de fe nd th e ir own rights . Thi s th eo ry became prac t i ce dur in g 
th e de f e nse o f th e a r se na l a t Fre de ri ck, Ma ryl and, du rin g th e Whi skey 
Re be l I ion, wh e n an a rmed c i t i zen group was pr epa re d t o he lp de f e nd t he 
c ity aga ins t i-he threa t o f an attack by re be l I ious mi I i t i a from 
wes t e rn Ma ry land . 
Th e Cons tituti o n inc lu de d gene ra l pro v is ions o f a nat iona l 
mi I ita ry es t ab I i s hme nt i n th e a rmy, a s t ate s ys t m in i-he mi I iti a t o 
s uppl eme nt and gu a rd aga ins t the a rmy, and an a rme d popu lace t o check 
bo th th e a rmy and th e mi I i ti a . Befo re th e s tates co uld beg in leg i s l ti on 
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deal ing wi th the i r mili t ia respons ib ili t ies , Congress had to set 
g uide lines fo r them . Th ese gu ide l in es we r e in the nati ona l mili tia law 
of 179 2 . 
Henry Knox , Sec reta ry of War und e r the new gove rnment , s ubm i tted 
a p lan to Congress for the formation of th e mi I it i a in 1790 . It was 
based on \lja s hington ' s "Sentiments of a Peace Estab li s hm nt .
111 7 Knox 
o ut\ in ed the need for a n e li te co rp s of mi I iti a made up o f the ab lest 
young men from ages e ighteen to tw enty . Th ese men, strong and most 
apt to accept the marti a l s pir i t of the mi I itia , wou ld be the ma in 
I ine of de f ense in th e mi I i t i a . They wer e to be tra i ned th i rty day s 
each year , and a rme d an d fed at pub I ic expe nse . Th e ma i n corps and 
t he reserve , made up of th e mi dd le- aged and o lde r men respect ive ly , 
were to be s ubj ect ed t o less r i goro us tra in in g . It wa s es t i mate d 
that the three co rp s wou l d const itute 325,000 men , and cost $346 , 340 i n 
18 
t he f i r s t two yea r s . 
Th e cost of imp leme nt ing th i s proposal was a major obj e t ion , 
but th e i ntrodu ction that Knox ad de d t o h i s out l in e seeme d t o c rea t e 
the s tronges t protest . Remi nd i ng Congress of th e r e ent re vo lut ion 
in France , 1789 , Knox commente d th a t " th e st r ength of the Gove rnme nt 
... wi 11 de pend upon a due adj ustment of i t s seve ra l pa r t s ," t he 
19 
most i mporta nt of wh ich wa s " its s ys t e m of defense. " 
Th e comb i nati on of these r emarks , th e gene ra l ton e of th e entire 
introduct ion, and the i dea of an e li t e corp s , was t oo mu ch for some o f 
the Congressmen . It a ll so unded l ike the mil it i a wou ld be unde r 
s tr i ct nat iona l contro l. Rev is ion o f th e proposa l, i nc lu d ing th e 
sect ion s th a t might have a l lowe d a un i fo rm mi I iti a , began a lmos t 
i mmed iate ly . Th e res u lting Mi I i t ia Act of 179 2 , wa s vague and gen r a ll y 
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r e pud ia t ed th e co ncept o f a nati ona l mi I iti a . Th e act ca l led fo r a l I 
ab le- bodi e d whitl e ma le c i t i zens betwee n th e ages o f e ighteen a nd fo rty- f i ve 
t o e nli s t in th e mi I iti a . A long I is t o f those exempt ed from se rvi ce , in-
c luding a lmos t a l I f ede ra l empl oyees , excep t th e Pr es id ent , o f co urse , 
fo l lowe d. Wh e n ca l led t o ac tu a l f ede ra l se rvi ce , th e mi I iti ame n co uld 
not be fo rced t o se rve mo r e than three mo nth s in a ny o ne yea r. 
Suppo rting th e r ight f o r men t o bear a rms guaranteed in th e 
Seco nd Ame ndm ent, Co ngress r equired a l I me n enro l led in th e mi I iti a t o 
prov id e th e ir own a rms a nd acco utrement s . Th e Mi I i t ia Act s pec ifi ed 
th e amo unt o f extra ammuniti on t o be s uppli ed by eac h man, a nd even th e 
spa r e f l in t s-- t wo . By pe rmitting eac h man to prov id e hi s own wea po n, 
Co ngress sa ved mo ney, but t he hodg e- podge o f weapo ns a l lowed , both 
in ca lebr e and qua I i ty , would c r eat e havoc for s upp ly on a ny ext e nd ed 
duty . 
Th e ac t s ugges t ed a mi I itia o r ga n i za ti o n cons i s t in g o f units 
ra ng ing from compani es t o d ivi s ions with exac t r equ i r ements fo r th e 
r a nk o f o ff i ce rs f o r eac h, and th e numb e r on non- commi ss io ned offi ce r s 
a nd pr iva t es pe r compa ny. Batta I io ns we re t o have f i ve comp an ies , co n-
s is ting o f s ixty-four privates pe r company . One o f these compa ni es was 
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t o be e ithe r gr e nad ie rs , light i nf a ntry or rifl emen . Each div is ion 
was t o have o ne compa ny of a rti I le ry and o ne troo p o f ho rses . Thi s 
o rga ni za ti on was s pec i f ic but th e Act a l lowed a loo pho le for th e s t a t es . 
The s t ates need compl y with the p lan only "i f the s ame be co nve ni e nt ." 
With the c la use , a uni fo rm f ede ra I mi I i t ia co uld not be o rga n i ze d 
un I ess th e va ri o us s t a t es f o un d th e guid e I i nes "conven ie nt . 
11 2 1 
Th e re we r e pa rts o f the Act that might have pe rmitte d a true 
unif o rm mi I iti a . Th e ru les o f wa r and di sc iplin e es t ab li s he d by 
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Cong r ess in 1779 , f o r t he army wer e t o be use d by th e new mi I i ti a . Each 
s t at e was to have an Ad j utant Ge ne r a l, t o se rve as I i a i son be tw een th e 
go ve rn o r and the Sec r et a r y o f War . Pay f o r th e troops was t o be on 
th e same sca l e f o r eac h r ank as th a t o f th e r egul a r a rmy , and any men 
wo un ded whi l e in actua l f e de r a l se rvi ce wer e t o r ece i ve med i ca l a id 
c t pub / i c expense . Th e f ami I i es of those k i li ed in ac t i on w r e t o be 
pens i oned . 
Th i s Ac t pe rmitt d th e s t a t es grea t f l ex ibility. Th e r e we r e no 
pena l t i es f o r non- comp / i ance w i th eve n th e mo r e spec i f i c secti ons . 
Indee d, th e s t a t es wer e no t to comp l y un less th ey f ound comp/ i ance 
conven i ent . Th e s t a t es co u l d, and did , exempt from se rvi ce men o th e r 
th an t hose li s t ed in th e f ede r a l l aw. Mos t important l y , the r e was no 
ment i o n o f how o r wh en th e mi I iti a wa s t o be use d . Th e Mi I i t i a Act 
o f 1792 , wo u l d ha ve li tt l e e ff ect, unl ess th e s t at es chose t o comp l y 
with i t. 
Cong r ess so ught i mmed i at e l y t o r ec t i fy th e l ac k o f a method f o r 
ca l I i ng o ut th e mi I i t i a . S i x days be f o r e th e Mi I iti a Ac t became l aw, 
a n " Ac t t o prov i de f o r ca lli ng -f o rth the mi I iti a t o execute th e l aws 
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o f t he Uni on , s uppress in s urrect i on , and r epe l i nvas i on" was passe d . 
Thi s ac t pe rm i tted th e Pres ident t o util i ze th e mili t i a from s urrounding 
s t ates t o r epe l i nvas i ons in any one s t at e o r s t a t es . Once ca l l ed , th e 
mi I i t i a co u Id r ece ive direc t o rde r s from th e Pres ident , w i th out t he neces-
s ity o f go i ng throug h th e offi ces o f the r espective gove rno r s . 
Guide lines f o r us ing th e militi a t o s uppress in surrecti on we r e 
mo r e I imiting . Be f o r e th e mi I i ti a co u l d be ca l l ed out , a fe de r a l 
j ud ge had t o advi se th e Pres ident th a t a l I ju d i c i a l metho ds o f supp r ess i on 
ha d been use d and had f a il e d . Even th01 , th e c hi ef execut i ve was to 
i ss ue a forma l command t o the ins urgents to di spe r se , and g ive th em 
suf fi c i ent t ime to do so . On l y if, o r when, the in surgents r ef used 
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to obey th e Pres identi a l command , cou l d th e mi I i t i a be ca l l ed . Un i i ke 
the Mi I iti a Act , thi s Act provided pena l J-ies for any person , e ithe r 
c ivili an o r mi l ita ry , wh o d i d not comply with th e o rd e r s o f th e Pres i dent . 
The Ca I Ii ng Fo rth Act co mpensa t ed for some , but no t a I I, of the 
weaknesses of the Mi l itia Act . As th e vari o us s tates passed the ir 
own mi I itia l aws , th e de f i c i enc i es o f th fede r a l mi I iti a l aw beca me 
mo r e pronounced . Th e l eg i s l atures of the fiftee n s tates v i ewed th e ir 
r o l es in con f o rming to th e nat i ona l l aw i n ve ry diffe r ent way s . 
As t he nat i o na l mi I iti a act o f 179 2 was passed , a s ubt l e r eve r sa l 
of autho rity was taking p l ace . Cong ress c ho se to turn mu ch o f i ts 
respons i bility o ve r t o the mil i ti a , and a ll owed th e sta t es a great dea l 
of l atitude in forming th e c iti ze n arm i es . Th ey cou l d accept o r r ejec t 
as muc h o f th e Congress i o nal act as th ey wanted. Th e 1792 mi I iti a 
I aw eroded some Const i tuti ona I author ity f ram Congress , r a th e r than 
e nh ance d th e autho rity of the na t i onal government with a strong 
nati o na l mi I i t i a . 
Perhaps because Congress apr,uarnd unw i 11 i ng o r i nca pab I e of s i r ength-
o n i niJ lhrJ mi Ii l cJry os tab l i shmenr of· th o nat i o na l govc rnmc, ,1t , somo 
po li t i ca l l ea de r s , s uch as A l exa nde r Hami I t on and Henry Knox , began 
th e ir own attempts t o ext end th e contro l of the Unite d St ates . 
Hami !ton firm l y be li eved i n strong centra l government , and frequent l y 
exp r essed h i s v i ews on ju st how suc h a sys t em co uld be c r ea t ed . He 
stated that mi Ii tary s trength was a necessa ry foundation for an effec-
tive f ede r a l gove rnment , o r any government , for th at matte r. Gove rnment 
co uld never be " sa i d t o be es t abli shed until some s i gna l d i s p l ay has 
f . I. t . " 23 man i f ested its power o m1 , ary coe r c i on . Th e firs t oppo rtunity 
that Hami !ton and h i s fol l owe r s had to exert mi I i tary coe r c i on over a 
c ivi I i an pop ul ati on was dur i ng the Whi skey Rebe l I i on . 
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Th e Whiskey Rebe l I i on wa s i ndee d an i ns urrec t i on . Th e Const i tut i on 
permitted onl y the mi I iti a t o be used t o s uppress in s urrection s , and 
so the mi I iti a was used as th e too l o f mi I i tary coer c i on . The r ebe l s 
i n wes t e rn Pennsy l vani a had d i s rupte d gove rnmen t , threat ened t he 
I ives o f c ivi I i ans and governmen t emp lo ye es , and eve n ga i -he r ed a 
f o r ce as l a r ge as 5000 men to op pose th e exec ut i on o f the wh i skey 
exc i se l aw. Th e i nc idents of reb e l I i on posed a threa t t o th e ex i s t ence 
of th e f ede ral gove rnment. Th e po li t i ca l l ea de r s , s uch as Washi ngton , 
Ham i !ton , and Knox , cou l d no t l et c i t i zens di s rupt f ede r a l l aws , 
espec i a ll y i n th e mann e r use d by th e whi skey r ebe l s . Th e Con sti tut i on, 
af t e r a I I, guarantee d a p I ace f o r d i ssent at th e po I I s , and open 
rebe l I i on co u l d no t be condo ned. C l ea rly , th e time had come for th e 
gove rnme nt t o use mil i tary coe r c i on t o protect and asse r t itse l f. 
Th e on l y l ega l means o f accomp li s h i ng thi s protect i on wa s t hro ugh th e 
use of t he mi Ii t i a , thus it was ca 11 ed to s uppo r t th e governm nt and 
s up p r ess th e i ns urrect i on . F de r Gli s t l ea de r s , aga in inc lu d i ng 
Ham i I t on and Knox , impressed upon Pr es i dent Washin gton th e need for 
a large numb e r o f mili t i a to q ue l I th e r ebe l li on and to d i sp l ay t o 
skept i cs t hat th United State s was pow erfu I. 
Mary l and ' s r eacti on t o th e nationa l ca l I was impo rtant beca use 
of th e f e de r a l i s t attempt to s how the s trength o f the centra l government . 
Ma ryl and d i sp l aye d an in d i ff e r ence to th e urg ncy of the c II, and 
t he s t a t e mi li ti a turned o ut i n l ess than ha l f th e numb e r r equ s t ed . 
The r eac t i on by bo th t he s tate gove rnment and th e mi I i t i a indicated th at 
th e f ede r a l government was no t as strong as Hami ! ton and h i s f o l l owe r 
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mi ght have ho ped. Reasons for th e f a ilure to r es pond wer e many, b
ut 
one o f th e mos t imp ortant was th e l eg i s l ati on th at c r eated th e mi I 
iti 
Th e Ma ry l and l aw r e fl ec t e d th e indec i s i on o f t he nationa l l egi s l atu
re , 
es pec i a lly on jus t how far th e c i ti zens could be pushed befo r e th ey
 
o pen l y opposed duti es , f i nes , o r pena l ti es that might be part o f a 
mi Ii ti a duty . Congress se t a dea d I i ne f o r th e s tates t o enact t he
i r 
own militi a l aws , but Mary l and d id no t mee t th e dead li ne because o
f 
in dec i s i on i n th e s-i-ate l eg i s l atu re . Thu s the mi I i t i a was not fu ll
y 
o rgani ze d be f o r e th e n at i ona l r equ i s ition wa s made . Th e s t a t e l eg
i s l a-
ture r e f l ec t e d th e nati ona l atmos phe r e ; th e s tate rights advocates
 
wer e conce rned abo ut a l l owing th e f ede r a l go ve rnment too mu c h powe
r, 
and so th e nationa l law l eft muc h to th e s tates . Each s t at e de v i se
d 
a d i ff e r ent mili t i a l aw becau se th e s tates d i ffe r ed on i deas o f th e
 
cons truc t i o n and poss i b l e use o f th e mi I iti a . Th e Mary l and l eg i s l a
ture 
could no t ag r ee on a n i nte rp r etati on o f th e nat i on a l l aw, and so th
e 
s t a t e mi I iti a act was a hybr i d of extreme s t a t es r i ghts concep t s , a
nd 
a pa rrot in g o f th e nat i ona l l aw. 
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CHAPTER I 
Th e Mary l and l eg i s l ature began co ns ide r ati on o f a sta t e mi I i t i a 
l aw i n i ts r~ ovembe r , 179 2, meet i ng . Th e s t ate r epresent at i ves f aced 
a diff i c u l t task in trying to wr i te an e ff ect i ve l aw that wo u l d l ay 
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the foundation for a wo rkab I e mi Ii ti a s y s t em. Many factors ca used 
prob l ems i n the c r ea t i on an d e nactmen t o f the l aw: t he deba t e on s t ate 
versus f e der a l cor.trc l of the mi I i t i a ; the amo unt o f c i t i ze n s uppo rt 
that a mi I i t i a l aw wo u l d r ece i ve i n Mary l and ; th e ex i s t ence of i ndepe ndent 
mi I iti a compan i es throu gho ut the s t ate ; t he patronage that wo u l d go w i th 
the se l ec t i on o f off i ce r s ; and the cost o f a rm i ng and ma i nta i ni ng a 
c i t i zen army . Op i ni on o n the poss i b l e us o f the mi li t i a between th e 
two ho uses of t he l eg i s l ature d i ffered and ca used de l ay i n pass i ng the 
act . Even the na t i o na l l aw, wh i ch s houl d have prov i ded guide li nes to 
th e state , was o f I i t tl e use . 
Th e i ss ue of state versus f ede ra l cont r o l of the mi I i ti a was 
pr obab, l y the most i mp ortant factor in th e c r ea t i on of the s tate l aw . 
Di sag r eement cente r e d o n thE ex t ent to wh i ch th e nat i ona l l aw s ho u l d be 
fo ll owed , even tho ugh the nat i o na l l aw d i d not prov i de suff i c i ent 
gu i de li nes . The s t ate Sena t e proposed to use li tt l e of the nat i o nal l aw 
except those c l auses th at a l l owed the s t ate a gr at dea l of freedom i n 
exempting c i t i zens from duty and those organ i z i ng the troops . The 
ho use s up ported nat i o na l gu i de I i nes s uc h as they were , and opposed th e 
idea o f exempt i ng a l arge port i o n of the c i t i zens . This controversy 
was due in part t o th e newn ess of the nat i ona l gove r nment , and the 
ex i stence of un ce r ta i nty on how muc h the state sho u l d a l l o w the federa l 
gove rnm ent t o i nfluence sta t e l eg i s l at i on . 
The uncerta i nty of c i t i zen support fo r a mili tia l aw was a l so a 
cons ide r at i o n f o r the state l eg i s l ature . A mi I i t i a l aw needed th e 
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s uppo rt o f a la r ge secti on of the popu lat ion t o be e ff ec t ive , a nd th e 
Ma ry la nd leg i s la ture was not s ure of the s uppo rt s uch a law wo u ld 
rece ive . Th e s t a t e rep r esentat i ves expe r i e nced diff ic u lt y in sett i ng a 
sys t em of tin es t o be use d as an induceme nt to obey the mi I iti a law. 
Beca use the leg i s lat ure was not s ure how mu ch o f an indu cement was neces-
sary , o r ra the r how mu c h was too mu ch t o r the c i t i ze ns t o bea r , a sys t em 
o f f ines was des ign ed th at prcve d t o be i ne ff ect i ve . Thi s s ys t em 
pr oved t o be t oo sma l I an i nduceme nt t o ca use a gr eat dea l of s upport 
t or t he law. 
Th e ex is t e nce o f i nde pe nd e nt mi I iti a corr.pan ies furth e r comp I i-
ca t ed th e e fforts o f the leg i s lature t o enact a mi I i ti a law. Th ese 
comp ani es wer e not necessa r il y i n comp I iance with th e nat io na l l aw ; 
ma ny drew th e i r memb e rs from la rg e geographic a reas . Th e s t at e 
leg is la tur e d i d not wr i t e these mi I i t i a compan ies out o f th e law, but 
r a t her chose t o wr it e a ro und th em. Th e i ndepe nde nt comp a n ies wer e 
a l lowe d to continue , but they were fo r ced t o comp ly with th e majo rity 
o f the prov is i ons o f th e s tate law, th e not ab le except ions be i ng that 
th ey wer e a ll owed t o keep off i ce rs th ey had prev io us ly lect e d, a nd they 
we r pe rm i tte d t o ma inta i n me n from o uts i de wh a t wo u ld have bee n the ir 
I oca I mi I it i a areas . Th ese except i ons app Ii ed on I y t o th e i nd pend ent 
compa n ies , those th a t wer e pr ivate ly forme d be f o r e th e s t at e mi I i t ia 
ac t of 179 3 . 
Th e prob lems o f se lecting a nd comm iss ion ing off ice rs we r e ones 
th at th e leg i s la ture e vaded rathe r th an f aced . Th i s process con t a in d 
gr ea t pot entia l t o r patronage . Patronage mea nt powe r nd i nf l u nee 
t o the pe rson o r gr o up that had it , a nd th e leg i s lature wa s ca uti o us i n 
g i v in g s uc h a too l t o a ny one . Howeve r , th e prob l ems of a dm i n i s trat io n 
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a nd o rgani za tion wer e s uch that th e se lect ion·ofoffi ce rs wa s postponed , 
and left to the governor . Th e governor therefo r e had a great base for 
pat r onage , a l though Thoma s S im Lee , Mary land governor in 1793 , 
appa r e ntly d i d not use the oppo rtun ity to further hi s po li tica l ca r ee r . 
At leas t he did not se rve in a major po li tica l off i ce afte r h i s term as 
governor ended . 
Economi c cons ide ra t ions a lso influ ence d th e s tate leg is lature in 
c r ea ting a mi I iti a l aw . Th e nationa l law prov id ed th at the mi I i t ia 
was to a rm itse l f and thu s p laced an economi c burden d i r ect ly o n th e 
c ii· i ze ns rather than indirectly by hav ing th e government s upp ly th e 
mi I i t ia wit h a rms . Th e s tate leg isla ture was fa ced with the dec is ion 
t o inc l ude prov is ions fo r the mi I it ia ' s armament a lso , and eve ntua ll y 
chc;se t o r eq uire th e troops to arm themse lves . Th e s t ate d i d not have 
eno ugh pub I ic arms to s upp ly the ent i r e mi I i t ia , nor d id it have 
e no ugh money to purchase mo re wea pon s had they been r ea d il y ava il ab le . 
Di ffer in g ideas i n the leg is lat ure abo ut th e possib le use o f the 
mi I i t ia added to the de lay in the fina l passage of this act. Th e 
Se na t e , i n pr opos i ng mass exempt i ons seeme d to s upport th e i dea that 
the mi I i t ia wou ld be used pr imar il y as a de fe nse aga i nsl·o ui·s ide invas ion . 
However , the Se nate d id acknowl edge that the mi I iti a might be needed 
for o th er uses , but emphasized that a s mal I force co u ld accomp li s h these 
othe r nee ds . Th e Ho use opposed th e Senate on the exempti ons , an 
indi ca t io n that th e Hou se might have wanted to ma i nta i n mili t ia to be 
used for s uppress in g in s urrec t ions as we l I as repe l I i ng in vas ions . 
The s tate leg is lat ure bega n work on a mi I itia law wi th in expe ri ence 
a nd in decision . There was no state mi I it ia o rgani zat ion i n 1792 from 
whi ch t o r eb ui Id beca use th e last state milit ia law had exp i r ed in th e 
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late 1780s . Th e leg i s latu re was fo r ced t o beg i n anew a co u ld not 
eve n se t a n o r ga n i za ti on of t he troo ps in th e law beca use i t ha d nor a l 
est imate of t he num be r o f men t o be o rga ni zed. Th e f i na l o rga n i za ti on 
was le f t to t he gove r ro r , who was t o d iv ide th e troops into appropri a t e 
gro ups befo re a date s pec ifi ed i n th e law. 
Th e M6 ry land leg is lature was at a di sa dva ntage i n attempt i ng t o 
enact a mi I i ti a law i n 1792 . A mi I i t ia law was a ve ry imp ortant p iece 
o f leg is lat ion; i t co u ld a ff ec t t he li ves of v irtua ll y a ll c it i zens i n 
t he state , a nd wo u ld gr ea t ly ef f ect th e I ives of a ma j o r i t y o f men 
li g ib le t o vo t e , an important po li ti ca l po i nt fo r men wh o we r e e lec t d 
to off ice . Th e leg is lature had t o make a dec i s io n wh ic h a ff ec t e d 
th ese c i t izens , and ha d t o make the dec is ion with a ve ry f ew gu i de / i nes . 
Th e re was no mi I it ia t o re bui Id, th e f ew comp ani es that ex i s t e d we re mo re 
of a prob lem than a he lp. Th e re wer e t oo fe w wea pons and t oo I itt le 
money t o buy wea po ns a nd so the mi I i t ia was fo rced t o purc hase th e ir own . 
Th e mos t i mp o rta nt as pect s , howe ve r , wer e the un ce rta int ies o f fe de r a l 
i nf l uence a nd the acceptance o f the c it izens , and e ve n t he pr oj ec t ed 
use of th e mi I it i a . Wi t h th ese iss ues fac ing the Ma ry la nd leg is la ture , 
th e re s ho u ld be I i tt le wonde r tha t th e mi I iti a law they c r ea t e d was 
ine ff ec t i ve . 
As passe d i n Nove mb e r , 1793 , th e Ma ry la nd mi l it ia was i ne ff ect ive . 
It was in eff ective beca use i t d id no t prov ide a ny r ea l i ndu ceme nt t o 
obey th e prov is ions o f t he law. Th e re we r e ve ry I ight f ines f or 
non- att e nd ance of mu s t r , f a il ure t o prov ide e i the r a s ub s t itute o r t o 
se rve i n pe rso n, a nd fa i lure t o ma inta in pro pe r a rms . Th e p na lt ies 
th a t wer e inc lud d in the law we r e mi n ima l a nd ce rta i n ly not s trong 
e no ugh t o i ndu ce me n to obey ra the r t han face the pe na l ti es . It d i d 
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not prov i de a n o rgan i za ti on for th e mi I i t ia , but it le ft that ta s k to 
the governor and his adv isor s . It a lso evaded the problems o f s up p ly 
a nd ad mi ni s trai- ion for th e c iti zen army . Shou ld t he mi I i t ia ac tu a ll y be 
ca ll ed , i t prov ide d for ind i v iduc l s upp ly o f r eg ime nts , a sys t em wh ich 
wo u l d dup li ca t e purchas i ng , necess i t a t e more account ing , and poss ib ly 
cos t more beca use prov is ions co u ld not be purchased i n bu lk . Most o f 
the a dm i ni s tra ti o n fo r th e mi I i t ia wa s to be ha nd led by the governor , 
who might have I i tt le expe ri ence i n mi I i ta ry affa i rs . Anoth e r exa mp le 
o f th e law' s i nef f ect iveness wa s the lack of any sys t em for mob i I i z ing 
th e troups that t he act attempted to create . Th e Mary land law may 
be cons i dered ine ff ect ive beca use i t d i d not prov i de a r ea l method t o 
induce m n t o se rve , nor did i t prov ide deta i Is for wh at t o do with 
th e men o nce th ey were e nro I I ed . The act passed the r es pons i b i I i ty 
of obed ie nce onto th e consc ie nce o f th i nd iv idua l mi I itia men , and 
tn e t ask o f o rgan i za t ion and adm i ni s trat ion to t he gove rnor . It se t 
goals a nd expectat ions , but prov i de d no means t o ach ieve th em. 
A fu l I exa mi nat ion of t he 1793 mi I i t i a law i t se l f wi I I s ho~ 
i n more de ta i I that t he act was i ne ff ect ive , and wi I I s how how the 
leg is lature ma naged t o dea l with the prob l ems men t ion d ea r li e r . S me 
prob lems wer e faced and ove r come , s uch as t he met hod fo r enro l I ing men 
as spec i fi ed in th e nat iona l law. Other prob lems , I ike o rgan i za t ion 
a nd a dm i n ist rat ion , wer e pa~se d on to t he governor ; s t i I I o th e rs w r e 
passed t o -t-h e mi I i t ia i t se l f , as was th e r es pon s ib i I i ty o f prov id i ng 
a rms . Th e leg is la t ur e fa ced o th e r prob lems and co uld no t overcome them , 
o r e ve n pass th em on : th e f ine sys t em was one s uc h s tumb li ng b lock . 
Th e f i r s t sec t io n of the s t at e law s imp ly choed mu ch of the fede ra l 
o ne . The f i r s t un ique sect ions dea lt with th e meth od th e s t ate wo u l d 
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use t o enro l I a l I tree wh i t e ma l es from e i ghteen t o forty- f i ve years 
of age . 
Quake r s , Me non i t es , Tunkers and o ther consc i ent i o us objectors 
wer e exempted f rom pra c t i ce and mu ste ring , but wer e I iabl e t o r se rv i ce 
wh en th e mi I it i a wa s ca l l ed tor actua l se rvice . Thu s wh e n ca I l ed t o 
act i ve duty , these obj ect o r s wer e ex pect ed t o perform mi I i t i a duty 
eq ua l ly wi th th ose me n who had atte nded th e var i ous mus t e r s during the 
year and wh o had s upposed l y l ea rn ed the man ua l of arms , c ha i n o f 
command and some o f th e other trcpp i ngs of mi I i tary I i f e . I n add i t i on , 
th e consc i en t i o us objectors wer e to pay an anm·a l t i ne o f two do ll ars 
for the privil ege of fo ll owing th e ir be l i ef s . I n a se parate sec t i o n, 
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a l I mini ste r s of the Gospe l wer e exempted from mu st e ri ng . 
Th e governor was t o appo i nt men whose r es pon s i b i I i ty i t wo u I d be 
to make I i sTs o f the c i t i zens e li g i b l e tor serv i ce . Th ese men we r e 
to be pa i d per 100 names I i s t ed, except i n a r eas of s pa r se pop u l at i o n, 
s uch as A l l egany co unty , or heavy popu lat i on , s uc h as Ba l t imore town. 
Fines wer e prov i de d tor tho se who d i d not s ubm i t th e i r names tor t he 
mi li t i a l i s t s as wer e tin es tor f a l s i f i ca t i on o f li s ts by th e , 
comp i I e r ~ . Th e I i ab i Ii ty to r e i t he r offense wa s t en do I I ars tor 
each occurrence . Natura l Jy , th ese t i nes app li ed on l y t o t hose men 
who wer e ca ught . It probab l y wo u l d have bE)en easy to evad s ubmi tt i ng 
t o th e I i st s at l east i n some of t he wes t e rn areas o f the state . Th , 
f i ne of t en do ll a r s per offense wo ul d probab l y have se rved mo r e as a 
dete rre nt tor t he comp il e r , wh o wo ul d have lost pay ment t o r en li s t i ng 
a l most 400 me n t o r just one t a i lu r e to i nc l ude a name . 
Th e l aw a l so showed both i·h e l ax i ty of th e s t at e toward possib l e 
mi I i ti a effect i veness , and the s tate ' s l ack of know l edge o f the numb r 
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o f me n e l ig ib1 e for mi I i tia duty. Th e I is t s o f those e li g ib
l e wer e to 
be r e turne d to the Gove rno r by Apri I 20 , 1794 , und e r pe na lty
 of a 
for t y do ll a r fin e for neg lec t to turn in th e I i sts . From th ese
 I i s t s 
th e g:::>Ve rno r was to appo int office rs to command and o rgani ze
 th e mi I i t i a . 
Afte r th e Apri I date , company command e rs we r e r es pon s i b le fo
r en li s ting 
men who came of ag a nd wh o I ived with i n the company bound a r
i es . Thi s 
prov is io n did place th e respor.sib l I ity ot e n li s tment wh e re 
i t woul d 
be most e ff ective--on th e men in the loca l d i s tr icts who ha d
 a better 
c hance of know in g the ages and wh e r ea bouts of me n in th e i r o
wn di s tri ct s 
than s ome pe rson at lars for the ent ire co urty . 
Actual o rga ni za t ion i nto a l I s i zed units wa s t o take p lace b
y 
June 20 , 1794 . By that t ime , the gove rnor wa s to have appo
i nte d a l I 
o ff i ce rs , from Major Gene rc l down to e ns ign . Ultimate ly , th
is wo uld 
invo lve appo i ntment of approx imate ly 1700 of fi ce rs ,
3 
but th e leg is lature 
d i d not know th i s at th e time the act was passed. Given th
e sys t em 
of communi cation i n th e laTe e ighTee nth century , the gove rno
r ' s tas k 
wou Id be tremendous , and v i rtu a I I y i mp oss i b I e to accomp I i s h.
 Fu rth E r , 
as var ious o tfi ce rs were appo in t e d , some compani es r e fu sed 
to se rve 
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unde r off i ce rs they ha d no t e lected . More than once di s pu
tes s urf ace d 
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e ve r the geographi c divi s ions for comp ani es and eve n r eg imen
ts . Eve n 
if these i ss ues had not a ri sen, howeve r , the gove rno r had a 
grea t dea l 
t o accomp I i s h in jus t two month s . He had to or gan i ze a mi I 
it i a that 
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app roached 44 , 000 en li s t e d men , p lu s the 1700 office rs . 
Adm itte d ly , th e law wa s qu i t e s pec if i c in ass i gn ing respons
i b i I iti es 
to ce rtain o f th e mi I i t ia-- the off ice rs . Th ese men, upon r e
ce ipt o f 
their comm iss ions , hc,d to s wea r o r aff irm th at they "wo uld b
e true and 
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f a ithful t o the s tate o f Mary land ." Th e re was no s imil ar :
-eq uireme nt 
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t o s uppo rt th e Unite d St a t es . Th e off i ce rs wer e a lso t o provide th e ir 
own a rms and acco utrement s , as were the e n / is t ed me n. Fie ld grade of fi ce r s , 
Ma j o r and a bove , wer e t o s upply the s t a t e and reg imenta l co lo rs , a nd 
mu s i ca l ins trume nts fo r the ir res pective commands . Thi s secti on wa s 
a lso bo rrowe d from th e fe de ral law, and wo uld put a finan c i a l s tra in 
on these o ffi ce rs ove r and above that fo r provid in g the ir own a rms , 
unifo rms , e t c . No reaso n f or thi s requ i reme nt has been found , but 
poss i b le e xp lanat ions might be that th e s t a t e did not want th e expe nse , 
o r th e s t at e tho ught that th e in s truments wo uld be be tte r mainta in ed 
a nd th e fl ags no t capture d a s freque nt ly if they wer e th e pe rsona l 
p rope rty o f the o ffi ce rs . 
Th e numb e r and sche dul e of times f e r mu s t e ring and t r a inin g th e 
mi I iti a wer e out / i nes in the law a lso . Comr,an i es were to mus t e r twi ce a 
yea r , once in Apr i I a nd on ce in Novemb e r , months whi ch wi 11 become 
i mp o rtant late r . Afte r 1794 , regiments we r e to mu s t e r in Oct obe r . 
Th a t th e r eg ime n t s we re not t o mu s t e r in 1794 was impo rtant beca use 
these r egime n t s wo u Id no t have an oppo rtun i ty to meet be fo r th e mi I i t i a 
was ca I led fo r i-he Whi s key Reb e l I ion . 
Th ese va ri ous mu s t e rs were to be one day eac h, and so the e nt ire 
s tate mi I itia wou ld meet only four days a yea r . On 8 may ass ume that 
ve ry I i tt le ac tu a l tra ining was poss i b le dur ing th e reg imenta l mee t in g , 
if f o r no o ther reason than that i t wo uld take more th an ha l f the 
day t o ge t th , me n toge th e r in one p lace , if they a tte nd e d at 11. Even 
b2;tta l ions , ha l f th e s i ze of r eg iments , wo u ld s ri 11 pres nt prob / ms 
in tra i n i ng f or anything oth e r than pa rades and i ns pecti ons . Thi s 
sc he du le o f train i ng le fi only two days pe r year during whi ch 
act ua l training mi ght have occurre d . Ma rks mans hi p probab ly was ne t 
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st ressed , beca use o f the th eo ry of war i n the e ighteenth century , the 
cos t o f ammuniti on, and th e great dive rs i ty o f weapons , i f and wh e n 
the me n brought wea pons t o mus t e r . Arti I le ry pract ice wa s probab ly not 
he ld e ither , beca use o f the cost o f ammuni t ion and th e lack of ca nno n. 
Comp a ny mus t e rs wer e most probab ly so c ia l e vents comb in ed with I itt le 
actu a l mi I i -rary tra in ing , but with much sabr-e r att l in g an d ma rti a l 
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sp i r i t , a long with I iq uid ones . 
One o f th e most g la r ing i nd ication s of the in eff ect iveness o f 
th e law was the sett ing o f f ines for fai lure to a-i- t e nd mu s t e r and/or 
c ca l I t o actua l se rvi ce . QLfi ce rs we r e to be f ine d not mo r e t han s ix 
dc, ll a rs per day f o r not attend in g mu s t e r with th e prope r a rms or 
acco utreme nts . Non- commi ss ione d off i ce rs of the art i I le ry or cragoons , 
we re t o pay not mor e than two- t hirds of a do ll ar fo r the same offense . 
Al I oth e r non- commi ss ioned off i ce rs and pr i vates were to be fin ed one 
cent pe r day fo r fa ilu r e t o atte nd with t he prope r eq u ipment . Th e 
f ine for mi ss ing a muste r e nt i re ly was se t at fifty cents pe r day . 
Fina ll y , thes-e fin es wer e t o be co ll ected t,y the co mpany com"'ander . 
Impos in g th e st i ffest fin es on offi ce rs fo r f a i lure t o prope r ly 
eq u i p th emse lves i s und e rs tandab le , becau se th eo re ti ca ll y th e off i c r 
co rp s wo uld be the most a fflu ent and wo uld nee d a s tronge r incen tive 
t o o bey the law, and co uld af ford the a rms a nd o th e r equ i pment necessa r y . 
Th e f i ne of one ce nt , howeve r was a joke . Eve n th ough these lowe r ranking 
me n wer e probab ly less af flu ent than th e of fi ce rs , a lmost any one co ul d 
a fford to d i sobey the law if the f ine wa s j us t one cent. Th e fin e fo r 
mi ss i ng a mus t e r a ltoge th e r does not seem part icularly s t i ff e i ther . 
I f th e Mary l and Senate es t imate o f t he ave r cge pay of men o f mi I iti a 
9 age , se t a t ha l f a pound a day , was co rrect , a man cou ld ea r G mo re 
t ha n e no ugh t o pay f o r th e fin e . Thi s c irc ums t ance was a l I
 th e mo r e 
t ru e beca use i -hE' mi I d i a was no t pa id fo r mu st e ring, and an
y wo rke r 
atte nd in g a mus t e r wo uld l ose th at day ' s wages anyway . 
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An othe r sect i on o f th e l aw a ll owed t o se rve in pe r son o r t o 
p r o vide s ub sti t utes--a p r acti ce th a+ was common from th e Re
vo luti on 
thro ugh mu c h o f the ninet eenth century . Th e effectiveness 
o f s uc h a 
p r acti ce i s qu es ti o nab l e at bes t , but th e Ma ryl and mi I i ti a 
l aw o f 1793 
p r ov i de d f o r even mo r e ine ff ective use o f s ub stituti on. Me
n wer e 
a l l owed t en day s t o prov i de a s ub s t i tute if they d i d no t wa
nt t o se rve 
in pe r son. Eve n i n 1793 , wh en rapid mobi I i za ti o n was t o+a l l y 
unknown 
o n anyth ing but a l oca l l evel , a de l ay meant that any s ub s t
itute pro ,· ided 
mi ght no t be ava il ab l e unti I th e r es t o f th e mi I iti a had ma
r ched . Thi s 
p r ovi s i on in turn wo u l d mea n th at s ub stitutes co u l d b8 l eft
 behind t o 
ca t c h up with th e ma i n body o f troops . A l t e rna+e l y the ma i
n body o f 
t roops v1 o uld have t o wa it unti I a l I s ub s t i tutes wer E', prc vid
ed bdc r e 
it co u l d ma r c h . Such a de l ay might p rove v i t a l i n case th e 
mi I i t i a 
faced a n actu a I e ns;-agement with an enemy , o r was t o que I I a 
r ebe 11 i on 
be f o r e it beca me a r evo l uti on. 
·If a ma n d i d no t attend in pe r son o r se nd a s ub s titute , he w
as t o 
be fin ed. I n e ithe r ins t ance , th e batta li on o r r eg imeni-a l c
ommand r was 
to hire a s ub s t itu t e f o r any mc1 n neg l ecting t o do so o n hi s
 own . Th e 
cos t s o f f i nc ing a s ub s t i tute , p lus th e cos t o f paying the 
same , we r e 
t o be c ha rge d t o th e neg I i gent mi I iti a man . I f fo l l owed, t
hi s pr ocedure 
wo u I d have ca use d much extra wo rk f o r th e command i ng o ffi ce
r s , wh i I e 
no t prov i d i ng adequ at e p r eventi o n f o r neg l ect. The most e f
fective 
acti o n a l l owed was directed at men who we r e j ud ged un abl e t
o pay f o r 
th e cos t o f f in d i ng a s ub s titute . Such men wer e t o be j a il
ed fo r no+ 
a.rs~ 
mo r e th a n tw e nty days . 
Thro ugh o ut th e e ntire Jaw itse lf, the re was no provi s ion fo r 
i ng th e me n o ut o r for dra fting me n s ho ul d vo lurteer s prove t oo ca 11 · 
re lucta nt. Th e re was no provi s ion t o divid e th e mi I i t i a i nto 
c lasses h d 10 , as a been done by th e s t at e during th e Revoluti on. It 
ca n on ly be ass umed th a t s uch provi s ions we r e left t o t he Go ve rno r . 
An Act passe d dur i ng the Revo lut ion had a l lowed the Gove rr.o r t o 
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ca ll th e mil i ti a , but i t had bee n a l lowed t o expi r e . Act ions t a ke n 
by th e gove rno r i n th e ca J I f o r pa rt of th e mi I iti a fo r th e Whi sKey 
Rebe l I ion pro ve th at th e execut i ve s ti I I had a utho r i ty t o r eq ues t 
12 troops . Th e Jaw cou ld not have ass umed that the s t a t e Co ns t i tut ion 
of 1776 prov ided fo r s uch powe r , becc.use th a t docume nt pe rm i tte d th e 
gove rno r t o "emb ody th e mi I iti a" and nothing more . 
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Th e fina l secti ons o f th e Ma ry land mili ti a law dea lt wi th a 
ri ety of s ubj ect s . Cla ims from f i nes cou ld be appea led , in case va · 
a ny fin es wer e e ve r imp osed in virtue o f the law. An o th e r prohib it ed 
me n from sw itc h i ng comp a ni es once they wer e e nro l led, un less they 
move d from one cor1pa ny a rea t o a noth e r . Fina I I y , th e independ ent 
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o r vo lunt ee r comp a ni es a lrea dy ex is t i ng , es pec ia ll y those i n Ba ltimore 
t own wer e pe rmitte d t o cc ntinue , s utj ect t o th e r ul es la i d down fo r 
the r es t of th e mi I i t i a . 
Th e Maryl a nd mi li ti a Jaw had many secti ons. th a t might t end t o 
make th e mi I iti a c r ea t e d the re by less th an e ffect i ve . Th e s ub s titute 
c la use not o n ly cr ea t e d de lay , but a l lowed men t o evade th e se rv i ce 
as we ! I . Ofte n , as wi 11 be d i sc ussed in the next chapte r ,
 those 
SL!b s titutes provide d wer e less than des i ra bl e . Al th o ugh i·hi s pr~ct i ce 







Th e sy s t em o f fin es wo u l d not have se rved as a det errent TO ab sente
e i sm, 
o r no t a rm ing o nese l f . A sy st em f o r mob i I i z ing th e mi I iti a f o r mo r
e 
active se rvi ce was omitte d , and l e ft t o thE: Gove rno r and Co unc i l. 
Exempti ons f o r consc i ent i o L1 s obj ecTor s i nvo l ve rl a doub l e s t anda rd . 
Th e tra ining s y s t em o f on l y f o ur mu s t e r s pe r yea r, and on l y two 
poss i b l y e ff ec t i ve ones a l mos t g uaranteed a mili t i a th at wou l d be 
i I I-prepa r e d f o r any r ea l mil i tary act i on . Fina l l y , o r oani za t i on wa
s 
l e ft unti I mo r e th an s i x month s afte r th e l aw passerl . 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Tha t th e Ma ry l and mi I it i a l aw cop i e d much o f th e f ede r a l l aw 
s ho u l d no t be mi s unde r stood . Effect i ve o r not , th i s fede r a l l aw se
t 
th e o r gan i zati on f o r th e va ri ous s tate militi as , thus mak ins a " un
ifo rm 
mili ti a ." Thi s , at l eas t , was the concept expressed in th e Ur,ited 
St ates Cons t i tuti on . Th e Second Cong r ess , howe ve r , ha d its own i de
as 
abo ut th e method o f o rgan i z i ng the mi I iti a and th e d i v i s i o n 
c f r espons i b i I i ty o ve r th e mi I i t i a betwee n th e s ta t e and f e de r a l 
gove rnments . Th e f e de r ~ I l aw that r es u l t ed from th i s Cong r ess se rv
ed 
t o confu se th e i ss ue o f organ i za t i on o f th e mi Ii ti a . Th e mi Ii t i a t
o 
be c r ea t e d by thi s f ede r a l l aw wa s any t h i ng but un i fo rm, and could 
no t ho pe t o be e ff ecti ve . 
Co ng r ess wa s r es pons i b l e f o r es t ab li s h ing the age I imi t s and 
,·a ri o us f ede r a l exempti o ns from mi I it i a duty . Such we r e c rri ed o u
t 
by th e dec i s i on that a l I free wh ite ma l es betw een th e ages o f e i gh
teen 
a nd f o rty-f i ve wer e li ab l e f o r mili t i a duty . Fede r a l eY.empti ons ex
-landed from 
rh e Vi ce- Pr es ident down t o the vari ous f ede ra l ma il ca rr i e r s . Th e 
f e de r a l jud i c i a ry and I g i s l ature wer e a l so exempted . Th e 
number of m8n exempte d und e r the f ede ra l provisions was smGII, and 
I imited t o me n wh ose j obs might todey be c l assified as essenT i a l. 
However , Congress p r ov i ded th e s t a t es with a l most un limi t ed powe r s 
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o f exempt i on . The fede r a l l aw gave th e s t at es th e power to exempt whom-
eve r they desired . Th i s power a l l owed the sta t es to nega t e th e idea 
of ur ive r sa l conscr i pt i on , i f no t a uniform mi li tia . Had th e 
Mary l and St a t e Senate pr eva il ed i n 1792 , a l I men between the ages of 
e i ghteen and t wenty - one wo u l d have been exempt from muste rin g , and 
l i ab l e on l y fer ac t i ve duty .
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Th e actu a l o rgani zat i on of t he var i o us un i t s of mili t i a , und e r 
the federa l l aw , was even me r e ambi guo us . Th e E',m~, has i s of the naticnal 
l aw was tor state contro l, and as each s t a t e began o r gan i zat i on , uni q ue 
s ituati ons were found . Wi th o ut d i r ec t nat i ona l control of o rg ani za ti on 
1-he s t a t es co u l d not have c r ea t ed mili t i a un i t c rm i n o rg an i za t i on w i th 
o th e r s t a t es . 11\/ i thin each s t a t e , un i ts wer e not a lways un i f o rm in s i ze 
beca use o f the disperse pop ul at i on and geog r aph i c l oca t i on of the men 
who would form the mi I i tia . 
The basic uni t for the mi Ii t i a was to be thE. compa ny , and th E: o th e r 
un i t s , batta l i ons , r eg i ments , and br i ga des , wer e composed o f vary i ng 
numb e r s o f comp an i es . Th e l aw s t a t ed that these un i t s we r e t o be 
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o r gan i zed as outl i ne d "i t th e same be conveni ent . Th i s gave th e sta t es 
a g r eat dea l of lat i t ude . Some f l ex ibi l i t y w2s necessary because the 
vary i ng numbe r of e ligib l e men in any given a r ea wo u l d muke it d iffi cu l t 
to c r ea t e com~,a ni es o f the exact proport i ons. o ut I i ned . But such l atitud 
a l so a l l owed the s t ates t o have batta li ons o f mo r e o r few .r comp en i es , 
reg i ments o f vary i ng s i ze , and so o n , so that i f a r eg imen t was ca l l ed 
to duty i i - might differ i n s i ze by hundreds o f men , when compared to 
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1 va r y ing s i ze , a m1n1 strat i on, s upp ly and even 0th e r r eg iments . w· th · · d · · 
mob i I ity mi ght we t I be confcse d, if not imp oss ib l e . Any hope o f un i fo rm 
o r gani zat i on f o r th e mi t it i a was des troy ed by -:-hi s c l ause . 
Tw o of fi ces c r ea t ed by th e f ede r a l act wer e t o he l p so l ve th e 
pr obl ems o f o r gani za ti on. Th e s tates wer e t o have Adjutants Ge ne r a l, 
wh o wo ul d act as admini s trat o r s and i nte rmed i ari es f o r the s t at e 
mi I i ti as . Th i s o ffi ce , i dea I I y , wo u I d t ake much o f th e day--t o- day 
ope r ati o n o f th e mi t it i a from th e Gove r no r s and wou l d g i ve it t o a pe r son 
mo r e s uited f o r th e j ob. Commun i ca t i on betwee n th e s t at e mil iti as 
and t he Sec r et a ry o f War wo u l d a l so be r egu l ate d and un i f o rm . Th e oth e r 
o ff i ce c r ea t e d was Br i ga de I nspect o r. Pe r sons appo i nted t o th i s o f f i ce 
wer e t o see t o th e actua l cond i t i on o f th e mi t iti a- - th e ir wea pons , 
tra i n i ng , d i sc i p l i ne , and r ead i ness . Reports on th e cond i t i on o f 
th e mi I i t i a we r e t o be sent t o th e Adjutant Gene r a l, wh o , in turn , 
r epor t e d d i r ect l y t o th e Gove rn o r . Su ch an o rg an i za tion pr obab l y wo u l d 
have a i ded th e o r gan i za ti on and funct i on i ng o f the st at e mi I i t i as . I n 
M,; ry I and , howeve r , ne i the r wer e 
app o i nted i n th e s t at e 
mi I it i a l aw. 
YVh en th e Ma ry I and s t at e mi I i t i a was 
f i na ll y o r ga n i ze d, Br i ga de 
I nspect o r s 
wer e ap po i nte d by th e Go ve rno r , 
but i t was not unt i I 
Oc t obe r 6 , 1794 , 
i r, th e mi ds t o f the mili t i a ac t i on i n the Wh i s key Rebe l li en , th at 
Ma ry I and h I I 6 ,ad an Adju tant Gene ra. 
I n acco rd ance wi th th e second Arr,endment t o th e Cons t i tuti on , 
Wh i c h ass ume d th i:i t " A we t I r egu l at ed mi I i t i a be i ng necessa ry f o r th e 
security o f a free s t at e , th e r i ght o f the peop l e t o keep and bea r 
A lt men wer e t o pro vide th e ir own 
arm h 17 s s a l I no t be i nfringe d." 
weapons . Rega rd less o f wh at e l se i t ass umed, th e f ede r a l ta1-; ' s r e l i ance 








t h i s ri ght. A l so , thi s secti on o f th e l aw l eft th e s t at es , and u l timai e l y 
the fe de r a l gove rrment, with th e necess ity o f s up p lying an unt o l d 
v ari e ty o f ammuni t i on and mun i ti o ns . Howe ve r , in an e ffort t o ant i c i-
pate s uc h a p r ob l em, th e l aw r eq uired each man t o bring hi s own 
ammuniti on, in l i mited quanti ·r i es , t o active dLity wiih him . Th e 
q uant i ty was eno ugh f o r on l y o ne ex t e nde d s k i rmi s h, i f the ammuniti on 
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b r o ugh t was any good at a l I. 
Th e prob l ems o f s upp l y wer e no t cove r ed in th e f ede ra l mi I it i a 
l aw, and wer e conseq uentl y no t ce: ve r e d in th e Ma ryl and s t ai -e l aw. 
Reg i menta l q uarte rmas t e r s wer e I i s t e d , but th e r e was no indi cati o n o f 
any h i ghe r l eve l o f r es pons ibi I i t y . Th e s t a t es we r e l e ft to f en d fo r -rh E,m-
se l ves , and Mb ry l and did not f end ve ry we l I. Th e r e was no s t ate 
Quarte rmas t e r Ge ne r a l f o r th e s t a t e unti I Oct obe r 9 , 179 4 , and the o n l y 
r easo n th a t Ma ryl and had o ne then was th at Gove rn o r Lee o f Virg ini a 
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o rde r ed o ne app o inte d f o r th e Ma ryl and Wh i s key Rebe l li on troops . 
Th e f ede r a l l aw out I ined the sc he du l e o f pay f o r th e mi I i t 1a 
whi l e i n active se rvi ce for the United St a t es , and s t a t ed tha t th e 
fede r a l gov e rnment wo u l d pay f o r s uch se rv i ce . Th e pay sca l e wo u l d be th 
same as f o r r eg ul a r a rmy f o r eac h r ank, but wou l d t ake e ff ect o n l y a fte r 
th e s ~a t e mi I i t i a had a rr i ve d a t a genera l r endez vo us . Th e f ede r a l l aw 
a l so p r ovided benE: fit s f o r men injured whi l e on active duty , and 
f o r th e f ami I i es of men k i I l ed . Even tho ugh tra i nin g was s up posed 
t o be manda t o r y , th e re was no pro v i s i o n i n e ithe r the f ede r a l o r 
s t a t e l aws t o pay th e mi I iti a for tra i ning . 
No t i cea b l y l ackin g i n th e fe de r a l l aw was a method to ca ll th e 
mi I iti a t o active duty, o r a max i mum time f o r th e mi I iti a i n f ede r a l 
se rvi ce . Th ese wer e pro v i ded i n a separat e At o f MEi y 2 , 1792 . I t 
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out! i ned ho w th e mi I i t i a wa s to be ca l l ed , by r eq u i s ition from th e 
Pres i dent to th e Gove rno r s ; the l ength o f time for se rv i c ,, three month s 
per y ea r max imum ; and t h l im i tai- i ons fo r i ts use , th e Pres i dnt coul d 
ca l I only the mi I it i a from ne i ghboring s tates in case o f r ete l I i on o r 
inv as i on in any o ne s Tate . Because the staTes wer e not d i r ectl y 
in vo l ved , no s t at e ve r s i on of th i s l aw was passed in Mary l and . 
One o th e r omission i n th e federc l l aw wa s the l ack o f f i n s f o r 
noncomp li ance . N i th e r t he s tates nor i nd i v i dua l s co ul d b f i ned or 
puni s he d f o r not fo ll owing the f ede ra l law . A gove rn o r co u l d no t be 
held i n contempt fo r fa il ure to act as commander-i n- chi e f o f the s. t ate ' s 
forces . Th e r e was no provis i on to pur i s h a s t a t e l eg i s l ature that 
failed to pass a mi I it i a l aw with i n the one year I i mit . Fa i l ure by 
mi I i t i a me n to prov i de th ir own weapc ns wa s no t pun i shc;b l e . I ndeed , 
the federal l aw had no r ecourse against f a i l ur t o prov i de for th e 
es t abl i s hment i n a s tate o f a un i f o rm mi I i t i a , e ve n i f th e f ede ra l 
l aw had c r ea t e d one . Without in cent i ve o r coe r c i on , th e sta t es nad 
no need to fo ll ow any mo r e or l ess of the f ede ra l l av,: than th ey des i r ed . 
Th many prob I ems c r ea t ed by th e f ede ro I mi I it i a I aw co u I d no t 
nave been me r . ove r s i s hts . Some ambigu i t i es wer e c r ea t e d or i gnor d 
f o r a r easo n . That r eason seems t o lay i n th controve r s y ove r state i s 
rights ve r s us th e power of the f de r a l government . Wr• en th e second 
Congress firs t r eported a mi Ii ti a b i I I, it in c I uded mu ch that wo u I d 
ha v c r ea t e d a tru l y nat i o na l and un i f o rm mi l it i a . Th e f e d .r a l 
gO\·e rnment wo u l d have o rg ani ze d the mili t i a i n s uc h a way J-ha -1 a 
viab l fo r ce wo ul d have been c r ea t ed . PrO\· i s i ons o f the Wad s. wo rTh 
t i I I, f i r s t cons id r ed by the Hou se on FEb n:ary 2 1, 1792 , wou Id hav a I low d 
fede r a l i nspec t i on o f the s tate mi I i t i as . I t wo u l d a l so hav prov i ded 
an " e li te " co rp s o f mili ti a i n each state . Suc h a co r~ s wou l d have 
cons i s t ed of me n be tw ee n th e ages o f e i ghteen and twenty-fi ve , and 
vmuld hciVe bee n t r a inEd mo r e frequent l y th an the me. i n body of 
mi I i t i a . At one po i nt in the Co ngress i o na l co ns ide rai-i on , fines f o r 
non - ccmp l i a nce with the c l ause f o r p r oviding persona l a rms wa s 
d
. 2 1 
1 scusse d. 
A l though th i s p r opose d bi I I d i d not seek t o se t up t he type o f 
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mi I iti a t hat t he Sec r etary o f War Henry Knox had proposed i n 1790 , 
it c l ea rl y gave th e nat i ona l government control O\'er th e mi I i t i a . 
Th i s concept d i d not s urv i ve Congress . The Ho use so a l t e r ed th e b ill 
that its sponso r , Representat i ve Je remi ah Wadswo rth of Connecti c ut, 
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voted aga in s t i t when i t came u~ fo r fina l appro, ·a l. The Senat e 
30 
proposed a f ew amendments f o r th i s f i na l ve r s i on , one of wh i ch evo l ved 
i nto the act to ca 1 I out th e mi I i t i a . Th e othe r Sena t e amendments 
were not I i sted i n th e journa l s , but th ey wer e r eject ed . Th e bi I I 
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passed i nto l aw wi tho ut furth er comment from t he Se nate . 
Th e r es ult o f th i s concern f o r s tate ' s r i ghts was the f ede r a l 
mi Ii t i a I aw of May 8 , 1792 . In an attempt t o negate nat i ona I contra I 
over both the reg u l dr a rmy and th e mi I iti a , Congress a l t e r ed th e mi I i t i a 
b i I I to the po in t wh e r e i t became ineffect i ve in c r Ea t i ng a nat i o na l 
f o r es . Ary r ea l s ub s tan ce wa s l e ft t o th e s t at e , wiih on l y gu i de I in es 
offe r e d by th e f ede r a l l aw. I t seemed that , as far as th e m1 I iti a was 
conce rn ed , Cong r ess reve rte d t o th e trad i t i ons of th e Art i c l es o f 
Confe de r ati o n wh e r e th e ce nt r E I government on l y s ugges t e d l eg i s l at i on 
to the state . The one e>:cept i on to thi s wcis that now the Pre~ ident 
was t h e commandET-i n- ch i e f o f th e militi a wh en i n fe de r a l se rv i ce . 
Thus t he most important f actor in dete rminin g the Mary! and Mili t i a l aw 
3 1 
o f 1793--the f e de ra l mi I i t ia law--had a negat i ve e ff ect. It remain ed for 
th e s t a t e leg is la tu re t o de ve lop a mi I itia, us ing the fe de rdl law as a guide 
i f th ey des i red . 
Th e Ma ry land leg i s lature beg an i t s cons i de rati on of a s tate mi I iti a 
b i 11 in ea r ly Decemb e r , 1792 , wh e n an ove rwh e lmin g major ity vot ed 
2:i 
to imp ose a fin e , in I ie u o: mi I iti a dL:ty, on consc ie nt ious. obj ecto rs . 
Th e nex t importa nt act ion on th e b i I I was to s tr i ke a c la use that 
wo uld ha ve imposed sepa r a t e f i nes , det e rmin ed by pe rsona l wea lth, on 
pe rsons neg lec t ing t o co mp ly with th e prov is ion fo r providing pe rsonal 
wea po ns . Furthe r d iscuss ion on the bi 11 at thi s s t age in\'o lved exempti on 
o f co unty co urt jus t ices and the leg is la ture , Both exempti ons we r e 
a ppr ove d , but t he leg is lature wa s exempted on ly whi le in sess ion . Two 
d i ff e r e nt r o l I ca l I vo+es wer e nee de d t o e nd atte mp t s to exempt 
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app r e nt i ces from duty . 
Be fo r e se nding th e bi 11 t c th e Senate to r con s ide rat i on, th e 
~o use a l so a pprove d sect io ns that would p lace a fin e o f t wo-thirds o f a 
do l lar on any non- commi ss ion e d off ice r o r priva t e who fail ed t o atte nd 
a mu s t e r, a nd a sect ion g i v in g reg ime ntal commande rs autho r i ty to s pend 
c ny fin es co ll ec t e d on tra in in g a nd di sc iplin e . Fina lly, the House 
vo t ed t o s trike a c la use that wo uld have made th e mas t e r o f an 
a ppren t i ce I i ab le fo r fin es in curre d by tha t a p~rent ice . 
Th e Senate was not lo ng in exp r ess ing obj ecti on s t o the 
Ho use bi I I. Th ese inc lude d op ini ons tha t th e proposed numb e r o f 
trc ining days wa s t oo high , s tating that "A f ew weeks o f ac tua l se rvi ce 
aga ins t a n e nemy [ was ] eq ui va lent to seve ra l yea rs of or d i na ry mi I ita ry 
27 
dut y.'' Th e Senate a lso obj ec t e d th at ce rta in o f the fin es we re t oo 
hi gh, a nd wo uld t e nc t o oppress some c iti zens. , es pec ia ll y s in ce th ,se 
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same me n wer e expected t o provide the i r own weapons . Witho ut r eturning 
The bi ll , the Se nat e s ugg es t ed a conference. No r eco rd of t he confe r ence 
ex i s t s , but it must not have been s uccess fu l , because two days after it 
was f ormed 28 , th e Senate presented f o rma l amendments t o th e b i I I. 
These Senate amendments wo uld have compl e t e l y negate d th e sp i r i T, 
if not the s ub s tan ce of the federa I I aw. Th e Senate proposed to 
a iTe r the b ill so th a t on l y one d i v i s i on , cons i s t i ng of approx i mat e l y 
6000 men p l us o ffi cers , wou l d have b8en li ab l e for t he mi I i t i a duty 
during the f i r s t three years afte r the act passed . Wh en this 
1 i ab i I i ty en ded , a second d i vision of the same s i ze but diffe r ent men , 
wou l d be l i ab l e for three years, and so on until a ll e l i gible men had 
se rve d. At that t i me , th e f i r s t d i v i s i on wo u l d aga i n be I i ab l e f o r 
se rvi ce . 29 Th e Se nat e l ater es t i mated that there wou l d be 30 , 000 men 
o f mi l iti a age 30 i n th e s tate , and so f i g ur ed that on l y tw enty percent 
t i me . 
of a 11 e I i g i b l e 
f o r training o r duty 
at any 
men wou I d be Ii ab l e 
Beca use a I I the me n wo u Id eventua I l y 
se rve , th e Senate cons i dered 
its p l an on l y a t empo rary exemption . 
To thi s th ey 
added permanent 
exeiiipti ons f o r the var i o us c i v i / off i ce r s , students and t eache r s , 
3 1 
physicians d f an e rrymen . 
Taken togethe r , these proposa l s we r e 
s t agoe · f d t ,, r In g beca use th ey exempted so many rnen r om u Y • 
Th e Senate a l so proposed an amendment that wou l d have a l l owed the 
Gove t t t · · rn o r author i ty t o have th e mi I i tia t o tra i n a ex ra 1mes 1n case 
o f · · invas ion o r r ebe lli on . Ti me of se rv i ce i n s uc h case wa s two months 
max imum , af t e r wh i ch t i me se rv i ce wou l d be rotated to o th er men . I n 
case the mi I i ti a was ca l l ed out of the sta t e , se rvi ce wo u l d be no 
I 32 
o nge r th an s i x months before rotation . 
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In a I 33 at e r message , th e Senat e de f e nde d th ese ame ndments ' 
espec ia ll y the "t emporary exempti ons ," by s t at in g that th e federa l 
exemp w omeve r ey des ir ed. Regard less 0 + 
law a l lowed the s t ates t o t h th 
wh c t he r the Se nat e ac tua ll y be li eved wh a t it sa id, that th e fede ra l law 
Woul d b e us ed to defend s uch a n o utl andis h ame ndment was important. 
Th e 
fe de ra I law co uld i ndeed be inte rpret ed i n s uch a manne r; and eve r 
e emp o r a ry exempti ons " we re at var iance with the f edera l l aw , if th "t 
th e re was nothing t he fede ra l government co u ld do t o coe r cE', th e s t at e 
to co rrect t he var i a ti on. 
After r eadin g th e Se na t e ame ndme nts on ly once , the House re j ec t e d 
out of hand the Se na t e amendme nts proposed.
34 
Th e " t empo r a ry exempti ons " 
and th e e ntire scheme for ca l I ,ng out an extra mili tia in eme rgen
c ies 
Wer e ref used witho ut so mu ch as a vo i ce vote , mu ch less a ro l I ca l I. 
Th e Ho use di d accept th e exempti on tor c ivi I off i ce rs and oth e rs . 
Hav ing re j ected th e Senate ' s ~aja r amendme nts , the House dec ide d by 35 
not t o se nd a message exp la ining the reject ion . 
a vot e of 38 fo 25 , 
Th e s enate reg re tte d the omi ss ion , and ref used t o r ecede from th e 
arne ndme nts . 36 
A message from the Senate, exp la inin g i ts reasons fe r th e amend-
ments d. 37 
Aga in the Senat e 
, tsp laye d th at gro up' s pos i tion ve ry we l I. 
c la ime d th at th e amendments wer e in compli ance with the fede ra l law. 
Th e use o f only 6000 men wa s jus t i fi e d, sa id th e Senate , beca use t he re 
co u ld be no eme rgency tha t wo ul d ca use the Pres ident t o ca l I more th an 
Bes ides , th e s t at e had weapons enough fo r 
ih at numb e r t o ut of the s ta e . 
only b a out 7000 me n. 
(Th i s re fe rence t o ava i lab le a rms i mp li es t ha t 
the Senate , a t leas t, p
la nne d on a rmin g th e mili ti a wi ih s t ate wea pons--
someth ing t o r wh i c h the f ina l law did not provide . ) Th e sav i ngs o f t ime 
and money to t he mi I i t i a men , and e ff ort f o r th e s tate w6re a lso used 
to defe nd t ne Senate pos iti on. 
Th e st rongest a rgument made by th e Se na t e was cons tituti ona l . 
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uoting th e mi I iti a c lauses of th e Const ituti on , the Senate reminded 
th e House th at off i ce ring and tra ini ng the mi I iti a was left to th e 
s t ates . Thi s r emind e r co u ld mea n, to th e Senate at leas ~, that th e 
sta t es co u ld exe rc ise as litt le or as mu ch of the militi a as se ldom 
or as often as the sta t e des i red . Such a broad inte rpretat ion o f t he 
Const i t uti on fit very we ll with th e sp iri t o+ the f e dera l law . Congress 
e I ned th e age r eq uirement tor th e mi I iti a , ha d s ug ges,fod an had d t· 
o rg an i za ti on , had prO\'ide d tor a rmin g th e ,mi I iti a by r equ i ring th e 
1a to a rm thems leves , and had prov ided di sc ipl i ne as the Arti c les mi I it" 
of Wa r of 1779. These wer e within th e r es pons ibi I iti es of Congress 
as o ut lin ed in t he Const ituti on. Cong ress ha d inte r~ret e d thes,e duti es 
a road mann e r, a nd ha d le ft th e s t a t es to do mu ch th e same wi th in b 
th e i r dut ies . That th e s tates took advantag
e of thi s prec lu ded a uni form 
nat iona l mi I iti a . Appa re ntly , t he Ho use was not s way ed by these 
agruments , beca use i t re fused to recons id e r, and the bi I I di e d at the 
end of the sess ion. 
De li be rati on on the bill continued i n the November , 1793 , sess ion. 
Th e Ho use proceeded to drop the eyemp t ions f o r a l I c ivi I o ffi ce rs , and 
every o ne e lse except mini s t e rs of the Gospe l, and upon pay in g a two 
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do l la r fin e , co nsc ie nti o us object ors . Also during t hese de li berat ions , 
th e f in es for noncompl lance wit h va ri o us secti ons of th e law we re set. 
propoe rl y a rmed and 
Th e f in e o f one cent for not appear ing at mu s t e r 
40 
accout red was voted by a major ity of 49 t o 12 . 
Of th e tw e lve wh o 
di ssente d, ha l f had j ust obj ect ed to 
41 
impos in g any fin e a t a ll. Th i s 
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em o 1nd1 ca t e that th e House knew tha t s uch a fine wa s a · k 
JO ,e , 
wo u Id se t . . 
but f e lt co~pe l led t o comply with the federal provision that a l I 
mi I iti a men mus t arm themselves. A furth er ind i ca t ion of th is wa s 
th e dec i s ion -i-o furth e r I imi t I iab i l ity by empowe ring company commande rs 
to exempt m f . t ·th t . 42 en rom coming t o company mus e rs w1 he proper eq uipment. 
The House st ruc k tvw othe r important iss ue~ from th e proposed b i 11. 
The first wou l d have a ll owed the var ious comp
ani es t o e lect th e ir own 
oft· 43 icers (Capta in s and be low) . Th is wou ld have t akE> n q uite a load off 
th e o.overnor d d h · t ~ , and a I so might have amage , 1 s pa ronage . 
The second 
issue was a t ax of two ao !/ a r s per year t o s u~po rt armament of the 
. . 44 mi 11 t i a . Th is t ax wou ld have been imposed on 
a ll free white mal es 
o lde r than. t t I t t 200 d II o r y- tive, wh ose persona ax assessmen was o ars o r 
mo re . Thi s wou ld have provided a rea dy so urc
eofrroney to purchase 
a rm s , ana wo u ld have i nvo lved men past the age of mi liti a duty i n 
prov iding tor the pub! ic defense . However, d i rect t axes for mi I i t a ry 
s upport wer e very obj ect ionab le . 
Wh en th e above two iss ues wer e om i tted , th e bi I I wa s passed and 
sent to the Se nat e . Thi s t i me the Senate did not propose s uch s weep ing 
amendments. fvbs t of i t s proposed a lterations were mi nor , but the Sena t e 
s t ill tr ·i ed tdf dL·ty 
Anothe r attemp t ed 
to have ap prent ices exemp e rom , • 
to gua ra ntee th e continuat ion of the var io us volunteer co mp an ies 
th at had been formed in th e s t ate . Th
e re were no s urpri ses in th ese , 
but they po i nted to th e co nce rn abo ut loss o f wages mi li t i a duty wo u ld 
have on merchants a nd wor king men, and the poss i ble po l i tica l irrportance 
of the I I d s tab I 1· s hed When the House ref us
0
.d 
vo untee r comp an i es a rea Y e ' · "· 
both, th e Se na t e ag reed t o recede from theexemptions if the House would 
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pass th e volu nt ee r comp ani es in Ba l timo re t own. 
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Th ese diffe r ences o f op ini on betwee n th e
 two hou ses o f the s t a t e 
l eg i s l a ture came t o naught in t he actua l
 l aw . !:lut the opin i on s expressed 
in th e va ri o us Senat e mess ages inc'i ce.Ted
 jus t how brnad l y th e f ede r a l 
l aw co uld be inTe r p r et ed . Th e Ho use , by
 inte rpreting th e f ede ra l 
l aw mo r e s tri c t l y , how eve r, did not in c r
ease th e chc:n ces f o r an effec-
t i ve mi I i t i a , mu ch l ess o ne uniforrr w i th
 o the r s t a t e mi I iti as . A~a in 
t he dec i s i o n t o impose a one cent fine 
f o r no t attending mu st e r pro pe r l y 
a rme d negat e d th e i dea o f an a rmed c iti
zenry, even i f i t d id fo ll ow 
th e l ette r o f the l aw. 
Prece dent co uld no t have prevented th e s
t at e l eg i s l ature from 
enacting a n eff ect i ve mi I iti a \aw . Th e m
i I iti a l aw s pass.ed by Maryland 
dur i ng the Revo lu t i o n ce rtainly wer e no
t I i ke the 1793 l aw . Th ese 
ea rli e r l aws , pa sse d at a t i me of immed
iate dange r, f o rmed th e bas i s 
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for an e ff ect i v e mi li ti a . WhE:th e r or 
not the militi a in fa c t was 
e ffective cann o t be d i scussed he r e , but
 the l aw s can. Th ese l aw s 
wer e meant t o co ns truc t a v i ab l e mili tar
y fo rce , ca pab l e o f de f ending 
the home l and . Th e mo tivating factor f o
r these l aws wa s obvi o us-- th e 
threa t o f the Br i ti s h in th e Ches apeake 
and l at e r in th e wes t e rn parts 
A ltho ugh these laws wer e passed unde r th
e threa t o f attac k by an 
enemy f o r ce , they wer e tho rcugh- - et l ea
st wh en comper ed to th e 1793 l aw. 
Or·ge. ni ze d by co un ti es. , th e mi I iti a wou l d 
be unde r th e direct cont ro l o f 
a co unty li e utenant. Th i s pe r so n would 
act in mu ch the sam8 r o l e as 
th e l at e r Adjutant Gene r a l wa s s upp osed 
to , p lus he wo uld have d i r ect 
mi I ita ry contro l (and the rEfore co ns i de ra
bl e po liti ca l influence ) i
n hi s 
own county. Th ese men wer e a l so t o ac
t as armore r s ; th ey wer 
t o 
prov i de eno ugh a rms and accoutrements to
 s upp l y twenty- f i ve pe r cent 
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o f th e mi I iti a in the ir co unti es .
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Fines wer e much mo r e harsh un de r the Revo luti onary laws. The need 
to deter neg l ect of the Jaw was great an d immed i ate . 
Fa ilure t o 
attend a comp any mus t e r could cost an o ffi cer forty sh i I I ing s , and 
an enli st ed man as mu ch as twenty s hi 11 i ng s . I f an off i cer of fie ld 
g r ade (Major or above ) mi ssed a batta li cn mu ster, the fine co uld be as 
- 1ve po und s ; company off i cers could be f i ned th r·ee pounds and high ac:: f. 
en I i sted men t 
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Th b f hirty shi 11 ings . ,ere wer e t o e no ines tor not 
, ing proper l y a rm8d at the mu ste r, beca u~.e th e sta t e would provide attend· 
at 1 eas t one- fourth of t he arms for the mi I i tia. 
One of t he major prov i s i ons in th e Revo lu t i ona ry mi I i t i a l aws was 
The cor;p an1 es wer e o ra in e 1g. ,mes pe r yea r, and 
t hat of tra·, n ·, ng. · t t · · ht t· 
th e batta li ons ano th e r four sepa r ate times a year. I f no other 
1 f e ren ce ex i s t ed betw een the Revolut i onary and the 1793 mi I iti a l aws , d . f 
more train ing wo uld indi ca t e the ef f ecti veness o f the ea rli e r l aws . 
lrrmed i acy may exp l a in th e d i ffere nce aga in. Th e Revo lu t i onar y militi a 
needed to t · d ft be r ea dy and effect ive , ana so was r 2 1ne ~o r e o en. 
Sub s t i tutes wer e permitted in the Revo l uti ona ry l a ... ,s . Thi s 
1 
i on was ca rri ed o n into th e 1793 l aw, but some ear li e r I imitat i ons 
trad · t 
were omii ted. A s uppl ement to the 1777 mi I iti a l aw furthe r exp l a ined 
t he . 49 b t use o f s ub stitutes . No person drafted was to pay a o un y to 
0 s ub s titute, nor was a s ub st i t ute t o accept any o f
fe r of bo unty . In 
case any pe r so n was ca ught do ing e ithe r, th e pena lty wa s a court-mart i a l 
with th e guilty pa rty se rving i n t he militi a fo r doub l e the or i g ina l 
time . Th e f ine for not prov idi ng a sub stitute co u l d be as hi gh as 
ZOO po unds , but could be no l ower than twenty pounds . Th e 1793 
mi I itia Jaw d i d not proh i b it pay i ng a bounty f or a s ub stitute , and th e 
result wa s that me n se rve d in the mi I i t i a only beca use they wer e 
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o ff e r ed a bourty . 
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Th e mos t s tart i i ng d i ff e r ences between t he 1793 and t he 
Revolut i onary mi li tia l aws dea l t wi t h ca lli ng the mili t i a out fo r 
se rvi ce . The mi I iti a , unde r the ea rli e r laws , wa s div i ded into e ight 
c l asses ; as men were enro l l ed i nto th e mi I i t i a , they were ass i gned 
f-o a c l ass . Wh en th e need arose , the gm·ernor wo ul d ca l I a l I or r:art 
of a c l ass to se rv i ce. The gove r no r was a l so g iven pow r to ca l I 
out an ent i r e batta li on or whateve r un it he de=- i r e d. Thus th e mi I i t i a 
could be ca l l ed i n nume r i ca l o rd e r , and those who se rve d one t e rm wou l d 
know th at they wou l d not serve unti I a l I other c l asses had served . 
Th e 1793 l aw comp l et e l y omitt ed any typ e of draft system to r ep l ace 
th i s o ne used during t he Revo luti on. 
Pe rhaps th e l ack of i mmed i acy was t he l argest d i fference betw en 
the two mi I i t i a systems . Th e r ee d for the mi l it i a during the Revo l uti o n 
has a l r eady been di scussed . Th e Ma ry l and mi I it i a o f a l mos t two 
decades l a t e r may no t ha\'e seemed v i t a l t o th e secur i ty of t he s t at e . 
Th e t hrea t o f fore i gn invas i o n wa s s li ght i n t he 1790s . Gr anted , 
Ba l timor t o wn was per i o d i ca ll y invaded by fore i gn me r ch2,nt mar i ne 
sa il o r s . Howev r, these wer e c i v i I di s turba nces and th ey hardly threatGned 
the security of th e sta t e . The s tate may a l so have fe l t mo r e secure , 
and th us wou l d not have fe l t pr essed to prov i de that secur i ty . Thi s 
l ack o~ forseea b l e nee d f o r t he mi I i t i a may have a i ded i n ca us ing 
i -he i ndfect i veness inhe r ent in th e 1793 mi I i-t-ia l a1<, . 
Th e Revo l ut i o na ry mi I it i a l aws wer e use d as a ba s i s for some 
pa rt of th e l ate r l aw . Unfortunate l y , th ese parts d i d not a i d i n 
c r ea t i ng an e ffec t i ve mi I i t i a . Subst i t ut es wer e st i 11 a l l ov; d , whi l e 
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th e f ines were lessened a nd train i ng grea tly reduced. Even th e prov is ion 
for a rmament that was ca rri ed ove r did not fo l low the Re vo lutionary 
tred i t ion. It seeme d that th e Mary land mi I i t ia law of 1793 drew mu ch 
more heav il y on the f ede ra l law tha n from th e s tate ' s own mi I iti a 
trad iti on. 
Thus far th e di sc uss ion of the mi I iti a law has fo l lowed the 
lo ng- term i neffect i veness inhe rent in that law, and th e factors c rea ting 
that ine ff ect iveness on a mu ch s horte r t e rm. These prob lems were wi t h 
th e actua l o rga ni za ti on o f t he mi I i t ia . The law stat ed t hat the mi I it ia 
was t o be e nro l led by th e midd le of 1794 . Thi s lax sc hedul e preven t ed 
the s t a t e from complying with a Pres ide ntial ca l I for some 54 18 mi I iti a 
f Id 
· , . 51 rom Mary land to be he 1n r eadiness to march at a moment s not ice . 
Th e Pr es ident sent a req ues t for a tota l of 80 , 000 men t o Congress late 
in Ma rc h, 1794 , and i t was fin a ll y app roved by an Act of Congress on 
52 May 9 , 1794 . Thi s ca l I prompted Gove rnor Thomas Sim Lee of Mary land 
to rep ly to Sec retary o f Wa r Henry Knox th at the mi I iti a was not yet 
o rg a ni zed prope r ly, eve n thoug h i t s houl d have been by May I, 1794. 
Exp r ess ing hi s opini on on the militi a t urnin g out armed, if th ey turn d 
o ut a t a 11, Lee wro+e that unde r t he s t ate mi I iti a law c iti ze ns were 
fined only four cents per yea r for not prov iding a rms , a nd the "imbec i I i ty 
i n the I a,._:s " great I y increased the prob ab i I i ty that the c iti zens wou Id 
53 not a rm th emse lves . Governo r Lee a lso desc ri ed th e f act that th e 
nat i ona I I aw d id not have the powe r t o enforce co mp Ii ance with th 
a rms prov is ions . 
The prob lems o f hav ing th e c iti ze ns a rm th emse lves have been 
discussed , but th e prov is ions for organi z ing the mi I itia hav e not. On. 
o f th e maj o r r easo ns why s uc h a lo ng time was prov ided fo r o rga ni z ing 
J 
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1 , a In Ma ryl a nd was th at s i
nce 17 85 , the s t a t e had not had a th e mil· t · . 
mi I iti a law. 54 Thi s lack of a n ex is tin
g l aw left the s t at e with no 
id ea of the numb er of me n to be or ga ni ze d in
 1793. It a lso le ft 
Mary la nd no basis upon whi ch to b
u i Id th e mi I iti a in to battali ons , 
n s or la r ge r units . Th e de lays in o rgan i za ti on were ca used reg ime t 
ar 1e r neg lect t o ma intain the s t at e ' s mi I iti a , eve n tho ugh by an e I· 
the Artic les o f C
onf e de ration prov id ed that "eve ry s t at e s ha l I 
I 55 
a ways keep up a we l I r egulated a nd di sc i p l ined mi I i t ia . 
There were other r easons that th e Maryl and mi I iti a wa s not orga ni ze d 
1 
me to meet th e May, 1794 , ca I I, a nd was jus t ba r e I y organized wh en i n t· 
th e Wh is key R ebe l I ion ca 11 was made . 
Th e de lay ca used by th e di sag ree-
ment over the 1793 militi a bi ll did not de lay th e o rga ni zat ion per se , 
but ·t 1 did pus h t
he law and the o rga ni za ti on ba c k a yea r. Also , eve n 
With th e problems
 of eve ry day communi ca tion th at ex isted in the last 
decade o f t he e ighteenth ce ntury, five or s ix month s to enro l I the 
mi I i t• ta a nd 
report the returns was a great dea l of time . Thi s delay a l lowed 
A lack of immed iacy co uld be 
r ea I I y necessa ry. in th8 mi I ·, t·,a was not 
th e r eason for th
i s , but there was no leg i$ lative indi ca ti on th at thi s 
was i h · e i ntent o f the law. 
Th e re ca n be I ittl e doubt that the Mary land mi I itia law of 1793 
d id not pro\' i de f o r a n ef f ective mi I i t i a . 
Drawing so heav ily a nd 
ic ly fr om th e federa l mi I iti a law prevented a lmos t a ny hope of str· t 
an effecti ve mi I iti a . Because the fede ral mi I iti a law gave so mu ch 
fr eedom o f inte rpretati on t o th e s t ates , the s t ate laws var ied wid e ly . 
t here was no way to 
Th f e e de ra I I aw wa s ine ff ect ive in another way : 
enforce th . I , s aw, 
o f t h . I e m, iti a was 
whi ch was rathe r ironi c because one of the functions 
to enforce the laws o f the Uni on. Yet mi I i tary 
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coe r c i on, e i th e r from a r egu l ar army or eve n a mi I iti a, wa s a very sen-
s itive sub j ec t to Americans i n th e last q uarte r of th e e i ghteenth 
ce ntury. After a l I had no t Americans broken from Eng l and , arguing th c:t 
th e King and Par I i ament had no right to use mi I i tary coe r c i on aga i ns i -
them? How , then, co u l d the f ede r2 I go vernment hope t o coe r ce a state 
government into comp li ance with a l aw, even a mi l itia l aw? I t co u l d 
not , or at l east not in t hi s ea r l y mi l i tia l aw . Th e f eder a l government 
co u l d on l y hope that thE: s t ates , in their i nf i n i t e wi sdom, wou l d fo 1 1ow 
the ou t I i ne . 
A f ee l ing o f unce rta i nty was exp r esse d in th e Maryl and s t at e 
mi I i t i a l aw as we l I. Th e state saw f i t to abide by mos t o f th e f eder a l 
l aw, but was un ce rta in on how f ar beyond th at law it co u l d go . Fi nes 
an d othe r types o f coe r c i on wer e inc l uded i n the s tate l aw, but none 
w~re opp r ess ive , o r even stif f eno ugh t o be ef f ect i ve . It seemed th at 
th e state l eg i s l ature r ea li ze d that a f i ne f or not a rm i ng onese l f , i f 
heavy eno ugh to ca use comp I i ance , wo uld be unacceptab l e t o th e c i t i ze ns . 
Pe rh aps th i s idea of acceptance was th e key . Because th e f dera l 
government was so new, a nd formed on conse nt , th e federa l mi I iti a l aw 
was meant t o be mo r e acceptable than ef f ective . Si nce th e sta t e l aw 
was base d on th e f ede r 2 I I aw, some o f th i s des i re for acceptance was 
carr i ed ove r . I n 1793 there was no need to ca l I a gr ea t numb e r of 
mi I i t i a , as the re had been dur i ng the Revo l ut io n. Unfo rtun ate l y , th e r e 
wo u l d be a nee d to ca ll on the mili ti a i n 1794 , an d th e sac r i fi ce o f 




Th e Maryland mi I iti a that had bee n c reated by th e s t a t e act of 
November , 1793 , was first t es t ed against the "Whi skey Rebe ls " of 
weste rn Pennsylvan·1a. Thi s t es t began in mid- Augus t 1794 , and lasted 
th rough mi d- Novemb e r o f 
th at same year . Ma ryl and was ca l led upon t o 
non- comm 1ss 1oned o ice rs a nd priva t es for prov i de a tota I of 2350 · · ff 
th e ma rch · 
1 aga i nst the rebe ls . Th e President a lso r eq ues t ed quotas of 
van1a , Virg in ia , and New J e rsey; th e total from a l I four s tates Pennsy I . 
Was to be 12 , 950 men, exc luding offi ce rs . Th e men we r e not ordered 
to ma r ch immed iate ly , but wer e t o be he ld in rea din ess to ma rc h 
Westwa rd at a moment ' s wa rn i ng. 
Reaction t o the req ui s i t ion, dated 7 Augus t 1794 , var ie d 
betwee n the fo ur stat es i nvo lved. Th e mann e r in whi ch the Mary la nd 
s t at e government, an d th e men who we r e the mi I it ia answered th e ca l I 
i s t h e f ocus of t h i s chapte r . Why each reacted as i t did wi I I a lso 
be treated , but s uch cons i de rat ion mus i- be li mi t ed t o doc umente d 
ev idence and ca nnot g ive a fu l I exp lanation , espec ia ll y whe re jun io r 
Comments and op ini ons from 
off ice rs and I d e n isted men we r e conce rn e . 
i s often th e case , are not ava i lab le and probab ly have 
If diar ies we re kept, they st i 11 a re kept pr i vate ly; 
th ese me n , as 
not s u . rv 1ved . 
communicati on be tw ee n mos t j unior off i cers and th e i r s upe r iors 
Was probably verba l, i n th e mode of the day, and f ew reco rd s of 
Fort un at e ly , th e off i c ia l 
Wr i tte n commun i cat i on may be fo und . 
gove rnment co rresponde nce f or mo st of th e attempt t o ra ise th e quota 
and ma r ch th em t o the gene ra l rendezvous has s urvived , a nd af f o rds 
quite good ma t e r i a I. 
Std by Ma ry land to th e fede ra l req u is i t ion i s 
u Y of the reacti on 
im po r tcnt for two reasons. Th e ca l I was th e f i rst time th a t the s t ate 
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gove rnme nts we r e aske d direct ly t o s upport th e new gene ra l gove rnment 
s in ce t he Co ns tituti on was ratif ie d. Powe r t o enforce fe de ra l laws wa s 
a lso t ested by t he iss ue , not onl y th e exc ise law s in wes t e rn Pe nn s yl -
vani a , but th e unifo rm mil i ti a act as we ll. Th is la t e r law as noi-
opposed in th e same ma nne r as the exc i se law, but i t was cha I leng ed 
by imp I i ca ti on. Beca use th e s tate mi I i t ia laws wer e passe d i n response 
t o and by o rde r of t he f e de r a l law, any t ime the s t a t e mi I iti a laws 
were res i s t e d, th f e de ra l law, by ext e ns ion , wa s a lso opposed. 
Th e second reason invo lved thi s r es i s tan ce . Attempts t o enfo r ce 
pa rts o f th e mi I iti a law, es pec ia ll y those parts dea lin g with a draft , 
we r e opposed by segments of th e mi I iti a . Antagoni s m toward the draft 
i n Ma ryl a nd was s uch th a t in some a r eas in th e s t a te , ri ot s occurred , 
and wh o le reg ime nts re fu sed to res pond t o th e requi s ition. Wh en combin ed 
wi t h rumo r s th a t th e "Whi skey Rebe ls " wer e plannin g t o march into wes t e rn 
Ma ryl and , dr aft res is t ance was seen by po liti ca l and mi I i t a ry lea de r s 
as a threa t t o the s t at e gove rnment . Th e M~ryl and gove rnment ct ed in 
a mu ch mo r e pos itive ma nn e r t o thi s threa t than it d id t o the prob lems 
in wes t e rn Penn s y lvan ia . An inves tiga t ion in t o th e reasons fo r s uch 
B pos itive co urse mu s t a lso be made , but wi I I be attempted in th e 
f o l lowin g chapte r. Th e present di sc uss ion wi I I re la t e th e less 
pos iti ve ac ti ons t a ken by th e s t a t e gove rnment for t he wes t e rn Pe nn sy l-
va ni a exped i t i on. 
A reco unt i ng o f events jus t pri o r t o the 7 Augus t req ues t off e rs 
some exp lanat ion of the me thods used by the s tate t o ra ise th e q uot a 
t he Pres ide nt wante d. Th e mi I iti a was not o r ga ni zed by th e leg is la ti on 
that had prov ide d f or r eg u lating th e c iti zen a rmy. Thi s law le ft 
actua l o r gani za ti on o f th e militi a t o th e gove rno r and co un c il, who 
44 
we re t 0 compl et e this task by June , 1794 . Th e leg is lature a ll owed 
s ix month s for determ inat ion of th e numb e r o f men e li g ibl e for th e 
mi I i ti a and fo r division of th ese men into the var ious units . Desp ite 
i n obta i ning acc urat e report s , the governor and counc il did d i ff i cu I ty . 
d i v ide the mi li tia into f ifty reg iments and four extra batta li ons . 
Th la rge r uni s , bri ga des , whi ch wer e t o ese were comb·1ned to form ·t 
form th ree divisions. Each r eg iment wa s t o co ns is t of men from on ly 
one co unty . in the state , and wh e re th e re were not enough men t o f o rm 
eg i me nt, extra batta li ons were c rea t ed or the ex is ting reg iments af ullr . 
Were ma de la rge r th an the req ui s it e t e n compani es . Beca use of these 
ica l o r politica l I imits , some of th e r eg iments not on ly had geograph· 
mo re compa n i es , but some wer e small e r. Extra batta li ons , whi ch t en or 
~hould have cons i s t e d of fiv e comp ani es , had as f ew as four o r as many 
as seven. 2 
Afte r a genera l formation was made , the next s t ep was t o c r eat e 
a com ma nd st ru cture . Tw e lve brigades were in c lu ded in thi s s tru cture . 
Individu a l 
br igades we re t o cons ist of an approx imat e ly eq ua l numbe r 
g iments . Aga in geograph ica l and po liti ca l l imits i nf luenced th e of re . 
of t he brigades . They ranged in s ize from three reg iments (on e S i ze 
from All ega ny and two from V-/ as hin gton co unty ) t o the s ix reg iments 
Of th e Ba ltimore co unty militia. In breaking with these li mit ati ons , 
eg 1ments of Frede ri ck and uppe r Montgome ry counti es we re combin ed the r . 
io ,fo rm one br iga de , and those of Prince George ' s and lower Montgome ry 
counti es formed ano the r. Brigadier genera l s we re se lect ed by th e gove rno r 
and h coun · I 1· 1e utenant co lone ls wer e c osen c i t o command the br igades ; 
for th e r . b tt I · ns Unt · I eg 1ments, and maj ors were t o command the a a ,o . ' 
the state appo inted an ad jutant gene ra I i n October' 179 4' the 
45 
reg imental and br igade command e rs re porte d direct ly to the gove rn or, 
and eve n some o f t he ma j o r s did th e s ame instead of re port ing direc t ly 
to th e i r res pective r eg imental commande r s . 
Cr ea t in g th e comp ani es wa s more diffi c ult and prove d t o be 
mor e tim e cons uming th an th e o rg an i za tion of the large r commands . 
Alth o ugh th e s t a t e had no law t o organize or r egulate th e mi I itia 
be tw ee n 17 86 and 1793, many groups of men create d the ir own voluntee r 
compa ni es dur ing th ose seve n years . A vo luntee r company o f a rti I le ry 
3 
f r om Fe l l' s Po int was organi ze d in March, 1790 . Be f ore th at date 
a t leas t one comp any, "Th e Firs t Ba lt imore Town Light Company o f 
Vo luntee r s " was es tab li s hed in 1789 . Oth e r compan i es , in c ludi ng some 
on th e Easte rn Sho r e , we re f o rm ed between 179 2 and the e nac tment of 
4 
t he 1793 mi I i t ia law. Whateve r e lse format ion o f these compani es 
may indi ca t e , the y meant a mu ltitude of prob lems t o r th e gov e rno r in hi s 
att empts t o divide th e militia into compa ni es . Th e vo l untee r compan ies 
ex is t ed and th e ir offi ce rs wer e e lect ed be fo re th e 1793 law t ook e ff ect. 
Ind ee d th ey we r e gua ranteed continue d ex is t ence unde r th e tw enty- s ixth 
section of that act. Beca use the o lde r compan ies we r e vo lun t ee r, 
they could be and wer e se lective in wh om th ey a l lowed t o j o in . Thus , 
some of the men e li g i b le for duty from a s mall area might be in c lude d 
in t he vo lu ntee r o r o lde r comp an ies . Furthe r, men from two o r mo re 
counti es mi ght be long t o these compa ni es . Th e new compan ies forme d 
und e r th e 1793 act , we re f o rmed of men f rom s mal I loca les , and we re 
s up pose d to be s tr i ct ly I imite d to these a reas . It was le ft to th e 
gove rn o r and co un c i I t o f i 11 th e gap s c reated wh en th e new comp ani es 
we r e f o rme d around th e vo lu ntee r compan ies . 
46 
There may have bee n severa l reasons wh y th e new companies we re 
formed by a reas . The s imp les t of th ese probab ly was conven ience . Loca l 
men co u ld a tte nd compa ny muste rs with less hards hip than men from outs i de 
the immed i a t e a r ea . Company commanders might personal ly know the men 
they we re r espons ib le fo r, i f those men came from the nea rby area . 
Such wa s the case in ma ny compan ies , for the off i ce rs were e lect e d. 
Further , lega l juri s diction wou ld be more e as ily de fin ed wh en an 
e ntire comp any was from one loca l In comp ani es that we r e s itu ated 
c lose t o county l ines , legal jurisdiction might be ve ry important in 
cec iding who was respo ns ibl e for j a iling men who broke th e mili ti a laws . 
Because of these probl ems and a general t ard iness in the re turn 
of comp any en ro I I men t s , th e gove rnor did not have an exact i dea of 
t he t ota l mi I iti a unde r hi s command. Wh en Secretary Knox i ssued th e 
President ' s request on 7 Augu s t , Gove rnor Thomas Sim Lee had not 
rece ive d a l I of the comp any I ists , and th e refore had not se lect e d 
of f i ce rs for some o f the comp ani es . Even though some of th e new 
compani es and a l I o f th e voluntee r compani es e lected the ir off ice rs , 
Go ve rnor Lee had f in a l approva l a nd cou ld accept o r reject any s uch 
e lection . 
With many companies not comp lete ly formed and many off icers 
not se lect e d or approved , a good pa rt of the mi I iti a co u ld not have 
h Id even one company mus t e r befo re 7 August . If a company mus t e r 
cou ld not have been he ld, then a batta l ion o r reg imenta l mee tin g wo u ld 
have bee n imposs ib le , beca use reg iments , whi ch by th e Jun e organ i zat ion 
p l an we re s upposed to cons ist of t en comp ani es , by ea rl y Augus t might 
have on ly three or four comp le t e comp a ni es , and t hese might not have me t 
except t o e lect off i ce rs . Th e condition o f th e Ma ry land militia wa s at 
an in comp let e by th e fir s t weeks of Augu st , 1794, a t wo rs t bes t confused d 
it wa s t ota l chaos . 
Th e f irs t offi c ia l r eaction t o Secret a ry Kn ox ' s re ques t d id 
not come u t· I n 1 14 Augu st the n Gove rnor Lee is
s ued ord ers fo r th e mi I it ia 
rea 1ness t o ma rch. Th ese orde rs acknowl edged th e t o be he ld in d. 5 
f act th a t t he s t at e ' s f or ces wer e in co
mp le t e ly o rgan i zed, and ca l led 
for th e offi ce rs to make e ve ry e ff ort t o comp ly with th e ca
ll regardl ess . 
Thi s ca l I spec if ie d that each reg iment s
hou ld prov ide a t ot a l of 
forty-five en/ i s t e d me n-- two se rg eants,
 two co rpora ls and fo rty-one 
Pr ivat es . 
Had a ll o f the r egiments bee n equa l in s i ze , thi s t ota l wou ld 
have t a ken 
about one-tenth of the men from eac h, o r th e equiva lent of one 
comp any. B 
ut th e r egiments we re of va rying s i ze , as we re th e compan ies 
in each reg iment , and the cal I would have t a k
en fewe r th an one man in 
fiftee n fr om some , o r more than one i n seven from oth e rs . 
Extra 
batta I . ions we re r eq uired t o send tw enty- two men, one se rgeant , one 
co rpor a l 
, and tw enty pri vates . cava l ry and a rt i I le ry we re not necessa r il y 
attach e d t o each r eg imen
t , a nd so th e gove rn or as ked that th e brigade 
comma d n e rs send h
im Ii s t s of the men ava i lab I e from each of th ese two 
bra nches of the mi I it ia . commande rs f rom a l I units we re t o ta ke v
o l-
untee r s firs t, and if necessary , use th e draft t o t i l l th e ir quot as . 
li st s of dra f t ees and vo luntee r s wer e 
t o be sent to th e gove rno r by 
6 Septemb e r. 
Th e gove rnor ' s o rde r r a ised two imp ortant po ints . 
Was th e date by wh i ch return s wer e t o be sent t o him. 
Th e firs t 
A time s pan o f 
a lmos t a , d f om th e Pres ide nt and 
month sepa rai ed Sec ret a ry Kn ox so r e r r 
the dat e by wh; ch th e i; s t s o f 
the m; 1; t ;a to be used we re t o be sent 
t o th e gove rn o r . 
Such a diffe rence co uld ha rdly be cons ide red 
48 
or aa . ~ n I z in g d h an a iding the militi a rea dy t o march at a moment' s wa rn in g. 
' overnor Lee d id not eve n iss ue hi s o rde r unti I a fu l I wee k Indeed G 
r nox sent him th e Pr es ident ' s req ues t. By de lay in g jus t thi s afte K 
mu ch ' a wee k of o r gan i zat ion for th e quot a wa s los t; but by g iv in g 
re · g imenta l comm ande rs · th f S t unt i I th e s ix o ep emb e r t o make re turn s , 
th e g ove rno r lost a l I hope of hav ing the mi li t i a he ld in readin ess 
unt · 1 1 some t ,· me a ft e r that date . I · · th d th 
n g 1v1ng e comman e rs ree wee ks 
to make the·, r r e turn s Lee fo rf e it ed any se nse of imme d iacy that he may 
have wis he d t o convey , even though hi s o rde rs we re for immediate 
acti on . in r a i s ing the quot a o f troop s from Mary land. 
Th e req ues t t o r men iss ue d by Sec retary Kn ox was mea nt to accom-
r es i de nt i a l proc lamation orde ring th e in s urge nts in wes t e rn pany a p 
Pen nsy I van·, a B f t o d ispe rse befor e th e fir s t of Sept embe r. e or e th e 
a co u ld be ca ll ed upon for actua l se rv i ce , a proc lamat ion s uch as mi I iti 
th e one Was hin gton i ss ue d wa s required by law. Kn ox se nt a cop y of 
proc lamati on t o Lee wi th th e req uest fo r mi I iti a . Th e r e fo re , the th e 
gover nor knew that t he troops wo uld not be ca l led to march un t i I after 
th e firs t t t b d of Sep t emb e r, ye t hi s req uirement for re urn s o e ma e was 
five d ays after th e ea r l ies t opportunity f or th e mi I iti a to be used. 
Thi s d th ea dl in e was not e ven for th e t roops to mu s t e r but ra e r s imp ly 
Wh e n t L he I i sts of those chosen to se rve were to be sent t o ee . 
t· ime would be cons ume d in gather in g the men in to la r ge groups , 
More 
f i nd i ng th ch prov is ions f or th em, and p lannin g e ma r · 
No · d d tha t mi ght he lp exp la in thi s de lay, 
e v , ence has bee n f aun 
othe r t han the fac t that th e militia was in comp le t e ly organ i zed . 
Th e gove rno r se nt a lette r to Knox exp la in ing that th e s t ate co un c i I 
had determ ined t hat s tate arms could not be g ive n t o tn e troops unl ess 
49 
the leg is lature gave a uth ori zati on to do so .
6 
However , any de lay th at 
this dec is ion mi ght have ca used wa s a ll ev iat ed when four day s late r 
Lee se nt anothe r let t er to Knox stating that th e co un c i I had ove rturn e d 
its prev ious dec is ion, and wou ld agree to s upply the mi I iti a with 
7 
s t at e weapons and ammun iti on. Th ese lette rs may have indi ca t ed that 
th e gove rno r was not s ure of hi s lega l contro l of th e mi I i tia , and was 
conce rned abo ut the cond i tion of th e corp s , not on ly in organ i za t ion, 
but in prov is ion and eq uipment as we l I. 
Th e second important point in the governor ' s orde r was the method 
of enro I I i ng troops . By drawin g an eq ua I numb e r of men from each 
reg iment , the demand on any one a rea s houl d have bee n more acceptab le 
t o th e c i t i zens . Seve ra l d isadvantages were c reated by th is method, 
howeve r . By taking men from vari ous comp ani es , any esp rit- de- cor ps 
within a s i ng le company would be destroyed , and men wou ld se rve unde r 
off ice rs they did not know , o r fo r that matte r might not respect . In 
an e r a of expa nd ing and deve lop in g democ ra cy , e lecti on of offi ce rs wa s 
important--espec ia l ly among men who were c iti zens f ir s t and so ldie r s 
on ly by necess ity. Milli tia cou ld not be treated li ke reg ul ar mi li t a ry 
troops as they a r e now . Consent to se rve , and to se rve under specif ic 
of f i ce rs was needed in th e mi I itia , but was ove rl ooked by Lee . Draw ing 
eq ually from each r eg iment wo u ld a lso I imit the numb er of vo luntee rs 
from any one reg iment . A grea t o utpourin g o f vo lun t ee rs d id no t occ ur 
often , the draft was needed in a lmos t eve r y county for th is ex pediti on, 
but in a t leas t one reg iment , from Ba ltimore City , th e re we re more 
volunteers than Lee ' s orde rs a l lowed. Had th ese men been used, 
some men from oth e r areas mi ght not have had to be drafted . Conj eciu re 
s uch as th i s i s nothing more than hinds ight however , and Go v rnor Lee 
did not s uff e r from this affli ct ion. 
His o rde rs stood as th ey wer e , 
and s tarted the first mob i li zat ion of the newly crea t ed Mary land 
mi I i ti a . 
1n en ro l i ng men fo r th e exped i t ion wa s s low , and in Progress . I 
many pl aces hand icappe d by the Ja ck of vo luntee rs . Probl ems faced by th e 
f" I e Id off i ce rs . 1n Ceci I co unty, wh il e not be ing typ i ca l, s how the 
con fused state of or ganization in the mi liti a . Li e utenant Co lone l 
Edward O I dh am, comma nde r of th e forty-n inth reg iment, Cec i I co unty, 
r eported t o the governor th a t he had not lea rne d of one vo l untee r 
as of 4 Sep t emb e r. 8 
The oth e r Ceci I co unty reg iment, commanded by 
i e utena nt Co lone I . d h t h l" Henry Ho I Ii ngs wo rth, expe r I ence mu c e same 
d" I ff i c u It 
y. Ho l I in gsworth off e r ed an exp lanat ion for the di s i nc li nati on 
s tat ing that th e county mi I iti a was so d iso r-
of the men to vo lunteer by 
a many me n did not know to wh ic h company or reg iment they 
gan i Zed th t 
Th ese men could not, o r wo ul d not, off e r t he ir se rv ices be longed . 
unt i I some 9 order wa s c rea t ed . 
Chaos res ul ted fro m the ea r ly formation of vo luntee r comp an ies i n 
Cec i 1 co unty, wh ich left gaps between each othe r wh e re men co u ld not 
be ad . mitted to one company or th e othe r beca use th e compani es we r e 
fu I I . Th e me n i n these gaps wer e usua I I y not nume r ous enough to form 
the i r own comp any, and because of the s i ze limits and geog raphi ca l 
div i s• 
ion of the comp ani es , they were without compan ies . In ad dition, Lieu-
tena t n Co lone l Ho l I in gsworth c la imed that bo undary d isp utes between 
compa · i I · I n1es ca used de lay , wit h compa n ies att empting -o c a im a r ge r a reas 
an d th f th t e re f o r e mo re men . A comp lete reo rg ani zat ion o e coun y 
mi I i t i Th e res u lt o f a l I of 
a was proposed, but it would take time . 
th i s . th f confus ion i n Ceci 
I 
county was that no troops from e 1 e r o the two 
reg imonts marc hed with th e ma i n body of Ma ry land mil iti a towa rd 
10 
wes t e rn Penn sy lva ni a . 
5 1 
Anoth e r comp ! ica ti on that s lowed enro ll ment was th e lack of 
comp any gr ade offi ce rs . In some co unt ies , off ice rs had not been 
a ppo inted unt i I t he firs t o f Se ptembe r; t hi s was th e ca use for one rog i-
11 12 
ment in v✓ as hin gton co unty and one in l<ent co unty. A de fi c iency of 
offi ce rs ex is t ed not on ly beca use of poo r org an i za tion , but a lso beca use 
many of th e of f ice rs res igned th e i r comm iss ions , poss ib ly t o avo id 
se rvi ce on t he wes t e rn ex ped i t ion. 
15 
13 
Reg iments in Caro li ne , 
14 
Montgome ry 
and Ta lbot , los t o ffi ce rs through res ignati ons at thi s cruc ia l 
t i me . Although no direct connec t i on between th e res ignat ions and th e 
d i ffi cu lty i n ra is i ng troops was made , each re port of res ign a t ions 
ment ione d t hat troops were re luct ant t o vo luntee r , and a dra ft was 
nee ded. Also , in many cases these off ice rs rece ived comm iss ions some 
t ime pr io r t o the ca l I , and co uld have r es ign ed earli e r . Even if no 
furth e r conn ect ion can be made , th e res ignat ion, and the lack of 
off ice rs c rea t ed mo re wo rk f or th e gove rn or and co un c i I. In th e mids t 
of asse mbl ing a det achment fo r th e wes twa rd ma rch, th ey had t o conce rn 
themse lves wit h se lect i ng and comm iss ioni ng new off ice rs . 
For at leas t so me men on th e Eas t e rn Shore , th e knowledge th ai-
a long ma r ch f aced th em had a de trimenta l eff ect on e ff o rts t o ra ise 
16 
th e quot a . Th e men from th e Eas t e rn Shore woul d not on ly have t o 
ma rc h wi t h t he troops from th e wes t e rn s ho re t o Penn sy lvani a , they 
wo u ld have a co ns i de rab le mar ch t o reach th e s t arting po int o f rh s 
wes t e rn s ho re t roops , p lus a haza rdous c ross ing of th e Chesa pea ke by 
boat . A dr aft was necessa ry in a lmos t a l I of -rh e Eas t e rn Shore counti es 
17 
fo r jus t t hi s bas i c reason. 
52 
A draft of men was necessa ry in the western s hore co unt ies as we I I. 
Even Ba ltimore c ity and co unty wer e fo rced to draft men , much to the 
d isg us t of Br igad ie r Ge ne ra l Samu e l Smith , the command er of the Ba lti -
mo r e c ity br igade , a nd command e r of the Maryl and detachment that 
18 
ma r ched i nto wes t e rn Pen nsy lvania . In fact , eve ry co unty on th e 
wes t e rn s hore , exce pt Prince Geo rg e ' s , r eported need ing a draft of 
men. Troops of th e th ird r eg iment , Montgomery county , demand ed a 
bo unty be f or e th ey wou ld marc h. Th e r eg iment ra ised th is bounty , by 
t..:nreported mea ns , but st i 11 had t o draft men; i t wa s a lso r eported 
that some of the vo luntee r s wh o agreed t o mar ch after rece iv ing th e 
19 
bounty, were under age , and co uld not lega l ly march with th e corps . 
Un fortun at e ly , most of t he other count ies d id not report the reaso ns for 
th e i r def ic ie ncy of vo luntee r s . 
Commande rs o f the two co unt i es farthest wes t , Al lega ny a nd 
Was hington, did r eport th e i r r easons for us ing a draft , and why that 
draft was less th a n s uccess fu l . All egany co unty encompassed that 
part o f Ma ry land c losest t o the area wh e re th e "Wh is key Rebe ls " were 
ope rat i ng , and was somewhat i nf luenced by th e i r act ions. Di rect access 
betwee n the c it i ze ns o f A I I eg any county and the ins urg ents in wes t e rn 
Pennsy lvan ia wa s hamp ered by the Appa lach i an and All eg heny mounta ins , 
howe ve r. Nc nethe I ess , th e mi I it i a in th e one r eg iment in the co unty 
20 wer e r epo rted t o be wa iver i ng and severa l off ice rs r ef used t o se rve . 
Troo ps wer e eventua I I y ra ised in th e co unty , and th e state government 
se nt th em arms to protect themse lves and to qu iet any unres t th at mi ght 
cont inu e . Th ese same trcops wer e used to protect Cumber land , in 
2 1 
Was hington co unty , from threatened attack . 
W~shington co unty had much more diffi culty in rai s ing it s 
quota than did All ega ny co unty. Th e mountains that kept All ega ny and 
th e weste rn counti es of Penn sy lvania apa rt , d id not extend so mu ch 
into Wa s hi ngton co unty, so th e re was less of a natura l barri e r t o 
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keep th e ins urgents out of Wa s hi ngt on. Sympathy for t he rebe ls 
r eported ly r an high i n pa r ts of Washin gt on co unty, and a pa rt of one of 
the r eg iments th e re , th e twe nty-fourth, threa t ened t o t ake t he s t at e 
22 
a r sena l at Freder ick in s upport of the rebe l I ion. Men in th is 
23 
co unty ri ot ed again s t the draft, and eve n beat th e ir off ice rs when 
24 
a draft was attem~t ed. 
Co nce rn ove r th e eff ect of a draft, even though no draft was 
used , was exp ressed by Li e utenant Co lone l Benjam i n Brooks of the 
fourtee nth r eg iment, Pr in ce Geo rge ' s county . By ext ending the time 
Ii mi t a I I owed by the gove rno r, Broo ks avo ided th e necess ity of a 
draft . Pe rh aps act ions s uc h as th is , by th e command ing offi ce rs in 
Prince Geo rge ' s co unty exp la in why that co u~ty was the on ly one not 
t o need a dr aft, a nd a lmost the on ly one that s upp l ied its ful I quota . 
Non e of the r eports ment ioned above were rece ived by Governor 
Lee befo r e th e fir s t o f Sep t emb e r, th e dead I ine set by the Pres id ent for 
the weste rn Pe nn sy lvania ins urg ents t o di spe r se . The only ev id ence 
fo und that wo uld indi ca t e Le knew o f the prob lems in ra is ing the quot as 
was a I ette r from Jo hn Car li I e , commande r of one of the Harford co unty 
r eg ime nt s , the f orty-second . Car l i le r eq uest ed in stru cti ons for ho lding 
th e men drafted from hi s r eg ime nt, b ca use he f ea red that "ma ny who 
a r e adve r se t o th e se rvi ce may be some hundred mil es off before the 
26 
ge ne r a I rend ez vous . " Quake rs had a lso bee n drafted t o ti 11 hi s 
r eg iment ' s quot a . Beca use th ey r efu sed t o se rve or pay for a s ub st itute , 
1 e asked f o r direct i ons fo r hand I ing them. Ca r I· I 
Th e gove rno r' s r ep ly t o t he r eq ues t s made by Ca rli le was t o a I low 
th e reg ime n t a I 
commande r di sc r etion in find i ng so lution s to th e prob lems . 
Actu a 1 1 y t he re was I i tt I e e I se that Lee cou Id r ecomme nd. He conc urred 
w·t 
I h Ca r I i I e ' s 
s ugges ti on t o gath e r th e draftees i nto an enca mpment 
wh e r e they co uld r ece ive training and be ke pt from dese rting. Lee 
~t a t e d th a t th e mi I itia l aw gave s pec i fi c ins tructi ons fo r act ion 
t owa rd me n wh o neg lect e d t he ir duty; but he a lso me ntion ed th at 
Car li 1 ' es own judgme nt "a ss i s t ed by a vi ew of th e c ircumstances attending 
each pa r t icular case" wou ld enable the commande r to det e rmin e appropri a t e 
act· 27 ion fo r th e Qua ke rs who r efused t o se rve . 
By th e fir s t wee k of Septemb e r, Gove rnor Lee kn ew of s undry 
Prob lems that wer e inhibiting the effo r t s to rai se th e quota . Many 
s uch r epo rts ha ve 
Oth e r prob lems . 
t o se rve and t o 
been menti one d so far , ye t th e gove rnor was aware o f 
Th e re wa s a t leas t on e case of troops r efus i ng both 
28 
provide s ub s titutes , as th e law a l low ed. 
Th e law 
required 
tha t fi e ld offi ce rs be he ld r es pons ibl e fo r findin g s ub s titutes 
i f th e me n themse lves d id not do so . Apparently some of th e men draft ed 
from C a lve rt co unty did not furni s h subs titutes , and the r eg imenta l 
comma nd
e r as ke d th e gove rnor fo r an opini on on wh eth e r th e fi e ld offi ce rs 
Wer e r · d. b t·t . 1--,... ~-h ea ll y fo be he ld li ab le fo r finding and fun ,ng s u s 
I 
u,eS ' at 
th E, e I. - n 1 s t e d men f a il ed t o provide . 
[ s i c] t he ac t makes i t hi s [th e fi e ld office r' s ] duty t o procure 
SUb s tit t . " t xp ct th u es " i t would be " unreasonabl e and oppress i ve o e e e 
Off i 29 ce r t o pay fo r th e s ubs t i tute out o f hi s own money . Lee gave th e 
furth e r opin ion that the law wa s a t f ault, and s hould not necessar i ly 
be b 0 
eye d t o the lette r. Aga in, the gove rno r left th e fin a l dec is ion t o 
Th e gove rnor rep Ii ed th at "a I tho 
55 
the ott· I cers in t 
he fie ld, and use d the mi I iti a law as a gu ide lin e 
fo r acti on . 
Progress on 
rais in g th e quota from Ma ryl and was s lowe d by many 
facto rs . The gove rno r de layed iss uing hi s o rde r t o beg in enro l I in g 
troo ps , and th en 
gave th e commande rs unti I th e firs t wee k in Sep t emb e r 
thi s t as k. Th e r eg imenta l commande rs faced poo r organization 
t o comp lete 
res i gnati ons of 
some of th e juni o r officers , and boundary d is putes . 
Some of these 
prob lems wou ld be so lved thro ugh th e eff orts of f ie ld 
Of t· I ce rs b f 
e o re th e troops marc hed wes t; some would not, and would keep 
Sig · n1fi can t numb e rs of me n from eve r making th e march. 
Yet, eve n though Lee knew of these diffi cu lti es , he r emain ed 
optimi s t · ic , at leas t o ff i c ia ll y . In a publi c proc lamati on printe d in 
the n ewspa pe rs thro ughout the s tate , th e gove rno r, acting as commande r-
in- ch· ief of the s t at e mi I iti a , fe lt "pa rti cul a r sati s fact ion in a ff o rdin g 
hi s t eS t
irnony t o th e me rit of the mi I iti a of thi s s t ate ." Such praise 
was ca used by the g rea t numb e rs of me n who "have mane fes t ed th e ir 
Patr iot" is m ... by making a vo lu nta ry t e nd e r of th e ir se rvi ces " for 
th e Present d·t· 30 expe 1 1 on-. 
Thi s message , i ss ued 29 August , but not 
, 
Pr inted 
on the Eastern Sho re unti I 9 Sep t emb e r, mu s t have been an ef fort 
to ass ure th e popu lati on that the wes t e rn insurrecti on wou l d be contro l led . 
Was not gr ounde d in fa ct, for ne ithe r great numb e rs o f men we re It 
Prepa ring t o serve , no r were th e me n th at were go ing as vo luntee rs . 
It s hould 
be r ememb e red that th e re wa s no evidence f ound th at Lee 
rece ived t Sh reports on th e st atus o f the mi I it i a on the Eas ern or e unt i I 
after 29 Augu st. Th us , wh i I e he cou Id honest I y c I a im that he had 
"h 
eB rd of n 
1 
[E as t e rn] wh e re vo lunteers have not 
op ace on th i s s hore 
rendered a f th t h had hea rd 
dra ft unn ecessary " the re i s no proo a e 
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from any I Pace on the Eastern Shore . 
Lee was a I itt le mo re rea li s ti c in hi s progress 
r eport to Sec re tary 
of the Treasu ry Ha mi I t on. 3 1 
Sti 11 prom is ing th at the infan try would be 
mu ste red on t ime , th e gove rnor exp ressed doubts ab
out th e ca va l ry and 
a rt i I I e ry. 
Lee wrot e , 
even fewe r 
Because of the ve ry r ecent o rgan i za t ion of the s t ate mi I iti a , 
a fe w me n from e i the r branch of th e se rvi ce had tra in ed, and 
had bee n eq uipped. He re th e gove rno r was on s ha key ground- -
cava I ry was the g lamo ur bra nch o f 
th e se rv i ce , and seve ra l t roops had 
bee n formed before th e 1793 law was enacted. 
Th e a rti I le ry wa s mu ch 
.the sa me , 
a case in po in t be i ng the Fe ll' s Po int Arti l le ry comp any, 
fo un ded i n 1790, wh i ch was th
e on ly art i I le ry that accompa ni ed th e 
co rps on its march into wes t e rn Penn sy lvan ia . By admitt i ng Ma ry I and 
that th e ca I I had "produ
ced e ff ects ve ry un eq ua I a t d i ff e rent PI aces and 
at d · lffe ren t po in ts in time s i nce th e requi s iti on wa s made ," Lee at 
approached th e truth i n th i s lette r t o Hami lt on. Wh at he did not I eas t 
say was th at a favor ab le r es ponse seemed t o be th e except ion ra th e r 
than th e rul e . 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Th e nex t o rde rs i ss ue d by th e Pres ide nt we re fo r th e assemb ly of 
beg in , a nd we re sent to Lee by Secretary of th e Treas ury 
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troops to 
Hami I ton on 29 Augu s t 1794. Sec retary of War Henry Knox 
Alexander 
had b ee n ca l led away on pe rsona l bus iness , and aft
er c learing hi s 
dep~ t f th ar ure with th e Pres i de nt, was absent from hi s offi ce o r e per iod 
Of · mid-Au gust t o mid-Novemb e r, 1794 . 
Ham i I ton took ove r Knox ' s mi I d a ry 
dut· 
I es wh i I e he was gone . 
Th e men from th e Eas t e rn Shore of Ma ryl and 
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wer e to trave I t o Ba I t i mor e and asse mb I e the re with the troops a I r ea dy 
in the c i ty . Those troops that f o rmed th e res t o f th e state detachment 
wer e to awa i t furthe r orde r s , but a ll wo u l d eventua ll y r endezvous at 
Wi 11 i amsport , and then marc h t o Fo rt Cumb er l and t o meet th e Vi r g i n i a 
mi I iti a befor e enter i ng Pennsy l van i a . 
Ham i I ton ' s l ett e r a l so r eq ues t ed that Lee not i ss ue orde rs fo r th e 
mi I i ti a to beg in assemb l i ng unti I th e first of Se ptemb er . Wi thout 
stat ing as mu ch , Hamilton kn ew that th e insurgen t s wer e g i ve n unt i I 
t hat date t o di spe r se . Anti c i pat i ng that negot i ation wou l d fa i I and 
that the i ns urgents would not comp l y wi th th e o rder t o d i sper se , th e 
Pres i dent o rdered th e mi I iti a assemb l ed. Hami I t on ' s l etter a l so i mp I i ed 
that the genera I gove rnment wo u I d s upp I y art i 11 ery fo r th e Mary I and 
co rp s , beca use Ham i I t on sta t ed that the same, with camp eq uipment 
a l r ea dy r eq ues t ed , wou l d be se nt ahea d o f th e det achment t o Wi 11 i amsport . 
Lee i ss ued o rd e r s i n acco rdance with t he Pres ident ' s r eq ues t , and 
commanded the Easte rn Sho r e mi I it i a t o beg i n th e ir jou rney to Ba l t i mo r e .
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Unde r th e gov rnor ' s previ ous o rde r o f 14 Augus t , a t ota l o f 74 1 men 
were expect ed f r om th e e i ght count i es th at made up th e Easte rn Sho r e . 
Acco rd i ng to one o f th e f ew r eports of the ir ar r i va I, I ess th an 400 
34 
men arr ived i n Ba l timo re . Not until 16 Sep t emb e r did these troops 
beg in t o arr i ve i n la r ge numb e r s at th e ir i niti a l r endezvous . An 
ea rl i e r r eport , made on 12 Sep t emb e r , s t at ed th at a pa rt of th e Queen 
Anne ' s and Ta l bot co unty quotas had arrived, but th i s group was commanded 
by an ens i gn , and pr obab l y numb ered l ess than thirty men . I f th e f i r st 
menti oned r eport was to be be ! i eved , f ew o f these men wer e phys i ca l l y 
fi t t o continue th e ma r ch t o Penn sy l van i a . Many suffer d from so r e l egs , 
and other s wer e a ff l i c t ed with " augues & drops i es ;" th e i r condit i on was 
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so ba d that the commande r of the ent i re Ma ry land detachment , Samue l 
Smi th , ad ded in this r eport , that "i ns t ead o f me n tor se rv ice we are 
burthened with s i ck , without physic ians , nurses o r hosp ita ls .
11 36 Smith 
f ea re d that mo re me n wou ld become s i ck and some might die , an d that 
the hea lthy wou ld be d isg us t e d with the trea tmen t that the s ick r ece ived 
and desert . 
In th e same r eport , th e genera I ment ioned that the Ea st ern Shore 
mi I i t ia wer e without fi e ld office rs , thu s rende r ing the group without a 
lea de r. Eventua ll y Li e utenant Co lone l Perry Benson , from Ta lbot co unty, 
wou Id take command of these men, but not unt i I th e mi I i t i a wa s r ea dy 
to leave Ba lt i more . Anoth e r probl em with th e Eas t e rn Shore mi I it ia 
wa s th at ma ny o f t hem were s ub s t itutes . Sm ith had a genera ll y dim 
vi ew o f both th e s ub st itute and th e man wh o sent one , and th e genera l 
gave ve nt t o th is op ini on i n h is r eport t o Lee . Th e s ub s t itutes d id 
r ot e ven have s hoes , in many cases , and we re ve ry poo rly out f i tted 
o th e rwi se , a lso from the looks of them , Smith doub ·red the ir fi ghting 
ab i I i ty . Suc h wre t ched men wer e sent, th e commande r sa id, beca use 
th e s ub s t i t ute ca red for I i tt le but th e mon ey he wou ld rece ive for 
se rving , and the man who sen t a s ub st i tute ca red not wheth e r the man 
r e sent was i n good phys ica l conditi on, but on ly that thi s s ub stitute 
went . S ince on ly abo ut 400 me n arr ived from t he Eastern Shore out 
of +h& 74 1 expect ed, it wa s apparent th at more than a few men neg lected 
eve n t o se nd s ub s titutes . 
Before th e Eastern Shore mi I i tia arrived in Ba lt imore , th e gove rnor 
rece i ved o rd e rs fo r th e e ntire corps t o march t o the rendezvous a t 
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~\Ii 11 i arnspo rt . In sendin g these o rde rs Hami I t on s tressed that speed 
was o f great imp ortance as th e wi nte r season wa s r apid ly app roaching . 
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He a lso comme nte d t hat th e ri ot s in wes t e rn Ma ry l and were ca us i ng some 
conce rn in the fe de ra l gove rnmen t . It was hoped tha t by movin g the 
co r ps rap i d ly toward Wi 11 iamspo rt, on ly a f ew mi /es from Hage r s t own, 
t he s ite o f many o f the ri o t s , the s p i r i t of " rebe ll ion i n Was h i ngt on 
an d All ega ny co unti es " wou l d be damp ened . From approx ima t e ly 12 
Sep t embe r unt i I 25 Se ptemb e r, very I itt le comm unica tion conce rn i ng 
the troop s f o r th e wes t e rn Pe nn sy lvani a expedit ion was i ssued from th e 
gove rn o r ' s off i c . Th e time pe ri od was t i I led with i ss u ing o rd e rs 
for r a is ing an addit iona l numb e r of mi I i t ia to put down th e r ioi-s in 
the two wes t e rn Ma ry la nd co unti es and t o de fe nd Fre de ri ck town aga in s t 
t hrea t ene d attac k. An acco unt of these e ffo rts , and the ri ot s that 
ca used th em, w i I I be the fo c us of th e next chapte r. 
Whi le th e gove rnor was devot ing mos t of hi s t ime t o the threats 
in Ma ry l and-- he was e ve n o rde red by th e co un c i I t o go t o Wash i ngton 
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co unty to le nd mo ra l s upport t o the friend s of gove rnme nt- - both 
Sec r et a ry Hami /t on a nd Ge ne ra l Samue l Smi th wer e bus y wit h th e quotas 
fo r th e Pe nn sy lvan i a marc h. Ham i l ton bega n send i ng lette rs direct ly 
to Smi t h on 15 Sep t emb e r , wi th r equ es t s that th e gene ra l take the f ie ld 
as soon as poss ib le , and th at he beg i n a co r respond ence wi th Governo r 
f-l en ry Lee o f Virg i n i a , wh c wa s ap po i nte d to command the entire mi I i t ia 
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a rmy . Th e next le tter from Hami I t on t o Smi th invo lved p lans fo r the 
rrove to Fo r t Cumb e r land , inc lud i ng sending r eg ul a r a rmy troops t o 
esco r t the promise d arti I l e ry t ha t was on i t s way t o t ha t r endez vou s . 
Another le tte r a pprove d dra fts for $37 , 000 tha t Smith ea r l ie r req ues t e d 
to pay for the ex penses o f the Mary land corp s fo r t he march. Th is la s t 
let t e r , da t e d 29 Se pte mb e r , was sent to Smi th at Frede r i ck, and 
4 1 
indi ca t e d that the ge ne ra l was s t i 1 1 i n Frede r i ck at tha t lat e da t e . 
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wer e a 1me con us ing, probably beca use they 
Repo r ts from Smith t t· f · 
e e and inc luded comments on th e prog ress of the s t at e were in compl t . 
req u is . t· I ion as 11 
we as th e f ede ra l r eques t. Th e gene ra l r eported t o Gove r-
th at 300 Eas t e rn Sho re troops ma rched from Ba ltimore nor Le eofMa r y l and 
on 17 Septe mb e r, and th a t anoth er 430 men wer e s up pose d towa rd F r ede ri ck 
t o l e 42 ave t hree days I a t e r. 
Yet on 2 1 Sep t emb e r, Smith wrot e from 
Ba lt imo r e t ha t on I y 43 
me n, whi ch ca used Smith no sma l I amount of conce rn. 
470 men from th e Eas t e rn Sho re had marched-- a def i-
c ien cy of 330 
Th e nex t · inte l I i gence , thi s time from Frede ri c k, s t at ed th
a t the re we r e 
only 8 25 mi I iti a a t th
at p lace , and many of those were unfit fo r 
dut y. 44 Th e mi I i t ia co unted in 
Shore 8 ' a l t imo r e , Harfo rd, and Anne Arun de l co unti es . 
thi s r eport wer e th ose from th e Eas t e rn 
Inc luded al so was 
one company o f a rti I le ry-- f ifty men--that was without f ie ld p ieces . Th e 
commande r 
s t a t ed th at he expect ed 150 men from Al lega ny and Washingt on 
count · ies ; if tha t numb e r did reach th e rendez vo us , th ese two counti es 
ove r f. I 1 
led th e ir quot as in s pite of the draft ri ot s and a ll eged di rect 
inf lue nce f 
rom th e Pe nns y lva ni a in ~.urge nts . Th e re were a lso some 200 
men at Hage rs t own, but these may o r may not have been a party of the 
sta t e req ui s iti o n used t o put down the ri ot s i n that area . As of 
27 Se t P e mb e r, then, Smith counted a fi e Id force of f
rom 900 t o I I 00 
men ' de pe nding on wh eth e r o r not the militi a in Hage rs t own wer e 
und e r h. i s command f o r th e f ede ra l quot a . 
As th e corps began t o take s hape at the Frede r ick rendezvous , 
Smi t h f aced new probl ems . H
e had been continua l ly concerned abo ut 
obta i n · F d . k h b 
1 




rom Ma ry I and, but now at re e r1 c e egan 
to Worry about los ing those few men he had. Sup p li es were of cons t ant
 
conce rn to Sm i tn--espec i a I I y b I an ket s and s hoes for t he men' but the 
6 1 
s ituat· ion a t th· I S rendezvous brought th e genera l a lmos t to despa ir. 
On October th e first he wrote t o th e governor that th e "s ituation was 
d ist ress ing" at leas t 63 men from th e Eastern Shore gro up we re s i ck 
because o f t he great t emp erature variati ons , 
and th e men had not enough 
b lankets t 46 
0 keep themselves warm. On t op 
of that, th e co rp s had 
no medi c i ne t o trea t th e s ick , and doctors were ve ry fe w, if th e re were 
any ai· a l I . Emergency procedu res s uch as us ing the Frede rick co unty 
o use as a n infirmary ca used unres t among some of the c iti zens , a court h 
s ituat· ion th a t Smith wished to avo i d, but cou ld not he lp. Th e genera l 
fee lings at thi s juncture by wr iting to Lee that "it wou ld s umma . r1 zed hi s 
of c rue l ba rb a rity to attempt t o for ce men who have wi I I ing ly 
off e red th . 
be an act 
8 1 
r se rvi ces t o ma r ch further in th e s i tuati on they are now." 
a ded t hat he co u l d not f a u l t the offi ce rs beca use they had don e He d 
" everything th a t me n can do " in commanding troops that wer e tra in ed 
e n I y " as w 8 I I as ti me wou I d adm i t." 
Smith a lso had to dea l with dese rti on from the ranks . On th e 
th i rd of 
night.47 
October he r e ported th at seven had ru n off dur ing th e prev ious 
I n a I ate r repo rt, he c I a imed that a t ot a I of 63 men desertec 
the entire ma rc h--a ll of them s ub s titutes . Th e lack of cava lry during 
so menti oned i n the 3 October repo rt. Th e general guessed that was a l 
governor ' s orde rs had not been unders t ood, for if they had , at leas t th e 
100 
cav I t He added that the 
a ry would have been with th e deta chmen • 
cava l ry of f" "b l t fau lt beca use th ey cou ld have taken 
1 ce rs were poss I y a 
Up on th emse lves t o vo luntee r , and ap parent ly thef did not. it 
Even if it was an act of c rue l barbar ity, Smith marched the 
His first r eport from that p l ace , 
48 det achment on to W i I I i ams port. 
dated 9 October, aga in confused the 
rea l s i ze of hi s force. 
Th e 
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gene ra I c I . a imed th a t a corps of 1559 was with him on tha t date . 
Bo th 
previ ous a nd 
s ub seq ue nt repo rts indi ca t e th at he did not have th at many 
men wh en he left Ba ltimore , 
and co ns ide r in g th e me n he d isc harged o r 
lef t s ic k ro ute , hi s command a t Wi I I iams port co uld not have a long the 
bee n mu ch mor e th an I 100 men, plus offi ce rs . Th e actu a l t ot a l was 
hinted a t wh e n Smith r e ported th at th e co rps would fo rm only two 
reg ime nts and one extra batta l ion--probab ly a t ot a l of twenty-f i ve 
comp an ies if the re wer e 45 men in each comp a ny, whi ch wa s ra re ly th 
s · t mi h ' s r eport brought out anoth er inte res ting po int. Wh en the 
t roops fr . . . om Al lega ny a nd Was hington co unti es Jo ine d the co rp s at 
Wi 11 i 
case . 
ams port , th ey wer e accomp ani ed by one I ie utenant co lone l and one 
ma · Jo r , fo r 
a fo r ce of abo ut 150 men. Th e gene ra l was for ced t o dec line 
se rvi ces o f th ese two offi ce rs beca use th e s i ze of hi s command co uld th e 
r.ot wa rrant three li e ute nant co lone ls and s ix maj o rs . A s urplus of f i e ld 
i ce rs was one of th e few prob lems Smith fa ced that he probab ly grade off" 
d id not mu ch . d min . 
Vi rtua I I y eve ry re port Smith made to the gave rno r ment ioned the 
lack of s upp I i es that p I 
ag ued the de tachment . As ear I y as 23 Augus t 
gene ra l began reques ting s upp l ies , and trans po rtat ion fo r those the 
t o ca rry 
s upp I i es . He es timated th at e ight wagons would be neede d 
s up p li es 49 fo r eac h r eg ime nt . 
espe . c , a 1 ly f o r th e East e rn Shore troops , and Smith had t o remind the 
Shoes and b lanke t s were in s hort s up p ly , 
gove rno r that if 
desert o r di e of expos ure . 
f rom a t th de f i c ie ncy of powd e r as from th e age o f that powd e r ha ad been 
th 
·t · s wE· r e not furn is hed, th e men wou ld 
ese necess 1 1 e ·. 
Even munitions were sca rce , but not so mu ch 
sto red in th t Frede ri ck s in ce the Revo luti on. 
es at e a rse nal a t 
s ug 5C ges t e d that a l I t he powd e r in the arsena l be t aken out and remade . 
Smi t h 
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Th e a rti I le ry prom ised Mary land by the federa l gove rnment wa s not 
s upp li ed by the first of Oct obe r, no r we re s hoes and warm c lothing th e 
sta t e promi sed , r eport ed Smi th . Th e comman de r s pec ifi ed th at 1000 
pa i rs of shoes were needed . In ad diti on, Smith commented th at the bee f 
s upp ly in Fr e de ri ck was "abom ina ll y bad.
11 5 1 
Th e s upp ly s ituati on s ho uld have improved afte r 9 Octobe r--o r rather 
the admini s trati on o f the few s uppli es ava i I abl e s hould have improved 
a fte r th a t da t e . By a uth or i za tion of Gove rnor Henry Lee of Virg ini a , 
Smi th appo inted a brigade qua rte rmas t e r .
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He a lso appo inted a 
fo ragemas t e r, but judg i ng from th e r eported numbe r of ca va l ry , and Smi th ' s 
many req uests fo r wa gons , t he re was probab ly very I ittl e forage to be 
maste red. Pr io r to th ese appo i ntme nts , th e Maryland detachment ha d bee n 
witho ut centra l contro l of e ith e r d is tribution or proc urement of 
s upp l ies . Gove rno r Thomas S im Lee direct ed th e fi e ld offi ce rs to fend 
for th emse lves and th e ir me n, and pass not es to pay for any s uppli es 
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~urchased . Obv ious ly , unde r th i s previ ous meth od of s upply , confu s ion 
r e igned. Beca use th e re wer e no r eports on s upp l ies dat dafte r th 
appo intment of s upply offi ce rs , it is im poss ib le to det e rmine if these 
men he lped ease proc urement of s up p li es . 
Indeed, ve ry f ew repo rts of any kind have been found for th e 
period from 9 Oct obe r to 3 Novemb e r , when Smith sent a deta il ed I is t 
c f the mi I i t ia the n at Un iontown , Penn sy lvan ia to th e gove rnor . Ge ne ra l 
Smith ' s f i na l report from Mary lan d came from Wi 11 iamspo rt , and was 
dated 9 Octobe r. In thi s r e port he s t at ed that h is co rps would r ndezvous 
with th e Virg ini a co r ps at For t Cumb e r la nd, Mary land , on 14 Octobe r. 
Ne furth e r i nte ll i ge nce f rom Smith has bee n found except from t he abo ve 
me nti oned 3 Nove mb e r s t at ement. Loca l newspape r a rt i c les and person I 
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letters ind icate that t he two sta t e mi I iti a forces wer e at Fort Cumb e r land 
by 16 Octobe r at the la t est . In a lette r fo Edmund Rando lph, Pres ide nt 
Wash in gton me nt ioned th a t he r evi ewed th e Mary l and and Vi rgin ia troops 
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on that da t e . 
Fin a lly, then , th e mi I itia brigade from Ma ry l and was po ised and 
r eady to march aga ins t the "Wh i skey Rebe ls . " Orders for th e Vi rg in i a 
and Mary land mi I i t i as t o ma r c h t owa rd Uniontown , Pe nn sy lvan i a we r e 
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i ss ued by Gove rno r He nry Lee on 2 1 Oct obe r . Hami lt on r epo rted 
lea rn i ng that these me n wer e about tw enty mil es from Uni ontown on 
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3 1 October . Th e combine d co r ps r eached the ir des t inati on on abo ut 
2 Nove mb e r, after mar ch i ng mu ch o f the way through ra i n and 
cons equent ly muddy roads . From th is loca t ion, o rd e rs we r e iss ued on 4 
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Nove mbe r fo r th e move t owa rd th e Pi tts bu r gh area . Once th e re , 
var ious lea de rs of the ins urge nts and oth e r s us pect s wer e captured . 
By 25 Nove mb e r, Th e Washington Spy r eporte d that th e mi I it ia was back 
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in th e state , and wo u l d soon be d i scha rg ed. 
Smith ' s f i na l r epo rt , as me nt ione d, was made from Un iontown and 
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cated 3 Nove mb e r. Th i s r eport containe d th e most det a i led acco unt 
of th e sta t e mi I i t i a found , and the acco unt was not f avorab le . Th e 
de fi c ie ncy in t ot a l nu mbe r of troops wa s so great th at the comma nd e r 
co uld not a djus t it to s em larger than it was , a l tho ugh he did i nc l ude 
troops left s i ck at va ri o us p laces o n the ro ut e of th e ma r ch, beg inn i ng 
i n Ba lt imo re . Pres i de nt Wash i ngton r eq ues t e d 2350 mi I it ia men from 
Ma ryland ; Smi th co u l d count o n ly 111 5 rea dy for duty at Uni ontown- - mu ch 
less th an ha l f of the req ues t . 
Eve n co unti ng a I I o f th e troo ps unde r hi s comma nd a t one po i ni- o r 
anothe r , Smi th comma nd ed on ly a f ew mo r e than 1700 men, plus 100 offi ce rs . 
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In outlining how th is numb e r dwind led, Smith po inted oui- th at 129 men 
wer e left s ick at Ba ltimore , Freder ick and Thoml inson1 s . Th e re were 
a lso th e s ixt y- t hree me n that deserted dur i ng the mar ch, a ll s ub s t itutes 
as Smi th sa id. These numb e rs , t ot a li ng less th an 200 men, may not be 
important o r d is turb ing . Di sease and dese rt ion were not unus ua l fo r 
e ighteenth ce ntu ry a rmi es , espec ia ll y c iti zen a rmi es . But Smith r epo rted 
tha t he de t ached a lmos t 150 me n at Fr ede ri ck and Fort Cumb e r land . Th ey 
we re needed t o prot ec t th e parts of Ma ryl and th at had ea r li e r been 
threat ened by ri ot s . 
Withi n th e tota l s trength at Uni ontown , th Ei command e r inc luded 
a fu l I company o f a rti I le ry . Th ese men were the previ o us ly menti oned 
vo iun tee r gro up f rom Fe l I 1 s Po int and Ba lt imore . (Smith d id not report 
on t he weapons ava i I ab I e t o hi s trcops , and it is not known if the 
a rti I le ry co mp any had a ny fi e ld p ieces .) Less th an one troop of horse , 
on ly e ightee n pr ivat es and three offi ce rs , were I i st ed. Such a sma l I 
numb e r was s ignifi ca nt wh en comp a red t o th e 200 ca va l ry Wash i ngt on 
requ es t ed from Ma ry land. 
Excuses fo r th e defi c iency in th e t ot a l numb e r of ca va lry va ri ed. 
Smith thought i t was due t o a mi s unde rs t and ing of the gove rnor ' s o r ig ina l 
o rde r fo r th e mi I i t ia t o mu ste r. Th e gove rnor reported to Hami I ton 
tha t t he poo r atte nd ance was due t o t he r ecent orga ni za ti on of t he mi I iti a , 
and the fac t th at the ca va l ry had not enough t ime t o tra in before th e 
ca l I was made . Roge r Ne lso n, a cava l ry commande r from Frede r ick county, 
sa id t ha t o rde rs fo r the ca va l ry t o mus t e r ha d a rrived so lat e th at many 
me n in hi s troo p had ma de oth e r p lans and co u ld not d is rupt th e ir 
pe rsona l a ff a irs . Bes i des , wrot e Ne lson t o th e gove rnor , he pe rsona ll y 
woul d not go with th e troo ps un less it was at th e command of th e ent i re 
Ma ry I a nd 60 ca va lry. 
a ,mes , o e mo re va lidity in Nel son ' s las t 
Th e re seemed, t t· t b 
comme t n th an the 
excuses of e ithe r Smith o r Lee . Arrogan ce may have 
kept some of t he cava I r y troops away from th e det achment. Th e exc use 
Lee gave Ham i I t on 
notwiths tanding , th e gove rno r hinted at something 
Ve ry c lose t 0 
a rrogance in a I ette r t o Roge r ~!e I so n wh en he s t at ed tha t 
many cava lry wou ld no t vo luntee r un less oth e r cava l ry from t he s t a t e 
a so ca l led. Thi s lette r conta ined an importa nt acco unt of th e Were I 6 1 
prob I ems L ee face d in r a is ing the cava l ry , a nd seemed t o be s up po rte d 
by r eports from oth e r so urces . 
The gove rno r po inted t o one maj o r diffi culty that kept the ca va lry 
from respond ing t o the ca l I: 
th e impract i cab i I ity of draft ing men from 
If a draft had been used in thi s in s t ance , Lee 
th· ' s branc h f o r s e rv i ce • 
' th e ca va lry wo uld in futur e di sso lve beca use f ew peop le would fea red 
choose t 0 
se rve i n a branch th a t ca used gr ea t e r pe rsona l expense t han 
in any of the oth er branches ca used. Lee ' s reasoning was that 
se rvi ce 
a ma n 'wh e n dra fted fo r cava l ry se rv ice would have t o se rve in pe rson 
Ith ho rse ) o r proc ure a s ub s titute man~ horse , thus the greate r (w· 
expe nse . 
So f ea ring the ultimat e res ult a draft of th e cava lry wou ld 
occas · i on, 
An exp lanati on fo r re fusa l t o vo luntee r was a lso a part of the 
Lee r e j ect ed the idea. 
Lee admitted that hi s gene ra l o rde rs wer e 
gove rno , r s I ette r t o Ne I so n. 
Probab ly ff f . mis unde rs t ood and the res ul t wa s on ly vague o e rs o se rvi ce 
' 
from t he va ri o us troops . 
one from Ne I son, s troop' and one from an Anna po I i s troop. Thi s I atte r 
t roop sa id th at it wou l d se rve only unde r its own offi ce rs ; t he 
comma nd e r f d th at he did not have enough 
of thi s troop , Lee me ntioned, o un 
In f act, on ly two off e r s were made t o Lee : 
vo I untee r s to f o rm a commar.d, and so went no f a r t he r th an t o off e r h
i s 
se rvi ces i f ca I I e d. 
Th e Ba l t imore ca va lry troops did not even off e r 
th e ir se rv ices but awa ited o rde rs , whi ch Lee d id not wis h to g ive . 
It 
appea red th a t th e ca va lry did not go beca use it was not ca l led. 
Th e 
troops k ep t wa i t in g f or o rde rs , and Lee , think i ng that he had iss ued 
s uf f ic i ent o rd e rs , ke pt wa iting to r vo lu ntee rs , and re fu sed t o draft 
men · In t o th e 
ca va l ry t o r f ea r th at s uch a move would cause the eve ntu a l 
di sso lut · io n of pa rt of th e mi I iti a sys t em. 
As with the ca va lry, the re we re many opini ons given fo r why th e 
in fantry turn ed o ut in s uch s ma 11 numbe rs . Ham 
i I t on, with some s I i ght 
was t o b lame to r th e de lays in procurin g 
j Us t i f i . ca ti on, tho ught that Smith 
and a dva nc ing t he Ma ryland quot a . 
In a short lette r t o Henry Lee , 
Hami I t on inti ma t ed th at "th e re i s 
somethin g about our fr iend Smith th a t 
Confess ing tha t Smith did nothin g wrong, 
Pe rp I exes and di s tresses me .
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o f th e Treas ury a dd ed "i t i s ce rtain th at he has done nothing 
th e 
In c los ing, Ham i I ton t o ld the 
Sec ret a r y 
but pa int bl ac k from the beginning ." 
gove rno r th at it might be necessa ry t o send Smith back t o Mary land. 
Vi rg ini a 
As ide from wh at eve r diffe rences Smith and Hami lt on mi ght have had, 
th e re 
was evide nce that th e Maryl and gene ra l was rathe r pess imi s ti c , both 
about th e I . need f o r troops in the firs t p lace , a nd the prog ress 11 s 
sta t e was k ma ing in procuring 
Wrot e th a t 
As ea rly as 23 Augus t Smith 
in hi s opini on the ins urgents wo uld be reconc il ed be fo re 
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ps wou ld Most of h·i s r eports t o th e gove rnor 
· r ea l ly be nee ded. 
conce rn· · Th e comment that 
ing th e quota we re gl oomy , if not d ispa ragin g. 
it Wou Id 
those troo ps . 
be a "c rue 
I 
barbar i ty " t o have the mi I it i a marc h west from 
Frede ri c k has c 1·ted, and it co uld be cons trued as me r e 
a I r ea dy been 
co n ce rn fo r th e hea lth and saf e
ty f or hi s men, o r an atte mp t t o s low o r 
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s top the movement wes t. Hamilton, of co urse , probab ly had no way of 
knowing these deta i Is , as Smith ' s lett e r was addresse d to the gove rnor , 
but the Secr et a ry had access to oth e r indi ca tion s of the same fee lings 
in Sm ith. Mary la nd ' s Gove rnor Lee , on 30 Septemb e r, wrot e to Ham il ton 
e nc los in g a I i st of comp la ints Smith had co nce rning s upp li es , th e quanti-
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ty of me n, e t c . Furthe r, there wa s at leas t one ea rli e r hint of the 
Maryl and gene ra l 1 s sen t iments whi ch ma y have r eached Ham i lton , and 
ce rta inl y d id reach Was h ington. Sec r etary of State Edmund Randolph 
ad dressed a lett e r t o th e Pres ide nt on 26 Augu st that s tated in part th at 
Smith had expressed a strong des ire that no b lood be s hed.
65 Smith was 
a lso , accord ing t o th e l ette r, r eporte d t o have cons id e red th e s tate 
mi I i t i a law in adeq uat e fo r th e ta s k of rai s in g and regu lat in g the 
force req ues t ed. Al I of thi s was combin ed by Ham ilton and used as one 
excuse fo r the poor response of the Ma r y land militi a . 
Crit ic is m of th e state mi I iti a law s hould not have been th e so le 
factor in Ham i lt on' s dec is ion th at Smith was s lowing down prog ress . If 
i t was , Gove rnor Lee co ul d a lso have bee n s us pected, and there is no 
indi ca t ion tha t Hamilton s us pect ed Lee of de laying th e quota . Th e re 
wer e many in s tances wh e re Thomas Lee did in fa ct criti c ise th e law , and 
eve n used it t o exp la in the def ic iency i n rai s in g the co rp s fo r the 
expediti on. Th e governo r had to inform th e Sec retary of War that th e 
co un c i I dec ide d not t o a l low th e mi I i t ia to use s tate arms . Wh e n asked 
for directi ons fo r acti on to kee p draftees from dese rting befo re th e 
co rp s ma rched, Lee s ugges t ed that th e fi e ld of fi cer invo lved use hi s 
own d isc ret ion , as the mi I i t ia law d id not provide for thi s contingency . 
Even wh rn the law prov i ded c lea r gu idance , as with wh at t o do with 
Quake rs who r efu sed to se rve , th e governor s ugges t ed that th e fi e ld 
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comma nde r aga in take matters into hi s own han ds , and fo l low the law on ly 
if that commander thought it prope r . Th e gove rno r ' s neg lect of h is 
opt ion to draft ca va l ry was another i ndication that d isc ret ion was used 
in dec iding to obey o r neg lect th e mi I iti a law . 
The us e of discretion wa s , howeve r , I imited t o wh eth er or not to 
e nfo rce the law , or to s ituat ions not anticipated by th e law . In cases 
wh e re the mi I i ti a act was spec i fic , as i n th e fines for not mu ste r i ng 
o r f a i I ing t o provide a s ub s titute , the governor co uld not s uggest th e 
use of mo re ha rs h fin es i n an eff o rt to coe rce the men i nto obey ing the 
law . Regard less of whethe r or not he wanted to , Lee co u ld not lega l ly 
have s upported men I i ke Lie utenant Colone l John Wil kinson , who wanted 
to a l ter th e l aw so that he co uld threaten longe r ja i I terms fo r any 
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ma n who re fu sed hi s c iv ic duty . Th e law cou ld be ignored but cou ld 
not be ove r- enforced. Th e d i ff e rence may have been s ubt I e , but Lee 
ap pa rent ly tho ught i t imp ortant . 
Pe rhaps th e re in lay th e maj or benef i t of a vague mil it ia leg is lation 
s uch as Mary land adop t ed. Th e law se t up a gu i de for organ i za t ion, more-
o r-l ess , that was to se rve as a bas is for th e c it i zen a rmy . Th e governor 
had d i sc ret iona ry powers i n ext end i ng the s i ze of any of the un i t s , 
67 
wh ich he apparent ly use d on more th an one occas ion . Th is ce rta i nly 
e nd ed a I I hope of hav ing a uni form organ i za t ion , one of th e maj or 
prem ises of the ·fede ra l mi I i ti a law . Such power di d a l low the ma le 
c iti ze ns to free ly assoc iate themse lves into mi I itary comp a ny , just as 
long as each man did indeed associate th emse lves . Th e gove r no r , with 
the a id of the co un c i I, had th e responsibi I i ty of se lect ing and 
co mmi ss ion i ng off ice rs , but most of the compan ies e I ected the ir own 
o ffi cers . The governor occas iona ll y di sag reed and s ubst ituted othe r 
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me n, but he apparent ly d id so in a wa y that ca used t he leas t amoun t of 
d issent . 
How the t roops wer e to be ca l l ed o ut was lef t entire ly t o th e 
governo r' s di scr eti o n by th e Ma ry la nd mi I iti a ac t. Lee may have been 
too d isc rete in ca lling up th e militi a fo r th e wh iskey r ebe ll ion wh en he 
d id no t use a dra f t fo r the cava l ry . Nothing , a fte r a l I, fo r ced t he 
gove rno r t o use eve ry mea ns ava i !ab le t o him f or ra is ing t he mi I iti a . 
Li kewise , Lee ' s o rde rs fo r mu s t e ring the ma in body o f th e de t ac hment 
wer e f o r t he use of vo lun tee r s fir s t, and a draft o nly wh en necessa ry . 
Aga i n t o avo i d c r ea ting an unf a ir burd en on some me n, he ca l led fo r 
troops f r om e ve ry r eg iment , and c rea t e d the probl ems a lrea dy out ! i ned . 
Anothe r aspect of th e law th at was neg lect e d, probab ly mo r e out 
of r ea li ty tha n a ny othe r reason, was the req uirement tha t each man 
prov i de h i s own wea pon. Th e mi I iti a act c lea r ly out ! in ed wh at each 
i nd iv i dua l was expected t o s upp ly , but the gove rno r and fin a lly t he 
co un c i I dec i de d th a t th e s t a t e would s upp ly a rms . Thi s r e leased t he 
me n f r om conce rn ove r fin es , if th ey eve r we r e conce rn e d about th em, 
and the gove rnme nt fro m th e t as k o f co ll ectin g any f ines th at mi ght be 
lev i ed fo r th is infracti on. Ad diti o na l benefits f rom thi s dec i s io n in c luded 
th e ass ura nce th e a rmy wo uld be a rmed a t leas t t o some ext e nt , a nd the 
troops coul d be kep t un a rme d un t i I th e re was a need fo r t hem t o be so 
eq u i pped ; thi s may have been i ntenti ona l so that th e c iti ze n a rmy would 
not s hoot up t he co untry s id e o r the ir off ice rs . 
Fines f o r me n f a i I in g t o prov i de s ub stitutes wer e appa r e nt ly 
a lso no t e nfo rced, no matte r how mu ch Ge ne ra l Smith prot es t ed t he poo r 
q ua li ty a nd s ma ll q uant i t y of these so l d i e r s by proxy. No ev id e nce has 
bee n fo un d , e i the r in t he Adjuta nt Ge ne r a l' s pa pe rs o r t he var ious s t ate 
Paper co l le t· c ions , 
that would indi cat e that men we re prosecuted for 
f a i I ure to prov i de a s ub stitute . 
a l r ea dy c i ted , 
pa . y Ing fo r th e s ub s titutes from the ir own fund s . 
Th ere was th e op ini on from th e governor , 
that fi e ld office r s wou ld not be he ld responsib le for 
A lack of ev idence i n 
th is · lnSt a nce does not 1·nd1· ca t e 
that no fin es wer e lev ied, onl y th at 
no reco rd o f a ny ex i s t s . 
Attempts t o ra·1se th e 
quota r eques t ed may have been hamp e red by 
t he s tate ' s mi1 ·1t ·1a 
l aw, but that wa s not th e on ly i nhibit ing fa ct o r 
that kept men from voluntee ring. 
enforce a dra ft. 
Th e gove rnor, a lthough he ha d th e 
autho · r I ty t 0 
do so , was not wi I I ing to inte rpret th e law s tr ict ly, and 
Lee may have bent th e /aw c6 much as poss i bl e in 
try· In g t o 
avo id di s rupting th e pop ulat ion and to enti ce vo luntee rs , but 
he co u Id not make th e men vo luntee r. 
Th e /aw wa s cons tructed t o g ive 
rne n a /te rn a t · 
1ves : se rve , find a s ubstitute, o r pay a fin e . At hi s 
Ov:n d isc ret· 1 
on , th e governo r eased the pe n a I ty tor not Prov id in , 
SUb stit 
utes , and hoped that enough men wo uld choose to se rve vo l untar i ly. 
1"h at th e 
c iti zens did not 
50 
choose wa s the reason why the Mary land 
co rp s was f ar be low i t s quot a. Th e questi on s t i I I rema in s why the 
rnen did not take th i s op t ion. 
At th e r is k of be ing hope less ly ens nar led in a c ircu lar argument, 
it i s necessa ry to po int o ut that t he c iti zens may not have se rved 
ceca 
use th ey The two troops of ca va l ry from Ba ltimore 
were not fo r ced to. 
d . 1 
d not se r t d ft d Even though th e Anna po I is 
ve beca use th ey wer e no ra e • 
troop of and it f i na I I y did 
f e red to se rve , it wa s a condit iona l off er, 
not 




0n of th to provide a s ub s t i tute been more ha r s h 
e draft or fai l ure 
Lnd 
e r th e I by th e gove rno r as th ey stood , pe rh aps 
aw, o r eve n enforced 
more men wou ld have served , e ither as vo lunteers o r as draftees . 
Converse ly ' had th is mode been adopted , there might have been more 
and worse draft ri ots . 
As it was passed , the law au thori zed r e lat i ve ly 
these 
Ii ght f. 
1 nes d , an the governor did not choose to enfo rc
e even 
str ict I y . 
The I aw was a lso detr ime ntal in 
ra is ing the quot a s imp ly because 
Had th e mi I i t ia Jaw bee n passed wi th in 
of the dat e on wh ic h i t passed . 
th e t · set by the congress iona l mi I it ia act (wi th in one yea r of 1 me I im its 
g M-oy 1792 ) 
the Mary land mi I i t ia might have been fu ll y orga ni zed by 
Another ad vantage wou ld have bee n that th e leg is lature 
Sept emb er 
' 1794 . 
ave rev ised a Jaw passed in the 1792 assemb ly, had a ny rev is ion been co u I d h 
in t he 1793 assemb ly . But th e act was not passed unt i I the nece ssa ry, · 
end of the 1793 assemb ly , and the 
mi I iti a was not organ i zed--eve n on 
the midd le o f Jun~ J794. Actua l o rgan i za ti on o r in some Pap e r-- unt i 1 
reorga n i zat ion wa s not comp let e until after the det achme nt marched cases 
The Cec i I co unty mi li t ia has been used as an 
West and returned home . 
examp l e of the cond i t ion o f some of the r eg iments wh en t he ca l I was 
Diso rgan i za ti on was a major fa ct or in keep ing m n for t he two mad e . 
1
ments d ff" in th i s county fro m march ing . Lack of company gra e o , cers reg · 
a lso ca u t· sed prob lems that de t a ined me n from seve ra l co un ies . 
There were severa l othe r factors whi ch could be used t o exp la in 
th
" mi I i t i a fa i 
I 
ed to f i 
1 1 
its quot a . Two of these , the season and 
the di s t ance some men wo u Id have t o trave I, were va I id but not unique 
Prob lems for th e mi I iti a in this instance . Th e ca l I was made in 
Aug Ust dur ing the beg i nn i ng of the harvest season for many rura l 
1 
a men , and mea nt that s ho U Id th eY be gone I ong , some me n wou 
I
d 
mi I i t· 
mi ss th e ir harvests . 
Th ese men cou Id e ithe r marc h with the co rps and 
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face a ve ry rea l and i mmedi a t e threa t of f inan c ia l prob lems if not 
sta r vat ion, o r no t vo l untee r and s t ay home t o t e nd the c rops . Th is 
late r cho ice seemed t o have been t he mo r e pop ular with many men in th e 
rura l r eg io ns of the stat e . Th is reaso ning does not exp la in th e lack 
of n,en f r om th e urb a n a r eas , howeve r . 
Di s t a nce was anothe r f act o r that de t e rmined th e mi I i ti a ' s response . 
The Eastern Sho r e mi I iti a f aced a long ma r ch and a s hip passage t o 
reach even the init ia l re nd ez vous . Th a t many me n from th e Eas t ern Sho re 
were re lu c t an t to lea ve th e ir fam i I ies a nd property and ma r ch a l I th e 
way to Pe nnsy lvan i a has a l r ea dy been me ntion ed. Mention ha s a lso been 
made of the f act that ma ny d i d not prov ide s ub s t itutes e ith e r; thi s may 
a lso have been dec i de d by th e d is t a nce a s ub s titute wo u ld have t o trave l . 
Any add i tiona l s um of money a s ub st itute r ece ived wou ld have t o be 
large e no ug h to make h im ma rc h from th e Eas t e rn Shore . Th e i I I- prepa re dn ess 
and i I 1- hea I th o f many o f th e s ub s t i tutes may be exp I a i ned by th is 
r easo nin g . Proba b ly onl y th e lowe r e lements of soc iety-- those eas il y 
and chea p ly bo ught- - wo u Id be w i I I i ng t o ma ke the tre k from th e Eas t rn 
S~o re . Of co urse , th is exp lanat ion does not prec lud e those men wh o 
wou l d wa nt t o protect th e f e de ral governme nt from th e ri o t o us sp irit 
ac ross th e mounta in s . It does prov ide a poss ibl e and somewh at p la us ib le 
reason why so fe w me n of a ny so rt ma rc hed from th e Ea s t e rn Sho re with 
the cor ps . 
The nature o f the ins urrection i t se lf may a lso have kep t men 
from vo luntee ring o r se rv i ng . As id e from th e fa ct that th e rebe l li on 
was i n a no th e r s tate , many men may have had mi xed f ee lings abo ut s up po rting 
th G gove rnme nts , f e de ra l o r s t a t e . Th e mi I iti a in both Al lega ny an d 
Wash in gt o n co unti es had to choose betwee n th e r ebe ls and the gove rnment s , 
a nd did no t s ide fully with the gove rnments unti I a fte r Gove rnor Lee 
sent additi ona l mi I iti a into th e ir co unt ies . Afte r th a t , these two 
co unti es s upp li e d mo r e tha n t he ir quot a . 
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Amb iva le nce t owa rd th e r ebe l I ion and the mi I itia ca l I may exp la in 
why th e \vashingt o n a nd All ega ny co unty mi I i t ias we r e so s low t o respo nd , 
but it does no t he lp in unde rs tanding why th e mi I i t i a in oth e r co unti es 
f a il ed t o vo l untee r o r go wh e n dra fte d . Fee li ngs s imil a r t o those in 
t he two wes t e rn co unti es may have ex is t ed in othe r wes t e rn s hore co unti es , 
but no evide nce o f th ese ex is t s . 
Apa th y may ha ve bee n th e bes t expl a na tion fo r th e poo r res ponse in 
th e o th e r co unt ies . Th e co unti es o f south e rn Ma ryl a nd: Cha rl es , Ca lve rt , 
and Sa in t Ma r y ' s , we r e probabl y not mu ch e ff ec t e d by the exc ise on 
wh iskey a nd so th e inh abitants o f these co unti es wo uld no t parti c u la rl y 
ca re abo ut pro t es t i ng th i s t ax . Th ese peop le we r e a ls o probab ly not 
ve ry conce rne d a bo ut a ny threa t th e r e be ls may ha ve posed t o th e security 
o f th e f e de ra I gove rnment , and so d id no t go out of th e i r way t o try 
to de f e nd th a t gove rnment. Thi s may have bee n a n add i t ion a l exp la nat ion 
for th e apa the ti c r espo nse from th e Eas t e rn Sho r e . 
Th e e pa thy o f th e middl e co unti es of Mary la nd: Montgome ry , 
Fr ede r ick , Prince Geo rge ' s , Ba l t imo r e , Ha rfo rd , a nd Ann e Arunde l, is 
no t eas il y exp la i ne d. Fre de ri c k co unty wa s threa t ened by attac k f rom 
some ri o t o us gro up s , a nd r esponde d t o tha t threa t in a dd i t ion t o i-he 
fede ra l r eq u is iti on. Fr om wh at I i tt le e v idence was found conce rnin g 
the r es ponse that th e Frede r ick co unty mi I i t ia made t o th e f ede ra l 
req uest , i t i s imposs ibl e t o d isce rn how mu ch o f th e mil i ti a ma r ched 
wi t h th e corps , a nd how mu ch s t aye d behind to gua rd the a rsena l at 
Fr ede ri ck . Th e threa t was mo re imme d ia t e i n Frede ri c k co unty th an 
l 
any of t he 0the r middle co unti es , but direct inf
luence from th e 
i ns urgents in Pennsy lvania wa s less th an that expe r ienced in th e two 
Wes t e rn co unti es . 
Pri nee George ' s , Montgomery and Anne Arunde l co unty mi I i t ias 
Some reg iments 
a lso see med t o respond t
o the fede ra l req u is it ion. 
While the draft was 
in Pr · ince 
nece 
George ' s co unty d id not nee d a dra ft . 
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ssa ry . 1 
n th e othe r two co unt ies , t hose dratted seem to have gone 
With th e co rp s . 
The mi I i t ia from t he Geo rget own and Bladensburg a reas 
in except iona l ly large numb e rs ; they I i I l ed the i r quotas , and responded 
rna rc hed ass 
oon as th ey r ece ived orde rs . No ev i dence has been found to 
any other group o f mi I iti a responde d as quick ly and as fu ll y s how that 
to +he ca 1 1 
Quotas f 
rom Ba I ti more c i ty and co unty and Ha rford co unty wer e 
1 
i I I ed , but they numbe red about ha If of those req uest ed. No 
Parti a I I Y 
easy exp lanat ion ex i sts for why the mi I i tia from these rount iE fa il ed 
One might eas il y suppose that Ba l t imore c i ty had 
t o f i 1 1 their quotas . 
rnany . Id le me n with in it s bo unda ri es and 
th at th ese id le men wou ld be 
Howeve r, on ly one r eg iment f rom 
Wi 11 . Ing t 0 ma r c h with th e detachment. 
thE: c ity fi I led 
its quota · the o the r three /el I s hort. No definite 
a ' 
cco unt 
of the Ba It i more county troops was found , but on th e basis of 
th . e f Ina I co unt Sm ith made 
Of , 
their · . 1nd 1v idua l quotas . 
these reg iments probab ly Ii I led only ha l f 
The Harfo rd county mi li ti a supp l ied s ixty 
rne n as opposed t o the I 12 men req uest ed. 
This re luc t ance t o march on th e part of the mil it ia probab ly was 
not ca used by s uppo rt of t he rebe l I ion or protest aga inst th e federa l 
9ove rnment 
Th e pr imary factor that kept th e men from marching 
Was Probab ly apa thy . 
Th e rebe ll ion did not threaten men east of 
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Fre de ri ck coun ty , a nd so many in the mi l iti a did not choose to ge t 
invo lved. Th ese me n probab ly dec ided aga ins t f ighting someo ne e lse ' s 
fight, e ve n though th e fe de ra l gove rnment asked some of them to mus t e r . 
Th e on ly e vid e nce o f th i s wi I I be found in the nex t chapte r , wh e r e a 
di scuss i on o f the qu ick and v igo rous r esponse to th e gove rno r ' s reques t 
for /000 me n t o put down ri o t s in Maryland wi 11 be made . By contras t ing 
thi s response t o th a t for the f ede ra I ca 11, i t is pos s i b I e t o see that 
th e mi I i t ia was wi l I in g t o ma r ch wh e n th er e was a c lea r and poss ib ly 
imme d iat e threa t , but on ly lukewa rm wh e n the threa t wa s seve ra l hundred 




The federa l requisition to M,:ryland made by President Wa sh ington 
i n August , 1794 , was me t not on ly by f e w vo luntee rs a nd much apathy , 
but by ri o t s as we l I. Th e ri ots occ urre d most fr eq ue ntly in Wa s hington 
co unty , a ltho ugh All ega ny a nd Fr8der i ck co unti es we re invo lved t o some 
extent . Comb in e d with the fear that th e Pennsy lvan ia ins urge nts 
were gather in g to marc h into Mary land, th e reports of these ri ot s ca used 
a very st rong a nd de fi n i te reacti on from t he Maryland government . Ext ra 
mi I it ia we r e o rde red o ut a nd t o ld t o ma r ch into the wes t e rn part of 
the s t a t e . Thi s t im e t he orders we r e c lear a nd direc t a nd demanded 
immed iate act ion . And , uni i ke the r esponse t o th e f e dera l requ is iti on, 
the state mi I iti a tu rn ed o ut in great numbers--perhars doubl e those 
requested in one p lace . Eve n th e governor wa s i nvo lved directly in th e 
mi I i t i a ca l I. Whil e he did no t ma rc h a t th e hea d of thi s s tate r eq ui-
s iti on , he was at leas t me r e intimate iy invo lved with it th a n he was 
with the fe de ra l r eq ues t. 
This d iscuss ion examines the va ri ous aspect s o f the wes t e rn 
Mary l and ri o+s , a nd the gove rnment' s r espo nse t o these riots . Th e 
governme nt act e d in a grea tly d iffe r e nt ma nne r unde r the threat of th e 
s tate riots tha n it did to th e threa t s t o th e Unite d States . Th ese two 
react ions mu s t be compa r ed because they we r e in pa rt respons ib le fo r 
the variat i on of the mi I iti a ' s r espo nse to the t wo ca l Is . Th e gover nme nt 
might have reacte d in a ny way i t des ired, but it could ha rdl y expec t pos i-
tive res ul ts un i ss the c iti ze ns o f th e sta t e , espec i a ll y th e mi I iti a , 
s upported that gove rnm ent acti ons . Th e mi I iti a did s upport th e govern-
me nt , a nd s uppo rt i t s trong ly , in the stat e r eq ui s it ion. Again beca use 
of the mi I iti a r eaction to the state and federa l r eq ui s iti ons , th ese 
react ions mu s t be canpared so that the impcrtance of both may be 
und er s t ood. Fina lly , th e riots in Penns y lvania and i n Mary land mu st 
be co nn ect e d to he Ip fac i Ii tate a furth e r und e rs tanding of th e i mpo r-
tan ce of the s t a t e r eaction t o th e threat in wes t e rn Mary land . 
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In see king a n explanati on fo r th e qui ck and dec is ive acti on taken 
by Go vernor Thomas S im Lee t o que l I the wes t e rn Mary land ri ots , one 
mu s t f irst look to th e whi s key ri ot s in wes t e rn Pennsy lvan ia . Th e 
two ma in gri eva nces expressed by th e whi skey reb e ls were t o 179 1 
whi skey exc ise t ax , and th e r emot e ness o f th e f ede ra l co urts frcm th e 
I 
so uthw es t e rn co unt ies o f Pe nn sy lvani a . Th e r easons fo r object ing t o 
th e exc ise were many : th e tax wa s t o be pa id i n cash, a ra re i t em in 
fronti e r wes t e rn Penns ylvan ia ; i t p laced a heav ie r burde n on a wes t e rn 
purchase r th an o n a buye r i n th e eas t , wh ere even though th e tax wa s th e 
same , it fo rmed a sma l !e r pe rcentage of th e total pri ce of a ga l Ion 
of wh iskey ; the t ax and i t s co ll ec t o rs cr ea t ed a new bu n,acracy wh ich 
cost more money t o maintai n; and it was jus t one more encroac hment by 
th e f ede ra l gove rnment into the I ives of wes t e rn c it i zens . 
Ob j ecti ons t o th e di s t ance o f fe de ra l co urts wer e directly 
conn ect e d t o th exc ise tax . Pe rsons cha rged with v io lat ing the exc ise 
wer e for ced t o s t and tri a l in the fede ra l co urt in Phi lade lphia , thu s 
necess i ta ting a long t rek eas t and negl ect of hi s farm for any man wh o 
2 
r efu sed o r fo rgot o t obey the law. 
Protes t a nd r ebe I I ion a r e not sy nonymous , and protests in wes t e rn 
Pe nn sy lva ni a did not necessa ri ly invo lve rebe l l ion. Men had prot es t ed 
t he exc ise and lack of fe de ra l co urts wi thout r is king in surrection , but 
wh e n these protests ga ined nothing , the prot es t s turned into rebe l I ion. 
The r ebe I I ion part of th e whi s key r ebE: I I ion began wh en som, c iti ze ns 
a ttempted t o d is rupt co l lecti on o f the exc ise t ax . Phys ica l vi o lence 
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aga · ins t th e 
exc ise t ax co ll ect o r was th e mos t common method of d is rupting 
co l I ect· 1 on Wh. · 1 
I e some co I I ect ors had been tarred and feath e red as 
e0 r 1 3 · Y as 1792 
th e g rea t es t amount of v io le nce occ urred during th E, s umme r 
, 
month "· o f 1794 
, a nd l as t ed on ly a ve ry s ho rt time , probably only 
Direct mi I ita ry s t y le acti ons firs t occurred on July 16 179 
h 
, 4, 
w en a g ro ups f 0 
me n fired s hot s at th e home of Gene ra I John Nevi I I e , of 
two months 
Bowe r Hi I I 4 
Th ese men wer e at a militi a meeting wh en wo rd a rri ve d th at 
s he riff was gathe ring exc ise of f end e rs fo r a tr ip t o the Phi la· a f ede ra I . 
Be li eving that the s heriff had gone t o Nevi I !e ' s 
de lph· I a f ede ra I court. 
'
t h
ey s urro unde d the ge nera l' s home and demanded the s he r i tf. ho use 
Pe rh aps mi s underst anding the ir int
ent, Nevi li e fired into th e crowd and 
A gun battl e of s ho r t durati on ens ued , 
with th e 
ki 11 ed one o f th e me n. 
mi I it· ia me n, now whi skey r ebe ls , retr8a ting. 
Thi s act· t t t d. ff t I I 10n e leva t ed the exc ise pro es s o a I e ren eve . 
Th er e i s quite a diffe re nce between iso lat ed ins
t ances of tarr ing and 
a co ll ect or and firing upon the house of a oca c 1 i zen. e ri ng I I ·y fea th 
m1 I iti a men rea li zed thi s , and dec ided that they wo uld be sa f e if Th e . 
gath e re d into a 
I 




' fi ght , i rrrned i at e ly recruited more mi I iti a unti I the ir tota I 
f ore e numbe re d more th an 500 men, 
many of whom were armed with rifl es 
or mu sket I ' h 
I t s Th e la rge r fo rce aga in marc hed t o Nevi I e s o use a e r 
Th e genera l wa s not at home thi s t ime , but 
on th e . s ixt ee nth o f J u ly . 
e was a de t ac hme nt o f regu lar armY troops from th e garri son at th er 
Pi tt sb urgh. 
Th e mi Ii ti a at firs t demanded Nevi 11 e and hi s res ignati on 
Wh en refused, th ey 




, pape rs appa rentl y see l, i ng 
emand ed to sea rc h th1ro u£' h Nevi .es 
destroy any writt e n evidence aga ins t them- Thi S command too , was 
f o r the loca l exc ise di s tri ct. 
to 
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refused , and after some con fusion, an attack on the house bega n. 
Anoth e r o f th e r ebe lli ous militia wa s kill ed befo re th e outbu ildings. 
aro und Nev i I !e ' s home were se t afire . At th is po int, th e regular a rmy 
troops s urrende r ed , and le ft the hou se before it ca ught f ire . Proceed in g 
into the hc,use , the r ebe ls des troy ed a l I of Nev i I !e ' s pe rsonal 
eff ects 
be fo r e setting the house on fir e .
5 Th e protest had grown into an in s ur-
recti on with arme d mi I iti a fighting r eg ul ar a rmy troops . 
Vari ous action s we r e take n as a r es ult o f thi s fight, th e most 
drami:' ti c b . ' e , ng the mcJrch of 5000 mi I iti a ihrough Pittsb urgh 
toward Fo rt Fayett e , th e reg ular army garrison .
6 
Th e r eg iona l 
i t i a wa s ca l le d out by th e r ebe ls to part i c ipa t e in thi s ma rch, and mi I· 
ap pa rently response was not always f avo r ab le t o the rebe l ca use . 
Howeve r, o ut of sy mp a thy for th e in s urrecti on , or pe rh aps fea r of 
r ep ri sa ls if the ca ll was not answe re d, a la rge body of militi a d id 
meet at Braddock ' s f ie ld on Acgust I, 1794 . Thi s group mar ched through 
Pittsb urgh in a mo re- or-l ess peacefu l s how of fo rce . No majo r injuri es 
occ urre d, but a ba rn wa s set on fir e th at ven ing. 
Th e ma r c h thrDugh Pitts burgh was the las t ma j o r act ion by tho 
ins urge nts in Pen nsy lvania . Indeed, many of th e ma rche rs deba i d 
wh e th e r o r no t the gather in g was contro l /e d and s uppo rted by ~h e in s urgents , 
o r whethe r th e grcup co ns isted mos tly of loya l mi I iti a wh o wan i -d lo 
keep wa t ch on the in=urgents . In a ny case , thi s in c ident, an d the 
ones I ead i ng up to it, inc I ud i ng at I eas t one cas of robb i ng 
th
o 
Th e riots in Mary land may 
e e ra / mc'l i I, const ituted th e ins urrecti on. -f d 
have been connect ed t o th e Pennsy lvani a ri ots , but the Ma ryl and 
d isturbances did not approach th e ir leve l of destruction of per
5
ona l 
propert y o r k i I I i ng . 
Th e firs t r epo rts of r i ots in wes t e rn Maryland wer e dated Sep t emb er 
1' 179
4 , and wer e sent to Gene r a I John Davidson, o ne of th e memb e r s o f 
"' 1s e e r r epo r e a 1s ·urbcnce in 
th e co un c ·1 I t o the gov~rnor .
7 
Th · I tt t d d " i 
Cumb e rl and , A l l egany co unty , whi ch wa s the most weste rn co unty in th e 
Rc:th er tha n a ri ot , it wa s mo r e of a c ivi I d i sturbance rhat 
s t at e . 
invo l ved a very li mited numbe r o f men who e r ect ed a li berty po l e as 
a protes t t o the mi I i t i a droft necessa ry to fi 11 the federa l 
r eq us i t i o n. A vo l untee r company o+ mil it i a confro nted those who 
wer e creat ing the di s turt ances and t o l d them to d i spe r se or the troors 
wo uld " ce rta 1·n 1y t 
11 8 
A + I +h d b 
give th em a sho . pparen, y , e or e r was o eyed, 
for th e 
c r o wd di spe r sed and t he po l e was chopp ed down . 
A furth e r i nc i dent ment i oned i n th i s r eport i nvo l ved a group o f 
fema l e patr i ots . During anothe r mi I i t i a meet i ng , some men voca ll y 
r es i s t ed the draft , a nd had another li berty po l e r ea dy to be erected . 
Th e parr i o ti c women took the opportunity aff o rded th em by a f i stfi ght 
amo ng th e me n to throw th e po l e into th e Potomac , and ra i se a " hu zza 
for G . e ne r o l Wa s h i ngton ." 
Such a patri oti c d i sp lay wo rked, for th 
f i gh ring 
s t 
o p~ ed , and t he meet i ng cont i nued wi tho ut furth r i nc i deni. 
One aspect o f this l ette r co u l d not be t aken so I i ght l y . Majo r 
J
O 
h n Lynn , t he author 
O
f the r eport , was b ecom i ng mo r e and mo r e a I a rmed 
by the sp r ead o f r efract ory sp i r i t . He f eared an i nvas ion from I he 
Penn sy l van i ans, a f eo r that wo u l d be r epea t ed in many o th e r r eporl s 
from d i ffe r ent men . u I t i mat e I y , th i s t ea r was one of the most i mr,o rtanf 
factors in th e dec i s i o n t o ca l l out an addit i o na l quota o f mil i •!i a . 
In Lynn ' s case , he s imp l y r eq ues t ed 400 s t and of a rms , so ih a l lh 
Pru-government mi I i t i a in A I I egany county wou I d be armed and ready to 
face th e Pennsy l van i a hordes if th ey attacked. 
Th e next r eported ri ot s occurred on Septemb er first , and in volved 
c iti zens of Hage r stown, in We shington co unty.
9 
Fr om ava il ab l e r e po rts , 
r1 0 , ins ea o a mer e c 1v 1 1s turban ce . Aga in, th e 
th i s was a r ea I · t · t d f · · I d · 
immed i a t e ca use was the mi I itia draft, but th e underl ayin g co use was 
sy mp a t-hy f o r th e Pennsylv2n i a r ebe l s and the ir ca use . Th e Washington 
Spy , th e l oca l newspape r f o r Hage r s t own, r eporte d rumo r s th at some 
Penn sy lvan i ans we r e i n th e area attempt ing t o purchase o r st a l gun s 
10 
and powder, a nd t o 
sp r ea d th e ins urrect i on. Even th e 82: l i - imo r 
Da il y Inte l I i gencer warn ed that some o f the Pennsy l v2nians we r e in 
11 
wes t e rn Ma ryl and t o purchase weapons . 
From these rumors , it i s poss ibl e t o see that wh en the riots 
in Hage r s t ow~ did occ ur, a grea t dea l o f a l a rm wa s c r eated. Us ing 
th
e draft as a pretext, a r ebe lli o us part o f the militia r epo rtedly 
b 12 ea t thE:ir o ffi ce rs in pro+est, and threa t ened t o marc h to Fred ,ri c k 
t 13 
0 
cap ture th e state ar se na l th er e . Th e ri ote r s erected a I ibe rty 
po l e i n the ce nte r o f Hage rs t own. Aga in, judgin g from newspap r r eports , 
th
i s po l e wa s c hoppe d down by a group o f "fri ends o f goverrment" in 
th
e t own. Ince nse d, t he ri o t e r s l ef t th e s ite only to r eturn wilh 
r e inforcements . Thi s l a rger crowd , est imat ed at 300 to 400 men , - r eeled 
ano the r I ib e rty po l e and threatened to ki 11 any one who mi gh t- lry 
14 
to c ut it down. 
In a l ette r t o Go ,,-e rno r Lee , L i eutenant Co l one l Thomas Sp ri gg , 
command e r o f one of the Wa shington co unty mi I iti a reg iments , co r robo r at ed 
15 
th
e newspa pe r accounts , and added a f w detai Is of hi s own. i:,rigg 
appa r ently was an eyewitn ess t o the ri o t s , and in probabi Ii l y would 
16 
have known wh a t was taking pl ace in th e surro unding area . He 
r eported th at men i n many areas r ef use d the draft and li berty po l -s were 
e r ec ed throughout the co untrys ide . By menti on ing that the l oya l 
be ing t 
1 1 
a r e fuse d t o meet at Hagerstown, Sp ri gg imp I i ed that the t0v:n mi 1 ·y 




that th e militia f ea r ed fo marc h into a host il e ar ea . This fear 
was 
reasonable if the Joya I mi I i-J-i a numbers d as f ew and th e ri o t ers 
as many as Sp riqq bel i eve d. The s ituation in Haqe r s t own had no t eased 
by Sep t emb e r 16 . Th e Wa shi nqton 2£.'l, i n an i ss ue of the seven t eenth, 
conta in ed an adverti sement o ff e ring one hundrsd dol l ars reward to any 
person who knew th e " ev i I di s posed" pe r so ns respons,ible fo r pr1ni·ing 
c handb i I I demc.nci i ng that the I i be rty po I e be set up aga in in th e iown. 
Th e handbi I I, pr inted in Ge rmon, appa r en tly threa t ened seve n men 
spec ifi ca ll y, in c luding the she riff of the county and a+ l east three 
17 
high-ranking mi J iti a officers. Unfo rtun ate ly, ne ithe r the o utcom of 
these threats nor th e offer of a r ewar~ were r eported in the paper . 
Th ese di s turbances wer e protests of the mi Ii ti a drc:ft. I t i s 
diff· p 1c ult t o estab li sh a firm connecti on 
betw en th e enn sy lvani a and 
Ma ryl and ri o t s . Altho u~h intent i s a lways hard t o prove, a ti e belw en 
th e two d
id ex i s t, as did the poss i b i I ity o f othe r ties. 
The connect i o n betwee n t he draft and the exc i se r iots wasp rhaps 
eas i es t exp l a ine d as ca use and eff€ct ; th e exc i se riots created a need, 
r ea l or imag ined , for the mi I iti a to be ca l Jed t o cont r o l them; ihe 
draft ri o t s occurred wh e n the mi I iti a was forced ro draf r men for 
se rvi ce aga inst exc i se rioters. Beyond that, any connect i on bE:com .s 
tenuous because of intent. On l y one of the rio•r repods quo+ed 
18 
me n who exp r essed o ppos iti on t o the eyc i se tax. Those r porls 
me nti o ned th at the sp irit of di ssen t hc,d spread rhrough tho wesr rn 
co unti es o f M2,ryland. Ones upposeo em i ssary of thE, Pennsylvanians wa 
84 
even r d 19 umore t o be ope r~ting on th e Eas t e rn Shore . 
Naturally , me n who were threaten e d by the riots ass umed th a t 
th e r e was a conn ect ion betwee n events in Penns ylvani a and Ma ry land. 
Geogr i3 ph i ca I I 
ocati o n might be eno ugh to s uppo rt th is ass umpti on t eca use 
s om e o f the re be l I ious counti e~ in Pe nn sylvani a bo rde rEd th e wes t e rn 
Conta ct be twee n th e two areas wa s somewhat hamp e re d 
but a va ll ey led from th e eas t e rr pa rt of th e Pennsy 1-
Maryl a nd counti es . 
by th e mounta ins , 
n 
I 
a co unti es t o th e eas t e rn part of Wa shing-ton county, Ma ry I and, and va · 
un , cati on wa s not comp let e ly c ut off. Furthe r, th e c iti ze ns o f comm · 
th e wes t e rn Ma ryl and count ies, in c luding Frede ri ck, we re in s im i tar 
nc 1a l c ir c ums t~n ces and s hared th e s am e type o f fa rming wi th c iti zens f i na · 
in wes t e rn Penn s y lvani a . 2° Co rn was a major crop in wes t e rn Ma ryl and, 
and w2s di s t i I led into whi s key for th e s ame reasons as it was in 
WeS
t
e rn Penn s y lvania: eas ie r s t orage and trans portati on. Th e re fo re , 
peo pl e of wes t e rn Ma ryland might prot es t th e exc ise as mu ch as "l"h e th e 
Pe nn s y lva ni a r ebe ls . 
Altho ugh cauti on in conn ecting th e Ma ryl a nd a nd Pe nrsy lvani a 
r iots i s nece~
5
a ry t oday, th e men invo lve d with qu e l I ing th e Ma ry land 
ri ot s had no time fo r ca uti on. They t oo k the ri ot s at face va lue-- as a 
th
rea t to th e security o f the loca l c iti zens , if not o f the s i-a t e and 
f ede r a I gove rnments . Th ese men' from Geo rge W<!Sh i ngton down f o Me. j a r 
John Lynn , pe r ce ived a r ea I and i mmed i at e den gcr, and aded t o end 
th
e ihrEa t of dange r. Adm itt ed ly, Wa s h i ngton too k no direct ac ti on on 
th
e Mary I and r; ot s , but he urged Governor Lee not t o a 11 ow Ch e di ssen I 
t o s pread and e nve lope th e wh o le wes t e rn a rea . 
Immediate react ion t o th e th r-eats was on an individua l bas i s , 
a
nd 
unde rstandab I y so . Th e mi I it i a o/ f i cers who t oo k act ion cou Id not 
---=:==:::iiiiiiii!li!:~£:;;~;;;?--::::;;_,,.==::::::::.:._ ---"....-----------
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comfortably awa it orders from thE, governor before they acted. I f they 
had do ne so , the s ituat i on o f each mi ght have become mor e per il o us . 
Major Lynn ' s act i o ns were probab l y th e most diroct--heordered an 
irr•med i ate ca ll for loyal troops , and a confrontation with th e r i ote r s . 
Thi s apparent l y ended the threat to Cumber l and , but to insu r e continued 
peace Lynn requested re info r cements and extra arms . By estab li sh i ng a 
patro l t o guard th e st r eets, Lynn a l so put th e town unde r c mi I d form 
of martial law. 2 1 The major wa s fortunate a l so i n the aid he rece i ved 
f r om l oca l c iti ze ns , s uch as th e " fema l e pat ri ots ." 
Co lone I Sp ri gg faced a mu ch st r onge r end apparent I y more v i o I ent 
oppos iti on. A I i berty po l e wa s e r ected at Hage r stown, and after it 
had been c ut down, it was r e- e r ect ed an d p l aced under an armed guard . 
Reported l y 300 to 400 me n wer e in o r around t he town , ca us ing troub l e , 
threa t ening the c i t i zens and plann ing an attack on the arsena l at 
Freder i ck . Fea ring he was o ut - numbered, Spr igg counse l l ed ca uti on 
in con front ing the ins urs;ents in Hagerstown . He cont in ued t o counse l 
ca uti o n un ti I troops from Freder i ck co unty, and eventua 11 y Gove rror 
Lee himse l f , arrived t o put an end to the ri ots . The resu l t was that 
th e centre I part of Wash ington courty was i n chaos for man:: than 
two weeks . Th e arms that Major Lyrn requested for All egany co unty 
had to pass thrnugh Wa shingto n co unty to get to Cumbe rl anc' , and an 
extra guard was needed to in s ure that they ar rived safe ly. 
I n Freder i ck t ov:n Genera l Bay l y faced nc• i rrmed i ate threat , just 
the rumo r ed attack on the arsena l. Wh en he received word of it, he 
p l aced a guard over the a r senal, and informed the governor of his 
act i o ns . 22 Th e guard was stead ily in creased as fear of an attack 
grew. The genera l' s next move was to send t he arms Major Lyrn had 
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r eq ues t ed f o r Cumberland . Governor Lee authorized th e transfer from 
th e 23 a r se na l o n Sept emb er 6 , and th e arms we r e on the ir way by Septem-
be r I0, under hea vy guard . 
Th e governor took a cautiou s attitude toward th e ea rly r eports 
o f riots . 
Even be fore he r ece i ved word of th e Cumber l and and Hage r s town 
ri ots , Lee s uggt ested to Bay l y that some preca uti ons sho u l d be l ake n 
t o d 24 guar th e arsena l at Frede r i ck . Gove rn o r Lee orde r Ed Bay l y l o 
i nvestigate th e s ituati o n further , as th e informat i on r ece ived in 
Annapo l i s mi ght not be r e li able. Mo r e spec if i ca lly , Bayly was instruc ted 
to ca use as l it-i- l e a/arm as poss ib l e , so th at th e c i ti zens o f Fr ede r i ck 
wo u l d not panic . I n essence , th e governor and co un c i I gave Bay l y free dom 
to +ake whateve r action was necessa ry , so l ong as it did not exc i l e ·th e 
popu l ation, and as l ong as he kep t th e governor i nform d o f hi s ac ti ons . 
Thi s l ette r d i d s tress , howeve r , that th e government wi s r. ed t o ma inta i n 
a de f e ns ive pos i t i on , at / eas t for th e time be ing , and d i d not want t o 
f o r ce o r intitiate a con frontati on . Perhaps the governor thoughi th at 
th
e precautions a l r ea dy t aken wo u l d s uff i ce to sett l e th e matte r 
w i -tho ut ri sk ing a ca l I f o r addit i o na l mi I i ti a , a ca l I that migh/- no t· 
be ans vi e r ed . 
Lee and th e co unc il i ss ued no further o rd er s to Bayly uni i i th ey 
app r ove d the sending o f arms t o Cumberland. Another week passed 
befo r e othe r o rce r s wer e i ssued . These we r e in r espon~e to 
th 
rec 
l etter s from weste rn Maryl and : one each from General Bay l y and Maj or 
25 
Da ni e l c d t d s t b 10 1794 an d a most disturbing 
r esa p , a e ep em e r , , 26 
one from U e ut e nant Co I one I Sp r I gg dated the to 11 ow Ing day · A 
1 1 
of these info rmed th e gove rno r that wes t e rn Maryl and was s til l no t 
secure , but Sp rigg ' • lette r seemed fu trigger acti on from th• s ta te 
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gove rnment, prob ab ly beca use it conta in ed r eports of th e most appa r ently 
r ea l t hrea t s t o th e government . An even ea rli e r l ette r dated Sep t ember 6 , 
a l so influence d th e governor ' s dec i s i on t o act . Thi s l ei -t e r, wri t- 1-en 
t:y Hami !ton f o r th e Pres ident, stated that Wa shins;ton wa s anx i o us about 
th
e s ituation in wes t e rn Mary l and , and wi shed the governor t o put an 
27 
end t o th e tro ub l e befo r e it sp r ea d furthe r. 
Pe rhaps impressed by the Pres ident' s f ee I i ngs of urgency, 
28 
b uf a I so 
s haken by Li eutenant Co l one l Spr i gg ' s assessment o f th e s i 1-uai i on in 
Hagerstown , Lee initi ated direct action that- would soon in vo l ve c lose 
29 
to o ne tho usa nd additiona l stat e mi I iti a . Th e governor i ss ued 
0rd
ers on Septemb e r 13 , th at ca l l ed for at least 300 infantry from 
each o f three areas in th e state . He a I so o rde r ed out art i I I er y and 
cava lry from th e Ba ltimore area . Th e same bas i c orde r s wer e sent 
to Ge ne ral Uri ah Fo rrest , cor,m r, nde r of the Pr in ce Geo rg e ' s and lower 
Mc, ntgome ry co unty mi I iti a t,rigade , Genera l Jeremiah Crabb , commander 
o f th e upp e r rv,o ntgome r y an d l owe r Frede ri ck co unty mi I i t i a br i gade , 
and to Genera l Samue l Smith, cor,mander of th e Ba ltimo r e t own mi I ii i a 
I n an e ffort t o keep th e President info rmed , Lee sent a 
br i gade . 
s imil ar l ette r t o Al exa nde r Hami ! t on, adv i s ing the Secretary of 
th
e Treas ury 1-hat th e s i tuat i o n would soon be under contro l. 
Un Ii ke the orde r s Lee i ss ued fer ca I Ii ng up the f edera I 
r equi s i t i on, th e or~e r s for th e s t a t e r eq ui s iti on wer e spec i fie and 
urge d i mme d; ate act ; on. If th e ord ers t o Smith ar e used as an examµ I e , 
-i-h ese ne1-1 o rd e r s may be see n as those o f a governmcni bo i h concerned 
and anx i o us th at the orders be fo l lo wed. Smith 1-·as o rd ered l o :,upr lY 
3
00 t o 400 i nfaniry and a compl et e company of a r t i I l ery and a I roop 
o f ho r se . Th ese two s pec i a l compan i es wer e t o be fu ll y equ ipped 
be f o r e th e mi I iti a l eft Baltimo re , thus r e nde ring them r eady f o r 
i~~e diate ac ti on upon th e ir arriva l at Frederi ck. Thi s r equirement, 
p l us th e s pec i f i e r equ est for a ce rtain numb e r o f ca valry and arri I l e ry , 
s how a grea t change from th e orde r s f o r the f ede r a l r equi s iti on, whi ch 
was es pec ially va g ue in reques ting both cava l ry and artil l e ry. 
LE·e was a l so much mor e spec ifi c in o rd e ring a draft if vo l-
untee r s pro ve d t oo f ew t o fi 11 the quo ta. On l y those men from Ba li imo r c 
t o wn we r e to be drefted; time wa s not to be was t ed in ge t ting the t-roo ps 
unde r way e ithe r, f o r the gove rno r' s o rd e r s s t at ed th at t he q uo t a 
shou Id march as soon as it wa s co I I ect ed . Arms f o r th e infantry wo u Id 
be s uppli e d from th e publi c s t o r es in Fr ede ri ck, and provi s i ons we r e 
t o be co
1 
l ec t ed al o ng th e march. Final l y, th e go verno r s tresse d th a-1 nc, 
troo ps in t ended f o r th e f ede r c l r equi s ition wer e t o be sent en thi s 
separate expediti o n. 
Th e t o ne o f Lee ' s orde r s o f Septemb e r 13 indi ca t ed a g r ea t doa l 
mo r E urgency than was indi ca t ed by hi s o rde r s to r a i se ih e f ede r a l 
r equi s ition. Th e need f o r immedi a t e acti on was stressed, and no 
1 
i s t o f ava i I ab I e me n was t o be made and sent t o th e gove rn o r be f o r e 
th e troop s mar ched . Th ese Septemb e r 13 o rde r s wer e jus i th at, 
orde r s , and no t r equ es t s be ing r e l ayed from th e Pres ident by th e 
gove rno r . Even in th e l a nguage o f th e day, it- wa s c l ea r I ha t l (o , 
th e commande r-in- chi e f, wa s i ss uin g commands, t o s ubo rdinat e o ffi ce r s , 
and that he ex pect ed th o rc' e r s t o be obeyed. Th er e was Ii H I e o f 
th i s ron e in th e Au gus t 14 o r c'e r s . I t sho uld be r emcmb e r~ed, howe,· r, 
~h at Lee was acting unde r th e Pres ident' s r eques t in th e Aug ust ord , r s , 
and becau s.e Washington' s r eques t could be r ead as t enta live , Lee ' s 
orde r s co uld and did r e fl ect that tentative nature . LEG was aclin g 
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i s own wh en he i ss ued the orders a month l ate r , and so could on h. 
be mu ch mo r e prec i se and demunding . Final l y, th e gove rno r was no t 
cons t · 
· r a ine d by a proc lamation f o r th e ri o t e r s to di sper se , he ha d no t 
i ss ue d any s uch, and d i d no t have t o wa it for th e Maryland ri o t e r s t o 
obey o r di sobey. It shou Id be r ememb er ed th cit w,,sh i ng ton was bo urd 
by fe de r c l l aw t o i ss ue a proc l amati on t o th e Penn sy l vani a ri o +er s 
be f o r e h e co uld ca l I out the mi I itia. 
Th e o th e r commanding gener a l s , Crabb and Fo rres t , r ece ived s imil a r 
0rd
e r s , th e on l y d i ffe r ence be ing that Lee d i d no t o r~ e r ihem t o 
s up p l y arti I l e ry , or I imit th e ir drcft t o a t own . Th e same numb er 
i nfantry wa s exp ect ed from each. Th er e f o r e , th e gO\·e rno r r eques l od o f · 
c fo r ce o f a t l eas t 900 infantry . I nc l uding th e 100 men o f the ari i I l e ry 
a
nd 
ca va lry units , thi s s t at e mi I itia force wa s t o be a t l eas t on e 
th
o usa nd men, ex c I ud i ng off i ce r s ; thi s t o t a I wa s s Ii ghi I y I es.s 
an ha l f o f the f ede ral quota expect ed from Maryland . Th e ma i n th · 
r-•urpose f o r orde ring o ut so many mi I di a men was t o impress up on ihe 
riote r s th e fa c t th at th e s t a t e co u l d be strong and powerfu l wh e n 
it neede d to be .
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I n pre fa c ing the o rd e r s i ss ued t o Gener c l s Smi th, Cr ab b and 
Fo rres t, Gove rro r Lee exr l a ined wh at he pe r ce ived t o be th e threa ·I 
Wh eth er o r no t th e ri o t s ever posed a r ea l 
that th e . t d r 10 s pose, . 
th
r ea t i s irre l evcnt , however, beca use th e gove rno r be li eved a dange r 
Lee I i s red hi s be li e f s as : 
ex · i s t ed, a nd ac t ed from th at be ! i e f. 
th
e r e now ex i s t in wes t e rn Ma r yl and threa t s t o thi s gove rnrr:enl, 
poss ibly t o any gove rnment ; th• men issuing these throa t s are becoming 
mo r e and mo r e darin~ and I i centi o us ; co mmuni ca l i on ox i s l·s be tw een 
these men and th e ins un;ents in west e rn Pc,nns y I van i a; I he r i o·•e rs in 
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i s s tate have r e fu se d t o comp l y w i th a draft o f mi I iti a o rder ed th · 
by th e commande r- in- chief and will not a id in th e p l ans o f th e Pres ident 
o f th e United St at es ; I ibertv po l es have been co ll ec t ed, and men co ll ect d 
f e r an attack o n th e s t a t e ar sena l at Frederick ; and th ese ri o te r s 
have used f o r ce and threa t en t o use mo r e , and th e r etiy c r ea t e confus i on 
ar:d danqe r. 
3 1 
Th e r ee.sons Lee qave f o r hi s ca l I f o r a separate r eq ui s iii on 
wer e base d on th e pe r cepti ons I i s t ed above . Cl ea rly, he tho ught 
th
at th e r e was an immediate threat t o th e gove rnment and c iti zens o f 
th
e s t a t e . He f eare d an attack on th e arsena I at Fr-e deri ck , whi ch 
if s uccess ful, would have put g r eat r esources o f arms and ammuni ti cn 
32 into th e hands o f the ri o t e r s . I n th e vent thi s ·fea r was r ea li z d, 
it would have bee n l ogi ca l t o f ear an a rmed ma r ch o n th e go ve rnment 
i n Ann apo li s , o r on Ba l timo r e . Th e f ea r o f an actua l I inl·, between 
th
e Maryl and and Penn sylvania ri o t e r s was a l so important, no t onl y 
t o Lee , but to Hami I t on and Was hington as we l I. These f ea r s do 
muc h t o ex p l a in why Lee o rde r ed ~-o many troo ps t o mar ch, and did so in 
s uc h a dec i s ive mann er. 
The nee d fo r immedi at e acti o n be ing es t abli shed by Le , he 
p r oceeded t o di sca rc hi s p r evi o us qu a lms abo ul o r de rin g oui lh c 
rni I i ti a . Gon e wa5 th e attempt t o pl ace an eq ua l burde n on th e 
va · d Pad s ri o us co unty mi I iti a r eg iments , but f o r ve ry goo r easons . 
o f th e wes t e rn sho r o f th e s t at e wer e ri o ting, so th o e co uld no l 
be ca I I ed. Th e Eas te rn Sho r e troo ps wer e t oo f a r r emoved from th 
thr·ea t t o be mobili zed in time t o be e ff ecti ve . The soull1 c r11 counli es 
on th e wes t e rn s ho r e wer e in much the same pos ii i on. Cec i I counl y 
co uld no t eve n pro vide I imited men f e r t he fede r a l n ,q ui s i ·t i on. 
L·C 
ca 1 1 eci for troo p=- from some o f th e mos t de nse I y popu I at ec! a r eas 
he eo rge own area , and hop d fer a 
in th e s tate--Balt·1more and t G t 
r apid ti 11 ing o f the quota . 
Orde r s tor th e cava lry and a rti I l e ry co r~ s wer e s pec ifi c t o r 
ven oug ee , o r vari o us r easons , t eared t o draft 
th i 5 ca I I. E th h L t . 
ca va lry f o r th e f ede r a l r equi s ition before th e eptembe r 13 orde r s , 
he had no f ea r o f dra fting cavalry for th e st at e quota. Such a change 
was aga in due t o th e per ce ived nee d t o r i mr di at e aci i on. Ne, hes i-
t at i o n wa s shown in ca l I ing t o r a gene n ., 1 draft, e ith er. Th e gove rno r 
told Smith th a t th e mi I itia law wa s to be enforce d and o bE: yed in thi s 
ins t ance . Such a stat ement did not nece=-sari ly impl y th at th : l aw 
was not to be obeyed f e r th e f ede r a l quota a l so , but r ath er th ai th e 
gove rno r wo u l d no t be so Jax in demanding th at the state quota be 
f i I I ed. 
Th e o rce r s i ss ued on Septemb e r 13 showed that Lee could act 
with firmn ess wh en an immedi at e dange r ex i s t ed o r w2s th ought t o 
ex i s t. Reacti on s by th e gove rn o r ' s cour c i I, th e mi I iti a and e\'e n 
privat e c itizens wer e mu ch more pos it i ve in thi s mu st er th an during 
th e ca 11 t o r the t ede r a I se rvi ce . Fc, r its own pad, th : co un c i I l o 
th
e gO\·e rno r act ed dec i s ive ly by o rce ring Lee t o go pe r sonally t o 
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Frede r i c k t o he lp s t aba l i ze -Jh e r ebe l I i ous a Jmos phere . Th ese 
o rde r s even spec ifi ed tha t th e gove rno r was ro " command in pe r son 
th E, det achment t o ma r ch t o Frede ri ck. " Go ve rn o r L e did no t ca ri~y o ul 
thi s mi I itary aspect of the o rd rs , but he did go t o wes le ro M,,. y land. 
Acti ons o f thi s typ e wer e in direct co nt-ras l wi rh Lee ' s perfo rmance 
duriog th e who le pe ri od o f the mu st e r to r f eder a l servi ce ; he did no t marct 
w i th th e t roops or eveo ad dress a oy of them i n an ettort" t o I end sup por I 
for the federa l quota. 
Th e d i ffere nce in the way Lee r eact ed was enhan ced wh en comp ar ed 
to the manner by whi c h each o f th e other sta t e governJrs approached 
th
e federa I r eq ui s i tion. Governors Hen ry Lee o f Virgini a , Th omc1s 
Mifflin o f Pe nn sy l vani a and Wil li am Howe ll o f New Je r sey eached marchE:d 
wi
th 
th e ir troops , in deed l ed the ir troops . Al I three a l so made var i ous 
speeches i n trying t o convince men t o vo lunteer. Th0mc1s S im Lee 
0 r d
ered Samue l Sm ith to command th e Ma ry l and deta chmert o f the f ede r o l 
r eq ui s iti on . A good case could be made for Lee ' s dec i s i on to l et 
anc,the r man comman d th e troops und e r f i r e : Lee had I imited , if any 
i tary exper i ence . Smith wa s a l so ve r y pop ul a r with th peop l e of 
mi I· 
Ba ltimo r e , and a t th e time of the f ede ral ca l I, wa s serv i ng the sta t e 
as a r ep r esentative in Congress . The gove rn o r a l so chose anorhor man 
to l ead the state quota. Li eutena nt Co l ene ! Jo hn Striker was se l ected 
command the s tate quota , and again Lee preferred a man with 
t o 
mi I itary exi=,er i ence to l ea d th e mi I iti a . 
lneYpe ri ence d i d not keep the gove rno r from go i ng to western 
Mary I and , howeve r . He was or de r ed t o go , but those o rCe rs we r I s ued 
b Y the co urcl I at a meet I ng tha t the gove rnor attended , and were p robab I y 
• t o~ a ll ty. Th e dec i s i on tor him to go wa s ~ached with Lee ' s know ledge , 
If not h Is approve 1 . Lee went I n h I s capac I ty as the execut I ve of I he 
tate , a nd no t as the commander-i n- ch i ef of the state mi I i tary force_ .. 
~. may have t e It t-h at th Is wou Id have a mo r bere t I I a I effect eh an 
if he arrived at th e hea d of an a rmy. 
Me n in ·rh e mi I iti a , l so reacted d i fferently to ihis ca l I as 
opposed to th e tederc I ca 11. Th e di tterence was ehat they~ rcac l, 
and did so in s upport of the state gov rrmen r . I n faci , repor Is say 
93 
-:-hat o n th e firs t day the requi s ition was made publi c in Ba ltimo r , 




es t i mat e may be great l y exagge r at ed, at l eas t as many men as we r e th· · 
neede d vc I untee r ed, and e,-entua 11 y mar ched t o Fr-ederi c k from 
econ ra s ecomos mo r e apparen wh en it i s r ememb e r ed Baltimo r e . Th t t b t 
th at th e f ede r a l quota r eques t ed wa s no t nearly t i I l ed from Ba ltimo r e . 
Th e r e a r e many exr. lanati o ns tor th e di tte r ence in th e numbe r o f 
vo luntee r s . One o f these i s the manr e r in whi c h th e r eGui s iti on was 
made . From contemporary acco unts , it appea r s that a l I o f th e mi I i i i a 
in Ba ltimo r e t o wn wer e as ked t o mu st e r at one time and in th e same 
p l ace. Wh en thi s wa s accomp l ished, Genera l Smith addressed the troops .
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He r epo rtedly gave an imp ass i oned speech, and expl a in ed th e threa i s posed 
to c iti zens o f the state . Afte r a ll owing th e mcl rti a l atmos ph er e t o i -a ke 
tu I I e t f ee t , and hi s menti on o f threats p I ay on the sympathy o f th e 
gath e re d mi I iti a , Smith sprang th e r eques t t o r vo luntee r s . Ii i s hardly 
s urpri s ing th at th e quota was immedi a t e l y and comp l et e ly ti I l ed a f ie r 
s uch a di sp l ay o f pomp and patri oti sm. Th e we i gh-t- o f a speech by iho 
mi I ita ry he ro and popul a r Congressman Smith co u l d noi he l p but moko 
an impress i o n on th e miliii a . In contras t, Sn:i t h made no speech fo r 
th e f ede r 2 I r equi s iti o n, but r athe r s imp ly o rd e r ed th e r eg imenl-a l 
commande r s in hi s brigade to c,bi-a in the quo ra by vo l untee r s o r dra f ·l s . 
Anoth e r, mu ch more s ubtl e diffe r ence wc1s th e metho d used in 
accepting vo turtee r s . Th er e was no rest ri cti on on the numb er cf men 
each r eg ime nt co u t d provide , as th e re was fo r th e f eder a I req u i s i Ii on. 
Th e on ly limit was on th e t ot a l numb er o f men to be prov ided, anC 
th at co uld be fro m 300 t o 400 inf antry. Ne t pl ac ing a I imi r o f 
r e.presenta+ ion per unit was co ndu c i ve t o mass vc I un teer i sm; I ha I i s, a 
94 
who l e unit, comp any o r r egimert, co u l d vo lurtee r t ogeth e r. A concess i on 
s uc h as thi s may have bee n coinc identa l t o th e need f o r a l ar ge g r o up o f 
mi I iti a J but it did i nflue nce th e t o t a l numb e r o f vo lun tee r s . 
M l eas t 
th
r ee compl e t e compani es vo luntee r ed f o r the st at e se rvi ce from 
Ba I ti mo r e , exc I ud i ng the arti I I ery comp ani es and th e ca va I ry troo p. 
In additior: t o these , e l ements from seve r a l oth er comi:-,ani es off E: r ed the ir 
. 3 7 se rvi ces . Of course , us ing a mass r a ll y t o drum up vo luntee r s may 
a l so have bro uf ht soc i a l pressure upon th e mi I itia; if a fow mon v lun-
t e r e d t o ma inta in a so If- i mage--to pro ve that they, t oo , wer e pa IT i o t s 
and wen-: r ea dy t o prot ect I ife and I ib erty and l aws . Wh at eve r th e 
e ff E:ct o f the mass must e r, and o f Smith ' s speech o f the individua l, 
these two ac t s did he l p f i I I th e quot a from Ba ltimore compl et e l y with 
vo I untee r s . 
Ano th e r explanati on f o r th e wi I I ingness t o vo luntee r may have 
bee n th e pli ght o f the wes t e rn c i t i ze ns . Afte r a ll, in s urgent's wer e 
thr·ea -t-ening c iti zens o f Ma ryland, and eve n th e st at8 ar sena l a -t-
Fre de ri c k. Th ese r ebe I Ii ous peep I e mu s t be s t opped so th at Mary I and 
may be a safe pl ace t o I ive . If th ey wer e no t put down in w si e rn 
M,: ry! a nd, th ese "dange ro us combin ati ons " might ma r c h t o Ba ltimo r e . 
Th e mi I iti a was t o ld tha t th e re was a c ! ea r end immedi at e da nge r, 
and app a r e ntly ce rta in o f the mi I i t i a be li eved wh at th ey wer e ro l d, 
and vo luntee r ed t o end that dange r. 
Th e r E wer e oth e r f act or s as we l I . A mar ch t o Frederi ck o r 
even Hage rs t own was qu; re a b; t shorte r and I ess t ax ; ng i han a march 
a l I o f the way t o Pittsburgh. Th e mi I iti a wo uld not even have l o 
l ea ve th e st a t e fo r thi s se rvi ce . Fina ll y , rh e s t at e se r v i ce was l o s 
comr, I ex than the f ede r a I se rv; ce . There wou Id be no q ues 1·; on of who 
wa s t o pay the mi I itia, who was t o f urni sh arms and suppli es or even 
who wa s r espons ibl e for th e ca l I. Th e s t at e o rd e r ed the mi I iti a o ut ' 
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and wo u Id attend t o a I I of its nee ds . Th er e wou Id be no doubts aboui 
Sfa te versus f ederc~ I righ ~-s or r espons i bi I iti es in this r eq ui s iti on. 
No r eco rd has bee n kept of how the s tate quota from th e other 
38 sect ion s of Maryland wa s ach i eved. These quotas wer e mot , howeve r, 
a
nd 
u ltimately mar ched to Frede ri c k, wh er e a l I o f the troops w0r e 
assemb l ed o n o r befor e Se ptemb e r 17. Wh en th e mi I i t i a from a l I o f ihe 
areas arr i ved at thi s rendezvous , they wer e met by a nume rous group 
of armed loca l c itizens wh o had a l so vo lun teered t o defend Fred ri ck . 
Th ese c i tizens, most of whom wer e too o l d o r t oo young f o r r eg ular 
mi I iti a se rvi ce , banded t ogethe r as ea rly as th e s i xth of Septemb er 
39 to prepare a defe nse of th e c ity. In additi on t o these men, at 
I East a fu l I batta li o n, more th an 200 men, o f th e Frederick co unty 
40 
mi I itia had been in se rvi ce s ince Septemb e r 5 . A troop o f cava l ry from 
41 
th
e ar ea began se rvi ce on th e seve nth. A l I of the mi I iti a in these 
groups vo I untee r ed witho ut even being asked, mu ch Ii ke part of ·/-he 
mi I iti a had don e earli e r in Cumberland. This s ituat i on wa s created 
by the threatened dange r tha t wa s tho ught to be approaching Frederick : 
expedi ency d i c t at ed that action was needed before ord r s from th e 
governor could be obta ined, 
Lee d i d not repr imar.d th ese volunteers, indeed , h cong r aiul ai cd 
them wh en he arrived i n Freder i ck . Once there , Lee ordered about one-
third of the s tate quota t o ma r c h t o Hage r s l-own to quel I the di sturbances 
the r e . Genera l Bay l y co mp Ii d with thi s o rder , and r eported ~h a !· 
th e tmops were in Hage rs t own by Septemb er 17, and asked Lee to ~ m• 
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to Hagerstown t o a id in stopp ing the dissent. Lee comp I i ed w i 1 h t-h e 
r eq ues t, and spent three day s i n Hage r stown , apparent l y enough time 
to conv i nce himse l f that th e s ituat ion wa s contro l l ed 
, and that a few 
troops wou ld be able t o keep peace in the area. Be f o r e l eav ing for 
Freder i ck , Gove rno r Lee i ss ued new orders t o th e r eg imenta l commande r s 
in Washington and the we= t e rn part o f Frederick co unty. Th ese o rders 
i nc luded author i ty to di sa rm and/or arrest any person kncwnto be or 
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general l y s us pected of, s uppo rting the r i o t s . With that, Lee r eturned 
firs t t o Frederick and th en to Ba l timor e . 
By Septemb e r 22 , Lee began r ece iving reports that the s itu a ri o n 
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in a l I of wes t e rn Mary l and had quieted co ns ide r ab l y. John Lynn 
confirme d th i s in a l ette r dated Septemb e r 25 , by s t ai· ing that Cumber l and 
wa s safe and qui et. Troops that had been mu st e r ed in Frederick were 45 
demob i l i ze d, except for approximate l y fi-fty t o guard th e ar sena l . Th e 
mi I iti a from other areas o f the s tate mar ched back to Baltimore, 
wh ere th ey f ormed a great parade on Sep t emb e r 23 , and wer e congratu I at ed 46 
by th e governor before being d i smi ssed afte r on l y two weeks serv i ce . 
The s ituation wa s und e r co ntro l, and in western Maryl and " women and 
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children no l onge r f ear. " 
Th e l as t ha d not been heard of the rioters, however. Two days 
af t e r th e state quo+a r eturn ed t o Baltimore, lh e Maryl and Gazerte 
pr i nted an excerpt from a l ette r exp laining that abou t twenty of 
the lea d;ng r;oters were ;n c ustody. Dated Septemb e r 20 , wh;l e the 
troops were st ; I I ; n weste rn Mary I and, th e I ett er con r; nued that rw 
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o+her men wer e negot i ating a surrende r. Thi s r eport may have been 
incor r ect, because only e i g ht men were b r ought t o tria l . Howev r, 
from thirteen differenl men, 
at l eas t fourteen 
as o rd e r ed by the 





Th e re were s ix me n in d ict ed fo r treason aga in s t both t he s t at e 
o f M,: ry I and and th e United St a t es . Th ese me n werF a 11 pa rti c ipa nts in 
th e ri ot a t Hage rs t own on Septemb e r first , and appa re ntl y oth e r 
acti ons a imed at di s rupting the gove rrment. Th e bi I I o f ind ictment 
fo r thi s case charged th e s ix men with fir s t wag ing open and pub l ic 
wa r agains t the s t at e , and second with wag ing th e same aga ins t th 
United St a t es . Thi s was th e reason th at t he s t a t e Atto r rey Ge ne ra l 5C 
Lut he r Mar tin, bro ught treason cha rges aga in s t t he s ix men. In a 
le t te r t o Sa mu e l Chase , Go ve rro r Lee did a lso indi ca t e th ai t he s ix 
5 1 
' 
men wer e acc used of oppos ing th e Ma ry land mi I iti a law. 
In a lett e r on the lega l as pect s of the case , written be fo re t he 
case even baga n, Chase adv i sed th e gove rno r t hat t he s ix me n co uld 
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no t be tr ie d outs ide t he Washin gt on co unty c ircuit court. Chase , 
Chi e f Ju s ti ce of th e Ma ry l anc Ge ne ra l Co urt o f the Wes t e rn Sho re , 
a ppa rent ly not yet kn owin g that the pri so ne rs wo uld be cha rged wi t h 
treason, s t a t ed th at th e Genera l Co urt co uld hea r cases for onl y 
murce r, f e lony , i ns urrecti on of treaso n. 
He a lso commented on the lega li ty of t ryin g these me n on cha rges 
o f v io la t ing s t at e a nd f ede ra l /aw. In hi s op ini on, the defe ndants 
s ho uld not be tri e d on both co un ts , but rathe r on the mo re ser ious o f 
th e two--vi o lati on of th e fede ra l exc ise law. After a l I, Chace a rgued, 
th e men wer e acc used of oppos in g the exc ise law, and onl y vi o la t e d 
st at e I aw, th e mi I i t i a act , ; n th e i r at tempt t o oppose the f ede ra I 
I aw. More c I ea r I y, Chase st at ed that he cou I d "not see how a man by 
do ing ar.y one act can at th e same time v io l a te t he l aws o' lhe na ti ona l 
- - - -
gove rnme nt a nd th e laws of th e sta t e gove rnme nts . " 
' 
-- 98 
Ch ase cont i nued h i s opini on , and q ua I if i ed i t by I i st i ng hi s 
eca use e I no have tu l I i nfo r mat i on o n p r es umpti ons on th e case . B h d.d t 
th e c 
ase , o r even t he charges aga i ns t th e pr i sone r s , he ass umed th at 
th e men wo u l d be charged wi t h o ppos i ng th e s tate mi I i t i a l aw. 
I f 
th
E, case was to be hea rd i n a state co urt , th E, t edera I charge co u I d 
no t be b ro ught aga i nst th E: men . Chase further I im i fo d h i s s tatement , 
sa i he ass umed th at th e men actu a ll y commi tted a breach o f the and · d 
peace , probab l y a r i o t , i n oppos ing the execut i on o -f t he mi I i ti a ac t . 
Base d o n t hi s ass umpt i on , Ch ase conc l uded that th e men coul d be tr i ed 
f o r t h i s o ff e nse o n l y i n th e co unty c i r cu i t co urt . 
Appa r e nt l y , di s r ega rd i ng Chase ' s o p i n i on, the gove rnment i ss ued 
r an s f o r th e s i x men , t o be moved to Ann apo li s , and prcceed i ngs wa r t 53 
a i ns t them wer e s t arted in th e Oct obe r t e r m o f th e Mary l and Gene r a l ag . 
Court o f th e Wes t e rn Sho r e . Th e prosecut i on , r epresent i ng th e st at e , was 
Atto rney Gene r a l Luth e r Mart i n. Afte r th e cha r ges aga i nst t he men wer e 
r ece ived, t he s i x men ente r e d p l eas o f no r guil ty t o the first co uni , 
and a p l ea t o the jur i s d i c t i o n o f t he co ur r -for th e char ge of rreaso n 
c ga i ns t th e United St at es . Ac tua I I y , th e p I ea t o the second char ge 
wes no t gu i I ty , but the de f e ndants argued th at a s f at e court cou Id not 
hea r a case invo l ving treaso n aga in s t 1-hE, Un i t ed St at es . Th e Cons !-i !u-
ti on o f the Un i t ed s tates s pec i f i ed th at Un i t ed St at es rreason cases 
co uld on ly be hea rd in th e f ede ra l c ircuit courts . S ince lhe Mary land 
Gene ra l Court was not a f ede re l c ircui t court , the de f e ndants questi oned 
th e co n:: t i tut i on a l i ty o f th e case . Muc h t o iho chag rin o f Ali-o rn cy 
Gene ra l Ma rt i n, who argued that th e s t at e co uld indeed prosecut e in 
t e h Ge ne r a I Co urt the de f endar.ts wer e f o und no t gu i I ty o f treason , 
agains t t he s t at e and were dis missed from the charge of treason aga ins l 
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the United St at es . 
Th e s taTe of Maryland could l ega lly try the def endants in th e 
G 
. 54 
·,ene r a l Co urt on c harges o f treason against th e state . A not gui li y pl ea by th e de f endants meant that a jury trial was necessa ry . 
A 
jury was prope r l y se l ect ed and qua I ifi ed, and th e tri a l began. Unfor-tur at e ly, th e co urt minutes have not been f o und , but pe rh aps I i s ting 
th
e witn esses fo r th e s t at e wi 11 be informat i ve . Th E, state provided seve r e I high-ranking mi I iti a o ffi ce r s f o r th e prosecution, inc luding 
th
e command e r o f thE, twenty- fourth r egiment, Li eutenant Co l one l Rez in D . 
avi s o f Washington co urty, Li eutenant Co lone l Thomas Sprigg , command ,r c f th e t enth r egiment , Wash i ngto n county , and Chr i sti an Orendo rf, batta li o n commande r f o r th e s ame t enth r egiment . Th e o n l y l es timony agains t the de f endants f o urd wa s a s igned s t a rement o f th e " G.;ne r a I lnqu es l for the Body o f th e Wes t e rn Shor e." Thi s document st a red l·ha l th e s i x accused men did arm thems l eves and gath er ed oth er peopl e t oqe th e r and co unse l l ed th em t o o ppose th e executi on o f the f edc r a ! 
exc i se 1 
55 aw. 
In spite o f thi s t es rimony, the jury f o und rh e de f c nd0nl s 
not . I 56 gu1 t y . 
From Chase ' s ea rli e r comments o n the l ega lity o f the case , and th e juri sdi cti on o f the st a t e courts , it i s not scrpri s ing l·ha t the charge o f treason against th e Un ;ted St a t es was di smi ss d wh i I e Chase • as s itting as pres iding just i ce f or the tri a l. Th e Chi ef Ju sti ce a l so , from hi s previ ous statement, mu st have agreed with lh e jury ' s dec i s ion t o find th e de f endants noi gui l ty on th e firs t char ge . Fina I I y, Chase prob ab I y approved of th nex t s1 ep in the prosecu Ii on o f th e ri ot e r s-- the trial in Washington co unry c ircuit co urt on l ess r 
c harges . 
-
, io rge oo fn ar , Adam Tom, 
Fo ur o f th e men charc ed wi th treason G H John Roe and Henry Bowert , wer e r eturred t o th e c us t ody o f th e she r i ff o f Washington co unty , and p l aced i n th at county ' s j a i I a fte r th e rreason tr i a I. 
Th ese me n awa ited tri a l on cha rges o f tres pass , contempt anc . 57 mi s demea no r , and they wa ited unt i I 1795 , beca use an ea r l i e r Decemb e r 1 trial was pos tponed . Th e pri sone rs wer e in j a i I a t l eas t unti 1 58 Janu a ry , 1795 . They mny have r ema i ne d in j a i l uni ii ih rri a l , bu! ih e r e i s no evidence o f i ·h i s . Wh en the case was fina l l y hea rd , each o f the f o ur men p l eaded gui I ry t o the three c ha r [eS . Th er e was no ques ti o n o f juri s d i c t i on thi s time , no r was th er e ary o !h e r do ubi . Th e judgment on each man was a fine o f three pounds curren! money , and th e 
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pri sone r s wer e r e l eased afte r having securi t i es pos t bond fo r them. So th e fina l outcome o f th E, treason trial fo r rh e wes t e rn Maryl and r i o t e r s wa s that f o ur o f thEm p l ea ded guilty t o I sse r cha r ges and r ece i ved sma l I f i nes . Th ese f o ur men did spend at Jeas i four monrh s i n j a i I, howe, ·e r , so wa it i ng f o r i ·he fina l dec i s i on was pr obabl y harde r o n them than the actu a l fine . Th e o ~ e r two men tri ed f o r treason , Mi c hae l Bowe rt and Chri sti an Fithti sh , wer e no r indi c t ed on th e l esse r c har ~es , and app ar ent ly did no r s t and tri a l f o r those ri o t - r e l at ed 
c rimes aga in. 
Ho weve r , at I eas J i wo o th er men f aced cha r ges connoci ec Io th e ri o t s . Jo hn Rohback was rri ed in th e Washingi o n co unty c irc uil ourr fo r a ttem~ti ng t o preveni the executi o n o f the mi I iti a l aw. Th e case , origina l ly brought bef or e th e co urt in April , 1795 , was pos t poned until 60 Decembe r 1795 , wh n a jury f o und Rohb acl< no r gui li y . Guy Yo ung was charge d with "cocking and po inting a gun at John Puff enbarger " in 6 1 addit i o n t o tres pa ss , contempt and mi s demeano r. Thi s char ge a l so 
1794 
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s t emmed from th e Sep t ember firs t r iots. Yo ung ente red a p lea of 
money an I pou nds o f 
gui lty, and wa s f in ed twenty sh i 11 ings current d 48 
tob acco in ccurt fees. 
It took unti I December, 1795 , to f ina ll y bring a l I cf the ri ot e rs 
t o ju s ti ce , but the sta t e fol lowed through on the prosecuti on. 
By 
thi s t ime , the s ituat ion in wes t e rn Maryland had long been ca lmed , 
ven 
though a la rge mi I i tia guard was p laced on the Was h ington co unty ja i 1 
wh i I e th e pr isone rs were th e re . Governor Lee had expressed co nce rn 
back in October, 1794, that an attempt mi ght be made t o free th e 
~r 1sone rs , but no evidence has been found that woul d justify Lee ' s . 62 
co nce rn. 
Th e gove rnment di s rega rd ed Chase ' s op ini on that the s t at e co uld not 
ho ld juri s d i c tion ove r th e fede ra l treason charge , and th e res ult was 
th at th e charge was di smissed. Even th e defendants knew that the sta re 
co urt had no ju ri s di ct ion t o hea r th e charge . Perhaps affected by th 
d i s mi ssa l o f the more se ri o us charge , a jury decided in favor of the 
de f endants in th e lesse r cha rge of treason aga inst th e sta t e . Thi s 
was s ti 11 not e nough, and th e state pressed even lesse r cha rges 
aga inst fo ur of th e o ri g i na l s ix , and two othe r men. Fi nal ly , the 
s t at e got a gu i I ty ven' i ct , but it was a great dea I of troub Io . What 
the s t ate was trying t o prove by th i s tenac ious effort was noi exp la ined , 
but perhaps the s ix co nv i cted men were be i ng used as an exa mp I e to 
any pe~ons who thought that ri ots or other i I lega l opposit ion to 
government co uld go unpuni shed. 
Perhaps the state was a lso attemp ti ng to appease thos men who 
we re threatened by the r iot e rs . Threats of physica l vio lence had b en 
iss ued aga ins t some re lat ive ly impo rtant men , such as Thomas Sprigg , 
---
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Rez in Davi s and Ad am Ott. Th ese wer e c ivi I a nd mi I itary l ea de r s , and 
threa t s t o th em, combin ed with ri o t s aga ins t th e gove rnment could no t 
be co nd one d. 
Th e who l e patte rn o f r eacti on t o th e wes t ern Maryl ard ri o t s showed 
a growi ng and continued co nce rn f o r th e sa f ety o f the gove rnment, whi ch 
~e rh aps did no t end with th e tri a l s o f the ri ot e r s . Lee ca l l ed, us ing 
no un ce rta in t e rms , f o r a l a rge fo r ce o f mi I iti a t o contro l th e ri o l-s 
and p r event th em from spreading furth e r. He i ss ued o rd e r s ·ro di sa rm 
a nd arres t ri o t e r s and even s uspec t s . Th e gove rnmen-i- brc- ught treason 
c hc;rges aga ins t seve r a l o f th e ri ot e r s even wh en advi sed o f th e probl ems 
thi s wo uld ca use . Th ese acti ons may be see n as those o f men wh o f ee l 
insecure , e ithe r o f the ir own sa f ety o r of th e sa f ety c f the ir gove rnment, 
o r bo th. As a s t at e , Maryland was still no t s ure o f itse lf, just as 
th e f ede r a l gove rnment was no t s ure o f its own authority and abi I ity 
t o enforce th at authority. Lee co uld see th e threa t posed by th e 
Pe nnsy l v ani a ri o t e r s , and he tho ught he saw it gr ow and sprea d into 
Maryl and. He pe r ce ived a threat t o th e gove rnment, and so r eaci ed in Ili c 
s t ronges t way he could, by ca lling o ut th e mili -ri a . Thi s ca ll was 
s uccess ful becau se th e mi I iti a a l so pe r ce ived a threa t t o th e gove rnmenl 




Thi s thes i s has been direc t ed at o ne inst ance o f th e use o f th e 
mi I iti a by th e United St ates and Ma r y l and gove rnments during t-h e 
firs t y ea r s afte r the ratifi ca ti on o f the Constituti on. Th e inc ide n /-
was th e ca ll fo r th e militi a from Ma ryl and and three o th er s s t at es t-o 
he l p q ue l I the 179 4 whi skey exc i se ri o t s in wes t e rn Penn sy !vani a . Th e 
ca l I a nd th e ri o t s th emse lves wer e a l so a maj o r pa ri o f ano th er inc ident--
Ma r y l a nd' s e f forts t o end ri o t s th at r es ulted in an atl empt t o drafr 
me n in wes f-e rn Ma ryl and t o fi I I th e na ri ona l ca l I. Res ponse by ihe 
mi I iti a t o both ca ll s has a l so bee n an integ r a l part o f ihi s di scuss i on. 
Th e evidence bro ught o ut in th o course o f thi s th es i s ma kes 
poss ibl e seve ral conc lus io ns . Th e nati ona l mi I iti a l aw o f 1792 did 
no t c r ea t e a nati ona l mi I iti a : it a l lowed t-h e s t- at es to c r ea i e th e ir 
own unique mi I iti as ba sed l oos l y on a gener a l pl an f o rmed by Congres 
Th i s l aw was passed by a Congr ess un s ure o f its autho rity t o fo r ce t-h 
s t at es t o o bey its di c tates , and un s urE o f /-h e pro pe r ba l ance o f 
f ede r a l a nd s t at e contro l o f th e mi I iti a . Th Maryl and gove rnment We.JS 
a l so un ce rta in o f its pos it i on in r ega rd ro conrro l, and t-h er e fo r o 
e nac t ed an ineffective s t at e mi I iti a l aw. Th e Mary l and gov rnment- and 
mi I iti a f a il ed t o fi I I the r equi s iti on made by Pres ident Washing /on 
f o r t-roo ps t o mar ch aga inst th e wes f-e r n Penn sy/ va ni ri o+ r s . Thi s 
fa ilure was due in part t o i"h e probl ems o f conlro l ove r th e mi Ii I i a . 
Th e s t at e ga ve /-hi s r eques t l e~.s th an ful I s u~pod fe r f ea r o f 
pa rti a ll y dos troyi ng a s t a-t-e institu I i on, th e mi I iti a . The mi I ii i a 
saw no threa t t o i t se lf o r its s l~ t e in /-h e Pennsy l va ni a ri o f-s , and 
~o did not r espond fully. llowev r, wh e n a t-hrea l t o t h s l a l e ex i s l ed , 
rh e mi I iti a co uld and did react fo r ce fu l / y . Thus , ii seems lh o l th e 
Ma ryl and mi I iti a , s uppo rted by th e s t l e gov rnmeni, was mu ch mo r e 
w i I Ii ng to de f end s tate authority th an it was t o de f end nati ona I 
auth o rity. 
Co ngress passed a mi I iti a act in May, 1792 . Thi s act did no t 
104 
c r ea t e a militi a o f ny type . It s impl y def ined who was to be in th e 
mi I iti a . Congress s tipul at ed that the s t at es s hould pass l aw in 
acco rcance with th e nati ona l l aw, and have th e ir mi I iti as fu l l y 
o r ga ni zed and the men enro l l ed by no mo r e than one y ea r a fte r May, 
1792 . In additi o n, th e s t at es wer e t o see that each mi I iti a man was 
pro pe rl y a rmed, as de fin ed by th e l aw, no l at e r than s i x months afte r 
th e s t a t es enact ed the ir own l aws . Each s t at e was a l so t o provide 
an Adjuta nt Ge ne r c l, t o ac t in th e manne r pr esc rib ed by th e Congress i on-
a l l aw. A sc heme f o r o r gani zati o n was s ugges t ed t o th e s t at es , but 
the r e was no r equirement f o r th e <: t a t e t o fo l low thi s org ani za ti on. 
Co ngr ess expec t ed muc h coope ra ti on and s uppo rl f r om th e s t a res 
in pass ing thi s l aw. Indeed, mo s t o f the burden o f enro llment, o rg an-
i za ti o n and admini strati o n was p l aced directly on the s t at es . Th 
mi I iti a wo uld in no way be a nati onr,1 mi I itary es t ab l i shm nt. I t wo ul d 
ins t ea d be a part o f the s t a t es , ava i I ab I e f o r th e use o f t h nai - io na I 
gove rnme nt. Th e s t a t es o rg ani zed thi s mi I iti a in any way t hey chose , 
se l ect ed o ffi ce r s a ny way th ey wanted, and dri I l ed and di sc i p l i nod th 
tr=ps in any way and wh e neve r they des ired. Congress or th e na ti ona l 
gove rnme nt had no contro l ove r these aspect s . Even th e requirement 
fo r wh o s ho uld be in th e mi I iti a a l l owed the s t at es u l timat e auiho ri ty . 
By pe rmitting tho s t at es po• e r M exempt f~m se rv ice whosoever ihey c hos• , 
th e nati ona l ac t gave th e s t at es th e powe r t o exempt a l I c i t i zens 
if th ey wi shed. C l ea rly, th r espo ns i b ility o f ihe c r ea -li on, ce. r 
and ma i nte nance of i"h e mi I i r i a was I eft to the s rat es . The na i i ona I 
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act, wh e th e r intended o r not ' 
actua ll y se rved only as a guide t o r 
s ub seq ue nt s t a t e legi s lati on. 
Th e nati ona l gove rrment did not entire ly re linqui s h authority 
ove r th e mi I iti a , howeve r. Unde r a sepa rat e act passed a few days 
be fore th e mi Ii ti a act ' 
fe r th e sta t e mi I iti as . 
Cc,ngress gave th e Pres id ent a utho rity t o ca l I 
Th e c ircumsta nces unde r whi ch he co uld do so 
wer e defin ed, as was th e method hE: had t o us t o ca I I out th e mi Ii ti a 
fo r nati ona l se rvi ce . Thi s act, kn own as th e "Ca l Ii ng Forlh Act," 
e ve n I imited th e numb e r of mi I iti a th at the Pres ided co uld ca l I. In 
case the mi I iti a was act ua ll y neede d t o r epe l an invas ion or s upp ress 
e n ins urrect ion, t he Pres ident could ca l I on onl y the mi I iti a trcm 
s t a t es th at bo rde re d th e s t at e in whi c h th e r ebe l I ion o r invcs ion occurred. 
Th e Congress ion a l mi I iti a act was co ns pi cuo us not only t o r its 
g iving a grea t dea l o f a utho rity t o the s t at es , but a lso t or its 
omi ss ion of th e us ua l pena liti es to r t a i lure t o compl y with th e law. 
No fines were me nti oned tor s t a t es that did not meet the dea d I ines , o r 
for most o th e r requireme nts I is t e d in the law. Th e fede ra l gov- r rm nl-
did not know if it had a utho rity t o fo r ce s uch comp I i ance on any 
memb e r s t at e , and so no tines wer e inc lu ded . Gr anted, mu ch of rhe law 
was ind eed a guid e l in to r th e s t at e leg is la ti on, something fo r whi h 
fines co uld not be imposed. Th e r equirement to r eac h man ro a rm 
himse lf within a ce rta in, th e requirement t or the s t ai es to appo ini 
Adjuta nts Ge ne ra l, o r th limit by whi ch o rgani zati on was to be 
accompli s hed we re not s u~po rted by tines . Co ngress inc lu ded no m ans 
t o e nf o r ce thi s law, e ith e r wher e th e sta t es were concern d o r who re 
indi v idua ls were invo lved. 
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Th e omiss ion o f f i nes br ings up two important iss ues : firs t th e 
a uthor i ty o f th United States to fo r ce one o f its membe r s t a t es t o 
comp ly with a na t iona l act , a nd second , th e wh o le concept of thE, contro l 
o f th e mi I i t ia . Th e f i rs t iss ue may be d iscussed in t e rms o+ a new 
go ve rnme nt un ce rta in o f i t s s trength s and li mit a t ions . Th e second iss ue 
is roo t e d much mo re deep ly i n -r-rad it ion and fea r o f a mi I i t a ry es t ab li s h-
ment . 
Th e auth or ity o f the na t iona l gove rnment was i n a ve ry c loudy 
and confused s t a t e dur i ng th e f i rs t f ew yea rs afte r the ra t i f ica t ion 
o f th e Cons t i tut ion. In may i ns t ances , the s t a t es wer e extreme ly 
j ea lo us of th e ir own powe r a nd autho r i ty, and r es is t ed a l lowi ng th e 
r a t io na l gove rnment t o encroach on th e ir doma i n. As a res u lt , th e na t iona l 
gove rnme nt was ca ut io us i n asse rt i ng i t s authori ty--at leas t as rega r~s 
th e mi I i t ia . Th e Cons t i tut ion gave the Pres i den-t- and Congress certa in 
powe rs o ve r th e mi I i t ia , wh ich i nc l ude d th e o rgan i zati on, d isc ip li ne 
a nd a rm i ng o f "/-h e mi li ti a . These were ra th e r broa d powe rs , no t exac -t- /y 
de f ined, but th ey we r e c l ea r ly ass igned t o the r espons ib i I i t y o f 
th e Co ngress . Th e nat iona l leg is la ture avo ided one o f th ese respo ns i -
bi I it ies , di sc ip l in e , e n-t-ire ly in th e 1792 law, aga in probabl y beca use 
i t was no t ce r t a in o f the exac t ba lance o f fede ra l co niTo l ove r wh at 
was essent ia ll y a s t a t e ins titut ion . Organi za t ion was on ly s ugges t ed , 
and a rm i ng the mi I it ia was le ft t o th e ind ividua l mi I i t ia man. At bes t 
th e na t iona l mi I i t ia act was an examp l e o f a s t at e ' s r ights inte rpre-
t a ti on o f th e Cons t i tu t ion; a t wo rs t it was a n exampl e o f Co ngres s 
neg lec t ing i -t-s r espons ibi , i ty a nd autho r i -t-y . 
Th e second Iss ue , th e concept o f contro l ove r t he mi I iti a , 
was a lso imp ortant in c r eating th e nat iona l mi I i t i a act. Many 
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advoca t es o f s t at e ' s r i ghts f ea r ed th e poss i b l e consequence o f g i v i ng 
t he nat i o na l go ve rnment a g r ea t dea l of powe r o ve r bo t h the r egu l a r 
a r my and th e mi I iti a . I n add i ti on to th e mi it i a c l auses , the Cons t i-
t ut i o n a ll owed Co ngress fu ll pc we r ove r th e reg ul a r mi I d ary fo r ces . 
Bo t h power s wer e deemed t oo muc h f o r o ne body of men , and so nat i ona l 
cor:tro l o f the mi I it i a wa s opposed i n Cong r ess by th e s t at e ' s ri ghts 
de l ega t es . Cong r ess d i d ma i nta i n autho rity eve r th e r eg u l ar a rmy , bui-
turn ed muc h o f i t s authority o ve r t he mi I iti a to the s t a t s . I dea ll y , 
th e mi I i t a ry fo r ces wo u l d th en be ba l anced and the s t at es wou l d no t be 
def e nse l ess aga i ns t a des pot i c na t i ona l gove rnment . Th e cos t o f 
ma in t a i n i ng the mi I i t i a wo u l d a l so pass to t hE: s t a t es , and -J-h e nati o na l 
gove rnm ent wo u l d no t have t o conce r n itse l f wi t h an addit i ona l mi I i t a r y 
exr-end i t ur e , unl ess th e mi I i ti a ente r ed nat i ona l se rvi ce . 
Th e Ma r y l and l eg i s l at ur e enacted a mi I i t i a l aw that r e f l ect ed 
mu c h o f th e un ce rta i nty o f the nati ona l l aw. Or gan i zat i on unde r thi s 
s t a t e l aw was t o be f i na ll y comp l et ed by t he gove r no r ; t hus t he s l a t e 
passed on th e duty o f o r ga n i za ti on . Gui de ! i nes f o r o r gani zat io n we r e 
q uo t e d d i r ect l y from th e nati ona l l aw. The s J-a t e act d id p r ov id 
f o r d i sc i p l ine o f the mi I i t i a , both i n the se nse o f p r act i ce and of 
f i nes fe r m n who d i d not comp l y wi t h t he vario us p rov i s i ons of ih e 
ac t . L i ke th e nat i o na l l aw, the Mary l and mil t i a act req u i r ed J-h e 
men t o p r o v i de th e ir o wn a rms . 
Ma r y l and was un ce rta in abo ut t he ex J-ent o f its autho r i t y over th 
c i ti ze ns o f the s t a t e . Fin es were ve r y I i gh l , an i nd i cat i on J-h a t 
pe rh aps the l eg i s l ature did no t ca r e t o impose a heavy burden on 
th e c i t i zens . I n th i s ins t ance t he f i nanc i a l burden was i mportani , 
but th e burde n o f corrp li ance wi th 1-he l aw was just as importani. Had 
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th e fin es bee n t oo hea vy, mass d isobedi ence might have res u lted, and 
witho ut a large e nforcement agency , the gove rnment co u ld do I itt le to 
make th e men comp ly, Th e mi I itia wa s to be an enforcement t oo l, and 
it th e mili t i a d i d not obey the laws, th en th e gove rnment wa s r e nde re d 
v i rtua l ly he l pless. Th e law wa s based on conseni, wi th t ines added 
as a remind e r that co nsent wa s more advantageo us , bo rh t o rh e individua l 
a nd to th e s tate , than d isobed ie nce . 
Th e s t ate government co nsen t e d to th e na ti ona I r equ i rement t o fo rm 
a mi I it i a , but the s t a t e did so at its own pace . More th an a year and 
a ha l f e lapsed betwee n th e t ime th e nat ional law was e na ct ed and th e 
t ime th e Ma ryland leg is lature passed i t s law. Th e cru c ial diffe re nce 
in t ime , howeve r, was the ha l f year more it t oo k Mary land t o begin 
organizing th e mi I i t ia. More than two years had passed before the 
s tate had eve n a semb lance of a mi I iti a . Pe rhaps a lag of more ih a n 
a yea r pa s t th e I im i t wou ld not have been important i f th e mi I iti a had 
not been ca l led tor the whi s key r iots, but the mi I itia was ca l led, 
and Maryland ' s mi / itia wa s not tu/ ly o rgani ze d and did no / have a ful I 
comp I ement of o-ff ice rs . 
A second co nclu s ion to be drawn from th e ev idence dea ls with /·h0 
r eact ion of th e Maryland governmen-r an d th stai e mi li/-i a itse lf i o 
th e President ial r equ es t t o r troops to s uppress ·!h e Whi skey Rebe l I ion . 
Th e s tate government did not respond s trongly t o th e r eq ui s iii on, 
although it c lea r ly cou ld have be~use the sta~ ce rta inly did r espond 
qu i ck ly and strongly t o t he riots i n weste rn Mary l and. Th e f a ilure 
to tu I I y sup po rt the nat i ona I government aga in ra ises I he issue of 
s rate I s rights with i n th e Ma ry I and governmen 1-. 
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Th e Ma ryland s t at e gove rnment did ca l I for the numb e r o f mi I iti a 
Pr es ide nt Washington reques t ed,but it did so ca uti ous ly and with less 
th a n fu l I s upport. Th e probl em was not with i·he Pres ide nt ' s autho r i ty 
t o ca l I t o r troops , but with th e ext e nt t o whi ch th e ca l I sGou ld be 
purs ue d. Th e s t a t e gove rno r a l lm:ed a grea t dea l o f time to r 
e nro l I ing a nd mu s t e r ing the mi I iti a to r the nati ona l se rvi co . Among 
th e r easons t o r th e s low rec ruiting process was tha t th o mi I i ti a 
was no t tu! ly o rgani zed. Th e f act tha t it was not tu ! ly o rga ni zed 
was a r es ult o f th e s t a t e ' s prob lems in fo l lowing the nat iona l mi I iti a 
law. Pe rh aps no s t at e off ic ial knew th e s t at us o f th e mi I iti a o rga ni-
zati on bette r th a n the gove rno r , t o r he was th e pe rson r es pons i b le t o r 
tha t o rg a niza t ion. Th e s t at e and th e gove rno r were c l ea r ly respons ibl e 
fo r a ny diffi culti es ari s in g from th e t act th at th e mi I iti a was not 
orga ni ze d in time to r th e na ti ona l requi s iti on. 
Pe rh a ps the mos t important reason t o r th e mi I iti a ' s poo r r esponse 
t o th e na t iona l ca l I was th e gove rno r ' s t a i lure t o exe rJ- hi s fu l I 
autho rity ove r th e mil it ia . Nowh e r e was th e gove rno r ' s f a ilure mo re 
evide nt th a n in th e a lmos t t ot a l lack o f cava lry t o r the s ·ra t e 
de t ac hment. Th e gove rno r was a lso co nce rned at o ut pl ac in g a heavy 
burd en on any one secti on o f the mi I iti a , and so he req ues i ed iroops 
form a I I parts of i·he s t a t e . He re th e ta i I ure t o exe ri au I ho r i ry 
c: nd ca I I tor mi Ii ti a from only th e wes t ern s hor e:: of the sta l·e mea n·! 
th at troops from the Eas t e rn Shor e wou Id be ca I I ed In 1 urn, thi s mean t 
th at f ew Eas t e rr. Sho r e mi I iti a wo uld r es pond, bas ica ll y boca L
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se o f the 
I ong ma r ch t o Pennsy I van i a . A I so , th East e rn Shor e tac d a grea ·I c r 
loss by go ing th a n by s t aying home and pay ing th e fin es fo r no ! 
answe r i ng the ca I I o r draft. 
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Th e gove rno r ' s exp l anati on o f hi s f a ilure to exert full 
aut hc rity puts hi s s ituati on in c l03 rpe r s pective . Governo r Lee was 
unce rta in th at th e mi I it i a wo uld r es pond 2. t a l I , and even more un ce rra in 
th at th e mil i t i a wou l d corrt i nu e t o ex i s t i f he use d hi s fu ll autho rity 
a nd ca I I ed for a draft o f ca va I ry o r even some o f th e i nf antry . Th e 
mi I iti a sy s t em was new, and Le8 was no t ce rta in th a t- th e men wo u l d 
consent t o the duty of mi I it i a se rvi ce . 
Beca use of these unce rta inti es , 
he did no t asse rt hi s autho rity t o he l p rai se th e nai - io na l quo t a , 
whi ch he l ps to ex p l d in wh y it was no t fi I led. I r oni ca ll y, eve n tho us; h 
he did no t use a l I o f hi s l ega l powe r s , th e gove rno r comp l a ined that 
th e s t at e mi I i ti a l aw did no t prov i de adequ at e f i nes f o r non- comp I i anco . 
Some mi I i t i a o ffi ce r s a l so did no t exe r c i se th e ir ful I authoriiy 
e ithe r . Samue l Smi th did no t use a ll o f h i s inf I uence and authority 
t o ra i se th e Ba l t i mo r e t own mili ti a quo t a . He de l ega t ed autho rity 
f o r th e mus t e r to men o f l ess i nf I uence , wh o we r e probat· ly no t as 
high l y r ega rd ed as himse l f. Th e r .s u i t was a s urpr i s i ng l y poo r res ponse 
from o ne o f th e s t at e ' s l a rges t urban ar eas . O"he r o ff i ce rs , s uc h as 
th e two command e r s o f Cec i I co unty r eg i ments , a l so did use th e i r 
autho rity fo the fu ll es t : th ey c l a imed th at th e mi I i t i a was t oo poo r l y 
and in cor,p l et e l y o r gan i zed t o e ff ect a mu st e r , and t hat t he r e f o r e no 
troo ps wo u I d be comi ng f rom th at co unty. 
Fo r th e i r pe. rt , some o f the mi I ii"i a a l so f a il ed t o use i 1-
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s aurhori ry--
but i n a d i ff e re nt se nse . M2,ny men d i d no t ca r e to be part o f t he in s l ru-
ment o f autho r i ty use d t o put down the whi skey ri ois . Othe r s v i o l enrl y 
pra t es t ed th e use o f th i s t oo I, and the i r prot es t s c rea tcd a di I I rcn I 
set o f pro b I ems . I t i s i mposs i b I e to say wh eth e r th e firs r gr o ups 
d i d no t r es po nd beca use o f th e nature and po l ii"i cs of the ri o rs , o r 
wh eth e r beca use th e mi I i t i a l aw did not make di sobedi ence l oss 
prc fitabl e than obedi ence . Th e open and vi o l ent prot es t was a direc t 
r esponse to a mi I iti a dra ft-- a pro +es t o f autho rity. 
Th e f a ilure t o asse rt autho rity i s important only beca use o f 
th e f ac t th at these po liti ca l l eade r s wer e entire l y ca pabl e and 
wi I I ing t o use th e ir autho rity unde r s li ghtly diffe r ent c irc ums t ances . 
Th ese c irc ums t ances fo rmed a direc t th rea t to th e autho rity and 
poss ibly th e security o f the s t a t e go vernment. Th ey invo lved the ve r y 
toe / o f autho rity, th e mi I iti a , and c r ea t ed f ea r that thi s too l wo uld 
be use d aga ins t t he s t a t e . 
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At thi s po int, a third conc lus i on may be drawn. Th e Ma r y l and 
s t a t e go ve rnment and mi I iti a did not r eact firml y t o th e nati ona l ca l/ 
f o r mi I iti a beca use th ey sa w no grea t need t o . They co uld see no threa i 
t o the ir s t a -t-·e , and in some cases , th ey wer e no t s ure t ha r a threa i t o 
th e nati o n r ea lly ex i s t ed. Th e ir acti or s wer e based on th e idea th a t 
the r e was no immedi afo da nge r. Th e s t at e gove rnment and militi a comp li ed 
wi -rh th e na i - i onal call beca use th ey r espect ed 1-he autho ri ·ry of ·rho 
Pres ident. Th er e was no thing in e f-rhe r the na·r i ona l mi I ii·iaacl o r rh o 
c2, / I in g fo rth ac t to fo r ce t he s t a t e t o compl y by q ui ck and s r rong 
acti on, o r even t o comp ly at a ll. Without be ing so s t at ed, compli ance 
with th ese nati o na l / a ..,.,s was di scr eti o na ry. Th e Uni -fed Si afos had 
no powe r t o f o r ce obedi ence--it did not have a mi I i ·ri a and uso of rh o 
a rmy t o s upport o r en fo r ce the I aws was exp r ess I y to rb i dden by /·he 
Co nc: tituri on. Th e l aws w0r e bcised o n conse nt, an d as ·/·he d i scuss i cn 
s hc,ws , -/h e r e wer e va ryin g degrees o f consen t. 
A fo urth co nc lus i o n may be drEwn from t he act i o ns o f ·/h o s l a l o 
to ma inta in its o wn authority: th e sta·re co u l d and d i d uso i /·s l ega l 
autho rity to prot ect itse lf and ·rhe lives of i i"s c i t i zens . The 
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governor wa s not concerned about putting an equa l burden on a l/ section s 
of th e s tate wh en he cal l ed f o r th e mi I itia to be use d against th e 
Hage r s t own r i oters. 
Lee ca l l ed for troops from spec ifi c a r eas - - i n f act , 
he o rd e r e d trocps from thE:se areas. 
Thi s subt l e d i fference was an 
i mportant ind i ca t i on of th E: go,·error's intent. Th e governor o rd e r ed 
th E: fu l i ext ent of th e l aw to be ca rri ed out , and intended that a 
draft s hou l d be use d i f necessa ry , r egard l ess o f conseq uences . 
Ano th er examp l e o f th e s tate government ' s s t ong action i nvo l ved 
th e o rders that Lee i ss ued for mu ste r i ng th e mi I iti a for s t ai e se rvi c 
Th e co mmande r s who r ece ived these o rde rs mus t have sense d th e governor ' s 
des i r e for qu i ck action. Th ese command er s did r espond qu i ck l y and saw 
th 2, t the ir quotas wer e f i I l ed i f not ove r-f i I l ed. Th e most not i ceab l e 
d i ff e r e nce he r e wa s th e act i on that Samue l Smi th took to ens ure lhai 
h i s quo t a was fi I l ed. He persona I l y t ook charge o f r ecruiiing and in 
a s i ng I e s troke conv i need da ub I e th e quota th cJi· they sho u I d vo I un /-ee r. 
Smi th use d hi s prest i ge as a Co ngr essman an d hi s au/-ho rity as a mi I i I i a 
genera l to ra i se th e quota . 
Tii e key t o the s uccess i n r a i s ing the sta t e quoia was the - fforr 
put f o rth by th e gove rnment. Th e mi I iti a r esponded i n des ired mann or 
o nce they wer e co nv i need th at th ey wer e rea I I y n eded . Gove rn men/-
e ff o rts i n th i s i ns t ance were a i ded by an imporl ani f actor- - a real and 
i m~ed i ate dang e r to a part o f the s t a t e not too distant from B l timore, 
Annapo li s or Georgetown. Th e mil i ti a was mu ch more willing to se r ve 
wh en suc h se rv i ce wa s for the de f ens o f home , f ami l y and friends . 
Furthe r, Frederick and Hage r s t own wer e a gr at dea l c l oser to horn 
than Pitts burgh, and thE,se t own s wer st il l in lh c, s t a l - while Pil/-s burgh 
wa:c, acr oss th e mounta i ns in Penn sy I van i a . 
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It i s poss ibl e t o co nc lude that the mi I itia was mu ch mo r e 
wi 11 ing to def end sta t e author ity th an it was t o de f end nat i ona l 
author ity. Th e probl em with thi s conc lus i on i s that th e re i s li tl- l e 
pr ima ry ev i dence f o r it. No person invo l ved in both attempts t o r a i se the 
mi I i ti a actua I I y stated that th e mi Ii ti a was mo r E i n-rerEs t ed in sta t e 
than nati o na l autho rity. Sti I I, the f act r ema ins th at th e mi Ii ti a d id 
r espo nd immediate ly and with much more men than r quested for th sia i B 
se rvi ce . Con\'erse l y, th e mi I iti a wa s s lugg i s h and fi I IEd l ess th an the 
quo t a for th e national ca l I. 
Many othe r r easo ns f o r th e di f f e r ence in response have been 
d i scussed in th e course o f thi s th es i s . Distance wa s muc h l ess a 
co n~ ide r ati on for th Ei state se rvi ce . To thi s was add ed th e governor ' s 
r equ es t for troo ps froM only areas l ess th an JOO mil es from Fred r i ck--
r.o tr oops from the Eastern Sho r e wer e ca l l ed; this s ingl e omi ss i on did 
mu ch t o inc r ease -th e probability that a l arge r percentage of the quoia 
wo u Id respond. Commun i ca ti on was a I so put t o advantage f o r the sta i -
ca 11. Th e governor communi ca t ed hi s o rders c l ea rl y , so thaJ- J-he miliJ-i a 
comm ande rs co uld und e r s tand th e ful I inten-J of those o rd er s . In ·!urn, 
th e comranders , o r at l east Smith, communi cated th ir o rd rs c l ea rl y , 
and th e mi I iti a r e~po nded by vo l unteering to s .rve. Communi ca l i on on 
thi s l eve l inc l uded convinc in g th e mi I iti a iha t a r ea l danger ex i l ed . 
Ra th e r th an co ne I ud i ng that the mi I i ti a was mo r e i nteres J- d in 
st at e than nat i ona I authority, perhaps a ""re accura I e s I at ement wou Id 
be that th e sta t e government, and aga in at least Sa mu e l Smith, w r mor 
i nte r es t ed in ma inta ining state authority than nat i ona l aul hor il y , 
much t o the detriment of the response t o the na ti ona l ca l I for mi I ii i a . 
When the st ate appea r ed t o be threatened ,th governor I ook qui ck ac Ii on , and 
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eve n became pe rsonally involved in ending the threa t by going to wes t e rn 
Maryland. Th e governor ' s counc i I ordered him to go, and act ed for him 
whil e he was gone. Lee also i ss ued c l ea r orders t or th e militia ca l I ' 
l eav ing I ittl e room tor di scr etionary act i on by th e variou s commande r s . 
1 ng ca rgeo r ec ruiiing rh e Smith d i d muc h the same thing by pe rsonally -~a k·1 h t 
Baltimore town quota. Ne ith er man, nor th e co uncil, d id any 0 1 these 
in s upport o f the national ca ll. Thi s d i fference in r esponse makes 
possib l e a conc lusion th at th e governor and hi s counc i I we r e mo r e conce rn d 
with maintaining state ra~er than national autho rity. Thi s may seem 
obv i ous , and in a se nse i t i s , but the po int i s that the governor and 
other s t a t e o ffi c i a l s did not s upport the national ca l I as th ey w r e 
capable of do ing; they did exe rt tul I authority in th aH mpt t o 
rai se the mi I iti a tor th e whi skey ri o t s . 
Th e entire argument of thi s th es i s may be fin a ll y di sti I l ed into a 
f ew sta-! ements . Th e di scuss i on has cente red on th e conn ecti on f o rmed 
by th e national and sta+e gove rnments and th mi I iti a . Th na ri ona l 
government attempted to create a t oo l of authority and protection by 
pass i ng the nat i ona I mi I i t i a act. Th i s a ct aff ected both the sta le 
governments and a cons i derab I e numer o f c i Ii zens of I he s lat es . Th 
I ink betwee n a l I three wa s co nsent--the s tate conseniBd t o naii o na l 
au tho ri ty and enacted its osn mi I it i a I aw, wh i I e the c i Ii zens consent ed 
to be the mi I itia. Di scuss ion in this thes i s has been limited to on ly 
th e inte ra c tion between i -he na ri onal governmenr and rh e Maryl anc 
s tate government and mi I iti a. 
Th e second connect i on i s th e Maryl and government, whi ch i s 
I inked to th E, national government and the state mi Ii ri a in two way s . 
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Th e f i r st part o f the l i nk to th e national govornmenl i lhe consent 
to pac,s a mi I it i a l aw more- or- l ess t-l1 c ', c.1m o d', t-h(' n,1I io 11 , il l aw ; the 
second i n the consent to he l p r ai se tlw mi Ii I i t1 fo 1~ 11ill in11a l s rv i ce . 
Th e I i nk that the s tate has to th o mi I i I i c.1 invo l ve', lli l' ,,f for i - used to 
ra i se th e mi li ti a fo th e national ca ll fire !-, iJlld 111,, •,I 1t e ca ll second . 
Both e fforts by the state to r 0 i se th e mi Ii I-i u i11vo / v,•rl 0l1 i·aining 
the conse nt o f the mi I i t- i a . 
Th e conn ect i on i s the mi I dia i l se l f _ rhC' mi Ii I i ,1 w:is unde r 
both s tate and nat i onal author ity , and l i nked l o eci c li li<·<c1Jso of that 
au tho r i ty . I t depe nded on th e state fe r 0 1-g,rn i Le-J I i o n , ,H!111 i n i s trat i o n , 
and l ea de r ship ; it dspe nded on thG nali o11<1I gov<•rnme11I fo 1 i ts in cep t i o n . 
Th e i mpor tant aspect of the militi a i s lh(, l ink o f U'11',L' ill J-hc;t th e, 
two gove rnmen t s haci with the mi l iti a . Wilho ul co nsL' 11I , IIL mili t i a was 
wo r t h l e~s to e i ther gove rnment. Th o govornmc ,1I', cho',t' 11nl t o f o r ce 
consent by heavy f i nes o r other pun i " hmen I , and so lll l'Y d, )end d a I most 
ent i r e ly o n i nte l l ectu a l o r emot i onc; I <Jrgumr)11I ', l o ril,l 1i1 th (; mil iti a ' s 
co nsent t o se rv . 
An argum8nt was more eas il y ca rri ed wh en tlw s l.il •· 'J" i e rnment 
presente d c l ea r an d d i r ect r easons fo 1- ilic• 11Pc• cl l o u•,,· 11 11' mi I i i i a . 
Ma ry l and ' s government did so wh en a li ompiing l o r c11',<' 111 <' nii I i t-i a i 
de f e nd its own autho ri -ly , and tho r •, u 11 Wd ~J cJ ', I r o ll '! 1, ", I,on by -I he 
mili t i a . Th e state governmen-I- did 110 1 p1C'sr•11 ! l l U, JI 111d cl i r oc t- r asons 
for t he nat i o na l ca l I , and so th P mi I i li.i did 11 0 1 '' " I1c 11<1 ; t-rong l y . 
Th e nat i o na l gove r1;ment wc1s on un co rl ai n :Jrnu11ci i11 <1•,·,t· 1 I i1g i t- · autho r i ty 
t o f o r ce t ho st a t governmon t- -10 us0 i I s ful I ,111II H1 1 i l y !,, ra i se mi I it i a 
f o r the na ti o na l ca ll, and so thC' rw lio11<1I q,.v,• 11 1m,,11I <"11l d no/ or a t-
l eas t d i d not at i -emp i -10 force Moryl ,md l o n1rnp l y Iw iI, I11I / y wi Iii rh o 
nat i ona l r equ i s i t i on. 
APPEND IX 
The federa l mi I itia law s uggested an organ izat ion of the s tate 
mi I it i as as to I I ows: 
11 6 
Each compa ny of mi I itia was to have one capta in, one I ieui enanr , 
one e ns ign, four serfeant s , four co rporal s , one drummer, one 
fifer, and sixty-fou r privates. This totaled three officers , 
seve nty-two en l i sted me n anc two mu s icians . 
Each batta I ion was to cons ist of five comp ani es , one of 
which had to be e ither grenadiers, I i ght infantry or 
riflemen. Batta I ions we r e to be command ed by a major, 
with the off ice rs of the various compan i es acting as 
his s taff. 
Each reg iment was to cons ist o f two battalions, or a tota l 
o f ten compani es. Regiments were to be comm anded by a 
I ie ute nant co lone l, with a staff of one ad jutant and one 
quartermaster, to rank as I ie utena nts ; one paymaster, on8 
s urgeon and one s urgeon' s mate ; one se rgeant-major , one 
drum-major and one fife- major. Total tu! I comp I iment 
s tr ength of a reg iment was thirty-two officers, exc l uding 
regimental staff , and 720 en li sted men, exc l ud ing 
mu s ic ia ns and reg imenta l se rgeant-maj or . 
Each brigade was t o cons ist of tour r eg iments , or a toral 
of forty comp anies . The brigade was commanded by a 
br igadier genera l, with a s t aff of brigade inspector 
and brigade major, both to rank as majors . 
Each division was to consist of an unspec ifi ed number of 
br· igades, with the addition of o ne comp a ny of art i I lery and 
one troop of horse. Divisions were to be command ed by a 
major-ge nera l with a s taff of two a ides-de- camp , each to 
r ank as maj or . 
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M. Fo r eman, Cec
i I Co unty , t o G
ove rno r Th omas 
Si m 
Lee , Aug ust 29 ,
 1794 , St at e P
ape r s Se ri es A,
 Box 76 , Doc . 
20 . 
Mi liti a App o int
ments # 1. Th i
s es timat e i s b
ased on a ful l 
comp l e-
ment o f t en co
mpan i es pe r r eg
iment and fifty
 reg iments . 
7 . Ma ry l and M
i I iti a Ac t . 
8 . Ry s I saac , 
" Preache r s and 
Patri o t s ," Th e 
Ameri ca n Revo lu
i i on , ed . 
Alfred F. Yo un g
, (Deka l b : No r t
he rn 11 1 i no i s U
ni ve r s i l y Pr ess
, 
19 76 ) pp . 135-1
36 ; a l so Ma r c us
 Cun li ff e , So l d
i er s and Ci v i l i
ans , 
(New Yo rk : Th e 
Free Press , Mac
mi l l an Pub l i s h
ing Compa ny , 19
69) 
pp . 200- 20 I. 
9 . Ma ry l and H
o use Jo urna l, 
1792 , (Ann apo li
s : Fr ede ri ck Gr
een , 1792 ) 
p . I 0 5 . 
10 . " An Ad t o 
Regu l at e the Mi 
I iti a ," June 177
7 , Laws o f Mary
l and , 1777 , 
(Ann apo li s : Fre
de r i ck Gr een , 
1777) Char t e r 1
7 . 
11 . "An Act t o 
r ev i ve and conti
nue the Ac Is of
 Assemb I Y for r
eg u I a ,.; ng 
th e mi li iia and
 t o empowe r t h
e Gove rn o r i o c
a ll o ut i·h mi 
li ·li a 
to suppress ins
urrect i ons and q
u i et di sturbance
s " November , I 7
8j , 
Laws o f Ma ry I an
d 1782- 1783 , ( 
Ann apo Ii s , Frede
ri ck Green, 1783
1 
Ch ap t e r I. 
12 . " Gene r a l O
rde r s o f Gove rn
o r Th omas Sim L
ee ," Penn sy l van
i a 
Archives , Se ri
es 2, Vo l . 4, (
ll a r r i sb urg , 187
8) PP · 13 1- U.5 .
 
(He rea fte r c ite
d as : Pennsylva
ni a Arc hives ) . 
13 . Ma ry l and C
o ns titut i on o f 
1776 , Seci i on 3
3 , in Ve rnon H.
 [noy , _ 
Chmn ., Constitu
ti ona l Revi s i on 
Stud Oocun,,n fs
, for fil e Con,, 1
, -
tuti ona l Conve
nti on Commi ss i o
n , (Ba ltimo r e : 
Ki ng 13 rotlw r s I
nc-. , 
1968 ) p . 380 . 
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14 . Ma ryl and Ho use Jo urn a l, 1792 , ( Annap o li s : Fr de r i ck Gr e n , /79 2 ) 
p . 106 . 
15 . Nat i ona l Mi I i t i a Act , 1792 . 
16 . Ma r y l and Co un c i I Pr ocee d i ngs , Oct obe r 6 , 179 4. 
17 . Un i t e d St a t es Cons ti tuti on, Seco nd Amendment . 
18 . Nat i ona l Mi I i t i a Ac t , 179 2 . The r equirements WG P l vo spa r e f l ints 
and not l ess th an 2 4 ca r tr i dges t o f i t th o pe r ona l wea pon 
i f i t was a mu sket , and 20 ba ll s and a q ua r i -e r po urd o f powd r 
if a r i f l e . 
19 . Lette r from Gen . Sa mu e l Smi th t- o Gove rn o r Th omas Sim Lee , Oc tobe r 
9 , 179 4 , St at e Pape r s Th e Brown Books , Vo I. 6 , Doc . I I . 
20 . Ca l I i ng Forth Act . 
2 1. Anna l s o f Co ng r es s , Vo l. 3 , pp . 33 7- 356 and 4 18- 436 b r t he deba t e . 
22 . Ame ri can St a t e Pape r s : Mil ita ry Aff a i r s , Vo l . I , pp . 5-1 3 . 
23 . Anna l s o f Co ng r es s , Vo l . 3 , pp . 435- 436 . 
2 4 . i b i d . , p . 436 . 
2 5 . Mar y l and Ho use Jo urn a l, 179 2 , ( An napo li s : Frede r i ck c-e n , 17 2 ) 
p . 59 . 
26 . ib i d ., pp . 69- 74 . 
27 . i b i d ., p . 85 . 
28 . i bid ., pp . 93- 94 . 
29 . i bid ., p . 93 . 
30 . i bid ., p . 105 . 
3 I. i b i d ., pp . 93- 9 4 . 
32 . i b i d . , p . 94 . 
33 . i b i d . , pp . 105-1 06 . 
34 . ib i d ., p . 99 . 
35 . ibid . 
36 . ib i d ., p . 105 . 
37 . i b i d., pp . 105-1 06 . 
---
38. United States 
Constitut i on , 
Artic l e /, Sec
tion 8 . 
3 9 . Mary l and H
ouse Journa l, 
1793 . (A 
1· F 
nnapo i s : red
e r i ck Green , 1
793) 








i b i d ., p . 47 . 
i b i d . 
i b i d . 
i b i d ., p. 53 . 
i b i d ., p . 52 . 
i b i d ., p . 97 . 
For the Mary l a
nd Revo l ut i ona
ry mili t i a law
s , see : Laws 
of Mary l and 
1777 , June : C
hapter 17, and 
October : Cha
pter 2 1; Laws o
f ' 
Ma r y l and, 1778
, Ma r ch : Chap
ter 22 ; and Law
s of Mary l and ,




47. laws of Mary l a
nd , 1777 , June
: Chapter 17, 
sect ions 2 , 3 ,
 4 , 5 , & 16 . 
48 . ib i d ., se
ct i on 7. 
49 . Laws of M
ary I and , 1777 , 
October : Cha
pter 2 1 . 
50 . letter fr
om Gen . Samue
l Sm i th to Gov
e rnor Thomas S
im Lee , Septem
b e r 
16 , 1794 , Stat
e Pape r s The B
r own Books , Vo
l. 6, Doc . 6 . 
5 1. Amer i can St
ate Papers : Mi
li tary Affa i rs
, Vo l. I, p . 6
7 . 
52 . Act of M
ay 9 , / 794 , An
na l s of Congre
ss , Vo l. 4, pp
. 144 5- 1446 . 
53 . letter fr
om Governor Th
omas Sim Lee t
o Henry Knox , 
May 26 , 1794 , 
Governor and C
ounc i I Letterbo
ok , 1794 , pp . 
28- 29 . 
54 . " An Act 
to continue the 
Acts ... ", L
aws of Mary l an
d , 1784- 1785 , 
November / 784 ,
 Chaprer 83 . 
Th i s act exte n
ded th e mil itia
 laws 
for one year . 
The next year '
s act lo contin
ue rhc ac1s i h
a I 
were to exp i re
, November, 17
85, Chapter 77
, did not coni·
inue 
or renew the m
i I i t i a acts . 
There wa s no f
urrher l eg i s la
rion 
on the mi I i t i a
 unt i I 1792 . 
55 . Un i ted S
tates Art i c l es
 of Confedera
tion , Artic l e 
6 . 
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FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I I 
I. 
Le tte r from Henry Knox to Governor Thomas Sim Lee , August 
I 794, State Pape rs Th e Brown Books , Vo I. I v, Doc. 36 . 
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' 
Mi I iti a Appointments #1 . 










Fldrs . 5 , 11, 29 ; Box 45, F ldr. /J ; Box 49 , I l dr . 6 ; Box 53 , rldrs 
; ~x , Fldrs . 3 , 5 ~ Box 28 , F l dr . 2 . Note : many of the 
Ba l timo r e co unty and c i ty co mp ani es wer e probab ly fo rmed b for' 
1793 , but data avai Jab l e in the Adjutant Gener a l' s Papers i s 
spotty at bes t, and en r o llments f o r many comp ani es in Ba l J-imore 
bea r no dat e . 
5 . Maryland Ha l I o f Reco rds Gift Co ll ecti on, F l dr. 452 . 
6 . Lette r from Governo r Th oma s Sim Lee to Henry Knox , August I I, 
1794 , St ate Papers Th e Red Gooks , Vo l. 17, Doc . 183 . 
7. Lette r from Gove rn o r Thomas Sim Lee t o Henry Knox , August 15 , 
1794 , Gove rn o r and Counc il Letterbook , 1793-1 79 , p . 40 . 
8 . Lette r from Co l. Edward Oldham to Governor Thomas Sim Lee , 
August 29 , 1794, St at e Pape r s Th e Br own Books , Vo l. I V, Doc . 3 . 
9 . Lette r from Henry Ho l Ii ngswo rth to Governor Thomas Sim Lee , 
Septemb e r 5 , 1794 , Adjutant Genera l ' s Papers, Box 2 1, Fldr . 25 . 
10 . Lette r from Co l. Edward Ol dham to John Hopkins SJ-one , November 
13 , 1794 , State Pape r s Se ri es A. Box 76 , Doc . 23 . 
II. Lette r from Will i am Van Lear to Gove rno r Thomas S im Lee , Sep J-emb er 
I, 1794 , Stat e Papers Se ri es A. Box 76 , Doc. 8 . 
12 . LetJ-er from Benj amin Chambers to Governor Thomas Sim Lee , 
Sept emb e r 3 , 1794, Adjutant Genera I ' s Pape rs , Box 39 , F I d r . 38. 
I 3 . Le H er f rom W i I I i am Wh i le I y to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, S pfombor 
I, 1794 , Stat e Pape r s Ser i es A., Box 76, Doc . 6 . 
I 4. Letter tram David Lucket t t o Gove rnor Thomas S im Lee, Sep lember 
2 , 1794 , Adjutant Ge ner a l' s Papers , Box 42, 1ldr. 46 . 
I 5 . Letter f ram Lt. Co I • Perry Benson to Gove rnor Thomas Sim L o , 
Septembe r 5 , I 794 , Adjutant Gener a I ' s Pap ors , Box 55 , r Id 1 • I 2 ; 
see a I so Let t e r from John Hughes to Governor Thomus S im Lee , 







Lette r from John Ga l e to Governor Thomas Sim Lee Septembe I 
1794 , Adjutant General ' s Pape r s , Box 53 , F l dr. ' 18. r ' 
Reports are ava ! I ab l e for boi-~ Queen Anne ' s county r eg i ments 
and th e Carol i ne county r eg iment. At l eas t one r eg i ment 
from each of Some r se t , l(ent and Queen Ann e ' s r epo r ted nee d i ng 
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a draf t. No r eports from Dorchester or Wo r ces t e r wer e f o und. 
For th e Caro I i ne county r eport : State Pap e r s Se r i es A, Box 
76 , Doc. 6 ; for Kent county see Adjutant Ge ner a l' s Pape r s , Box 
39 , F l dr . 38; for Queen Ann e ' s co unty see S rai-e Pape r s Se ri es 
fl, Box 76 , Doc . 102; ·for Some r set co unty see Adjutant Gene r a l' s 
Papers , Box 53 , Fldr . 18; for Ta l bo t co unty see S rat e Pape r s 
Se ri es A. Box 76 , Do c . 28 and Adjutant Ge ne r a I ' s Papers, Box 
55, Fl dr . 7. 
Let t e r from Gen . Samue l Smith ro Go ve rno r Thoma s Sim Lee , 
Se ptemb e r 2 , 1794 , Stai e Papers Th e Br own Books , Vo l . VI, Doc . 9 . 
Letter from Dav i d Lu cke rt to Governor Th oma s S im Lee , Septemb e r 
2, 1794 , Adjutant Genera l' s Pape r s , Box 42 , Fldr . 46 . 
Lette r from Dan i e l Cr esa p and others t o Governor Th omas Sim Lee , 
Sep t emb e r 2 , 1794 , Sta t e Pap e r s Th e Brown Books , Vo l. VI, 
Doc . 45. 
2 1. ibid . 
22 . Letter from Thomas Sprigg t o Gove rno r Thomas Sim Lee , Sep t ember 
11 , 1794, St ate Pape r s Th e Brown Books, Vo l. VI , Doc . 30b . 
23 . Lette r f r om \,Ii i I l iam Pi nkn ey t o Ge n . Ur i ah Forresi , Sep t emb e r 13 , 
1794 , St at e Pape r s Th e Brown Books , Vo l. VI, Doc . 32 . 
24 . Lette r from Wi I I i am Pi nkn ey t o Gove rno r Thomas Sim Lee , Scp i e mb r 
13 , 179 4, State Pape r s Th e Brown Books , Vol. VI , Doc . 32 . 
25 . Lette r from Benjam i n Brooks to Gove rnor Thomas S im Lee, Sep I ember 
8, 1794 , State Pape r s Se ri es A, Box 76 , Doc. 17 . 
2 6 . Letter from John Car I i s I e to Governor Thomas Sim Lee , Augus I 30 , 
179 4, St a re Paper s Ser i es A, Box 76, Doc. 16 . 
27 . Lette r from Gove rnor Thomas S im Lee to John Ca r I i s I e , Sep I ember 
4, 1794 , Gove mo r and Counc i I Lette rbook 1793- 1796 , Pp. 49-50. 
28. Lette r from Gove rnor Thomas Sim Lee t o Joseph W i I k i nson, S 'P l embe r 
4 1794 Governo r and Co un c i I Lett rbook 1793- 1796 , p . 49 . 
wil k i ns~n • s leH e r , eo whi ch th i s i s a rep l y , has noe been found . 
29 . i b id . 
Mary I and He ra I d and Eastern Shore I nte 11 i ence r , Eas I on , Mary I and , 









Let t e r f r om Gove rn o r Thomas Sim Lee ro A lexa nde r Hami I t s i -
4 , 1794 , Gove rn o r and Co unc i I Letterb ook 1793-1 7% , p~~ ' 52:~/mb e r 
Lette r from A l exand e r Hami I t on -i-o Gove rno r Th omas Sim L 
29 , 1794 , St at e Pape rs Th Brown Books , Vo I • I v, Doc . e; '. Au9us r 
Lette r from Go ve r no r Thomas S im Lee t o A l exande r Hami I t on 
Septembe r 4 , 1794 , Gove rno r and Co un c i I Lette rbook 1793~1 796 
pp. 52- 53 . Th i s l ette r co nf i r ms th at Lee ma do th e o rde r but no 
copy o f th e o r de r has bee n f ound. ' 
Lette r f r om Gen . Samue l Smi th t o Gove rnor Thomas S i m Lee 
Septembe r 16 , 1794 , St at e Pape r s Th e Brown Books , Vo l.' VI, o 
Ba l t i mo r e Da il y Inte lli gence r , Sept emb e r 12 , 1794 , Ba l l imo r o : 
Ma ry l and Hi s t o r i ca l So c i ety , mi c r o f i Im r ee l 14 15 . 
, 
Lette r f r om Gen . Samue l Smi th to Gove rno r Thomas Si m Lee 
Septemb er 16 , 1794 , St at e Pape r s The Brown Books , Vo l. VI, 
Doc . 6 . 
oc . 6 . 
Le tte r f r om A lexande r Hami I ton t o Gove rno r Thomas Si m Lee , Sep t emb e r 
10 , 179 4 , Ha r o l d C. Syret t ed. Th e Pape r s o f A l exande r 
Ham i ! t o n , Vo l. 17. (New York : Co l umb i a Un i ve r s i t y Press , 1792 ) 
pp . 2 18- 2 19 . (He rea fte r c i t ed as : Hami / ton Pape r s . ) 
38 . Ma ry l and Co un c i I Proceed i ngs , Septembe r 15, 1794 . 
39 . Let t e r from A l exande r Hami I ton t o Gen . Samue l Smi th , Se p I mb e r 
15 , 1794 , Hamil t o n Pa pe r s , Vo l. 17 , pp . 237- 238 . 
40 . Lette r from A I exan de r Ham i I t on t o Gen . Samue I Smi th , Sep I emb e r 
19 , 1794 , Hamil t o n Pape r s , Vo l. 17 , p . 25 4 . 
41. Lette r from A l exa nde r Hamil t on t o Ge n. Sa mue l Smi t h , Sepi emb e r 
29 , 179 4 , Hamil t o n Pape r s , Vo l. 17 , pp. 289- 290 . 
42 . Lette r f r om Gen . Samue l Smith t o vvi 11 i am P i nkney , Sep t embe r 17 , 
179 4 , State Pape r s Th e Brown Boo ks , Vo l . VI, Doc . 12 . 
43 . Lette r from Ge n. Samue l Smith t o Wi 11 i am Pi nkney , Septemb e r 
2 1, 1794 , State Pape r s Th e Br own Books , Vo l. VI, Doc . 8 . 
44 . Let t e r from Gen. Samue I Smith t o Go ve rnor Thomas Sim Lee , Sep fembe r 
27 , 1794 , St at e Pape r s Th Brown Boo ks , Vo l . VI, Doc . 36 . 
45. Th er e i s some evidence tha f t hese troops were f rom the conlra l 
co unti es , and wer e in t ended f o r the f ede r a l r equi s i t i on . G n . 
Ur i ah Forres t r eported t o Gove rn o r- Lee on Sep t-embe r 5, 1794 
t hat c l ose t o 200 men l e f t f r om Geo rget own s ho rt l y a fte r tho 
f i f t h , State Pape r s Th e Br own Books , Vo l. VI, Doc . 18. Co n . 
Mountj oy Bay l y on September 17 , 1794 , r eport ed in a l o ll e r l o 
th e governo r th at he was us ing t-he I r oops a r I ho Fr eder i ck 
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r endezvo us to marc h :o Hage r s town , St at e Pape r s Th e Br own Boo ks , 
Vo I • VI, Do c . I 9 . SI n ce no o th e r troo ps wer e r eported t o have 
me t at Fre de r i c k be f o r e th i s , th ese men probab l y wer e from 
th e Montgome ry- Prin ce George ' s co un -t-y mi I i t i a g r oup th at l e ft 
Geo r get o wn on Septembe r 5 . 
46 . Le rte r f r om Ge n . Sa mu I Smi th to Gove rn o r Thomas Si m Lee , Oct obe r 
I, 1794 , St a t e Pape r s Th e Br own Boo ks , Vo l. VI, Doc . 13 . 
47. Lette r fr om Ge n. Samue l Smi t h t o Gove rn o r Thomas Si m Lee , Odobo r 
3 , 1794 , St at e Pape r s The Br own Boo ks , Vo l. VI, Doc . 2 . 
4 8. Let t e r f r om Gen . Sa mu e l Smi th t o Gove rno r Thomas S im Lee , 
Oc tob e r 8 , 1794 , St at e Pap r s Th e Brown Books , Vo l. VI , Doc . 11. 
49 . Lette r from Gen . Samue l Smi th t o Gove rno r Thomas Sim Loe , 
Augu s t 23 , 1794 , St at e Pape r s Th e Br own Boo ks , Vo l. VI, Doc . 3 . 
50. Lette r fr om Gen . Samue I Smi th t o Gove rno r Th omas S i m Leo , Se pt-emb e r 
27 , I 794 , St at e Pape r s Th e Br own Books , Vo I. VI, Doc . 33. 
5 1. Lette r from Gen . Samue l Smi th t o Gove r nor Thoma s Si m Lee , Oct obe r 
I, 1794 , St at e Pape r s Th e Brown Books , Vo l. VI, Doc . 13 . 
52 . Letter from Gen . Sa mue l Smi th t o Go ve r no r Thomas Si m Lee , Oc robe r 
9 , 179 4, State Pape r s The Brown Boo ks , Vo l. VI , Doc . II. 
53 . Lette r from Gove rn o r Th omas Si m Lee t o Geo r ge Ga l e , Sep t-embe r 
13, 1794, Gove r no r and Co un c il Lette rb ook /793-1 79 , pp . 1- 2 . 
54 . Le tte r f r om Geo r ge ~/ash i ngt on i o Edmund Rando l ph , Oclob r 16 , 
1794 , Wr i t i ngs o f Wash i ngton, Vo l. 34, PP· 2- 4. 
55 . " Gene r a l Ord e r s " Oct obe r 2 1, 179 4. Ca l end ar o f Virg i ni a Sta l-e 
Paee r s , Vo I • 7 , C New Yo rk : Kr aus Rep r i n I Co rp or ai i on , I 9681 
pp . 354- 35 7. 
56 . Lette r from A l exa nde r Hami / t on t o Geor ge Washingt on , Oc l obe r~ 3 1, 
1794 , Hamil t o n Pape r s , Vo l. 17 , PP · 35 /- 352 . 
57. Genera l Orde r s o f Henry Lee , Nov embe r 2 , /79 4, Penn sy l van i a 
Ar c h i ves , p . 439 . 
58 . Wash ington Spy , Novembe r 25 , 1794 , Wash i ngton, Mar y I and : Ma r y I and 
Hi s t o r i ca l Soc i ety , Ma ry l and , mi c r o f i Im r ee l 1406 . 
59 . Lette r trom Gen . Samue I Smi th to Governor Th omas Si m Lee , Nov mb<' r 
3 , 1794 , St a t e Pape r s Th e Red Books , Vo l . 17 , Doc . 184A . 
I t o Gove rno r 
Tlloma S 
i m Lee , Ociob · 1 I .5 , 








Letter from Governor Thomas Sim Lee -to Roger Ne l son , October 25 , 
1794 , Governo r and Counc i I LeHe rb ook 1793-1 796 , pp. 98- 100. 
Let t e r from A l exander Hami l ton t o Governor Thomas S im Lee, 
October 4 , 1794 , Hami l ton Papers, Vol. 17 , pp. 302- 303 . 
Letter from Gen . Samue l Sm ith to Governor Thomas S im Le , August 
23 , 1794 , State Papers Th e Brown Books , Vo I . VI, Doc . 3. 
13 1 
Lette r from Governor Thomas S im Lee t o Al exa nde r Ham i I ton , 
September 30 , 1794 , Hamilton Pape r s , Vo l. 17, pp . 294- 295 . 
Letter trom Edmund Rando l ph to George Wash ington, August 26 , 1794 , 
RG 59 , Mi see I I aneous Lette r s , I 790- 1799 , Nat i ona I Arch i ves , 
Vvash i ngton, o. C. 
Letter from John Wil k inson to Gove rn o r Thomas Sim Lee , Octobe r 
23 , 1794 , Adjutant Genera l' s Papers , Box 18 , F l dr . 30 . 
A look at any of the company li st s f o un d in the var i o us boxes 
o f the Adjutant Genera l' s Pape r s o r State Papers wi 11 show 
that few compani es were the exact s i ze prescribed by the l aw ; 
most were we l I ove r seventy men ,1 w i th more than 100 men per 
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Ad of Ma r ch 3 , 179 1; A
mending Ad of May 8 , 1
792 ; and Aci o f 
Jun e 5 , 179 4 , Ann a l s o f 
Congress Vol . 2 , pp. 23
20- 2340 Vol 
PP • i38 H 383, Vo l . 4 , 




For~ more deta il ed ~c
count o f th~ gr i ~vance
s see : Le l and Ba l dwin
, 
Wh 1~key Re~e ~s , (Pitts
b urgh : Un1ve r s 1ty of P
ittsb urgh Press , 
Rev i se d Edit i on , 1968~; 
a l so H.M. Brackenridge
, Hi s tory o f 
the Wes t e rn l ns urr c t1
on ,. (New York : Arno Pr
 ss & Th e New York 
T'.mes , 1969 : r e~rint of
 1859 editi n) ; a l so A l
fred Creigh, 
H1srory of Wa sh1ngron 
Couniy , Penn sy l vania , 
(\1/a shington , 
Pennsy l van i a , 1870) ; a l
so l etre r from A l exa nd
e r Hamilton io 
Geo rg e Wa sh i ngton, Aug
us t 5 , 1794 , Ham il ion P
apers , Vo l. 17, 
pp. 24- 58 . 
H. M. Brackenr i dge , We
stern l ns urrec r i on , pp .
 28- 30 -
Le l and Ba l dw i n , Wh i s ke
y Rebels , pp. 110-1 28 . 
ib i d. 
Th e numbe r of 5000 men 
wa s derived by Ba l dwin
 in Wh i skey Rebe l s , 
pp . 146- 147 , by t aking 
the most probable acco
unts o f eyewi inossos . 
Th e one that he accept
ed wa s that of John Wi
l k i nson , Sr ., wh o 
wa s , says Ba l dw i n, an 
officer in th e Revo l ui
i on , and in Baldwin ' s 
op i ni on would have a g
ood eye for such an es
t ima t e . 
Le tte r from John Lynn 
to Gen . John David son , 
Sep t ember I , 1791], 
St at e Papers Th o Brown
 Elooks , Vo l . VI, Doc . 
30 . Seo c1 l so l o t tor 
from Dan i e l Cresap to 
Governor Thomas S i m Le
e , Sep t-emb e r 2, 
1794 , State Papers Th e B
rown Books , Vo l . VI, D
oc . 45 . 
Lette r from John Lynn 
to Gov rnor Th omas Sim 
L e , Sept embe r I , 
1794 , State Pape r s Th e B
rown Books, Vo l. VI , D
oc. 30 . 
Leite r from Gen . Mount
joy Bay l y to Governor T
h omos Sim Loe , 
Septemb e r 4 , 1794 , Si a-t
e Papers Th e Brown Boo
ks, Vo l . VI, Doc. 7 1. 
Wash i ngton Spy , Au g us I
 27 , 1794 . 
Ba l t i more Da i ly Inte l I
 igence r , August 2'.J , 179
4 . Th i s ii em was 
r e f erred t o as a r epr i
nt from a Fred ri ck , M
aryland paper , 
whi ch wa s noi f o und . 
Ba l timore Da il y l nie l I
 igence r , Sep l emb 1 8 , 
1791]. 
Leiter from Gen. Mount
joy Bay l y l o Gove rn or T
h omas Sim Lee , 
Septembe r 4 , I 794 , S lat
e Pape rs Th Brown Books
, Vo I. VI, Doc. 2 I. 
Balt i more Da i l y lnte ll




Letter from Lt . C
o l. Thomas Spr i gg
 to Governor Thom
as Sim Lee 
September 11 , 179
4 , State Papers T
he Brown Books Vo
l . I V, ' 
Doc. 30b . 
Late r references 
indicate that Spr
i gg may have been 
involved in 
the destruct i on o
f the first I iber
ty po l e . Severa l 
sworn 
statements appear
ed i n the Ba l tirro
re Da il y I nte l I i g
encer 
of October 7 , 179
4 , and the vlashin
gton Spy of Octob
er 1 1794 
attest i ng to Sp: i
gg ' s ac: i ons dur i
ng the r i ots . He
 app~rent l ; 
counse ll ed caut i o
n , fearing that h
i s mili t i a forces 
were out 
numbered by the r
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